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A central ambition of science education reform is to help students develop 
abilities for scientific inquiry.  Education research is thus rightly focused on defining 
what constitutes “inquiry” and developing tools for assessing it.  There has been progress 
with respect to particular aspects of inquiry, namely student abilities for controlled 
experimentation and scientific argumentation.  However, we suggest that in addition to 
these frameworks for assessing the structure of inquiry we need frameworks for 
analyzing the substance of that inquiry.   
In this work we draw attention to and evaluate the substance of student 
mechanistic reasoning.  Both within the history and philosophy of science and within 
science education research, scientific inquiry is characterized in part as understanding the 
causal mechanisms that underlie natural phenomena. The challenge for science education, 
however, is that there has not been the same progress with respect to making explicit 
  
what constitutes mechanistic reasoning as there has been in making explicit other aspects 
of inquiry.   
This dissertation attempts to address this challenge.  We adapt an account of 
mechanism in professional research science to develop a framework for reliably 
recognizing mechanistic reasoning in student discourse. The coding scheme articulates 
seven specific aspects of mechanistic reasoning and can be used to systematically analyze 
narrative data for patterns in student thinking.  It provides a tool for detecting quality 
reasoning that may be overlooked by more traditional assessments.  
We apply the mechanism coding scheme to video and written data from a range of 
student inquiries, from large group discussions among first grade students to the 
individual problem solving of graduate students.  While the primary result of this work is 
the coding scheme itself and the finding that it provides a reliable means of analyzing 
transcript data for evidence of mechanistic thinking, the rich descriptions we develop in 
each case study help us recognize continuity between graduate level learning and 
elementary school science: part of what students are able to do in elementary school finds 
its way to graduate school.  Thus this work makes it possible for researchers, curriculum 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Motivation 
Introduction 
Einstein said “the whole of science is nothing more than a refinement of everyday 
thinking.”  Similarly, extensive cognitive-historical analysis of episodes of discovery in 
the work of scientists such as Faraday and Maxwell has led Nersessian, a philosopher of 
science, to argue that “the problem solving strategies scientists have invented… over the 
course of the history of science are very sophisticated and refined outgrowths of ordinary 
reasoning” (Nersessian, 1992, p. 2).   Science does not lie in the terminology, laws, and 
equations commonly memorized by students or written in textbooks.  Instead, doing and 
learning science requires a “thinking as basic” stance (Greeno, 1992).  Greeno argues 
that:  
 
Significant mathematical and scientific thinking is done by children, and that the 
task of school learning should primarily be to strengthen and refine those 
capabilities, rather than primarily providing knowledge of terms and procedures 
that are thought to be the materials on which thinking is based. (p. 41) 
 
In this view, the role of the teacher is not to give students terms and laws to learn but 
rather to recognize the good thinking that students are already doing and provide 
opportunities for them refine it into something productive for scientific understanding.  
Such a view is congruent with the traditional constructivist paradigm of education: 
teachers should be able to identify fruitful seeds and use them to build students’ science 
knowledge.  Einstein suggests and Greeno proposes that those fruitful seeds are abilities 





specifically, do these fruitful seeds look like in the classroom?  What sorts of things can 
educators expect, or hope, to see when their students are engaged in “good” scientific 
thinking?  
Some professional educators already have insight into these questions.  Teachers 
and educational researchers who spend their careers listening and responding to student 
thinking develop intuitions about when students are doing well and when they are not.  
They observe students engaged in a discussion and recognize thinking that is valuable for 
science learning.  Practicing research scientists may also be able to identify moments 
when students are being especially “scientific.”  Consider the following example from an 
interview by Chin and Brown (2000) in which an eighth grade student describes why salt 
water has a higher boiling point than fresh water. 
 
Rick:  Salt in it… makes the water thicker.  And it kind of took more heat to melt 
the water that had salt in it…  It [salt] kind of fills up a lot of empty spaces 
between the [water] molecules.  And so the heat couldn’t pass through it 
as fast as it did through the plain water.  So it had to add more heat to 
break through the salt particles and heat up the water. (p. 122) 
 
Even though Rick’s explanation is not correct, we may find consensus that he is doing 
something valuable.  Our agreement relies on a shared intuitive sense of what “good” 
scientific thinking looks like.  In particular, Rick gives a causal story that accounts for his 
observations about heating salt water.  Describing underlying causes and effects for 
natural phenomena is one characteristic of scientific practice and is thus something we 





descriptions valuable for science is a more sophisticated problem than our intuitions can 
reliably answer. 
Even if we were not always able to articulate the specific kind of thinking we 
want to see students doing, being able to consistently identify it would be helpful.  
Unfortunately, while the above example may be clear to many science educators, there 
are other examples that would be controversial even within this community.  Consider the 
following explanation given by a student in an introductory physics course for why 
rubbing our hands together doesn’t produce static electricity. 
 
John:   Because there’s so much moisture in the air and it’s [our hands] a 
conductor so… Because it’s, it’s a conductor so like it’s not going to let 
charge build on your hands because it’s a conductor so [charge] can easily 
jump off and disappear.  Before it actually builds up enough so that you’d 
see a spark. 
 
This explanation is more difficult to assess than the first one.  Is the student engaged in 
“good” scientific thinking?  Which seeds of productive reasoning are shown and which 
are absent?  He uses the term “conductor” - vocabulary typically associated with 
electrostatics – in his description of why our hands don’t produce a spark and he attempts 
to connect properties of a conductor to the observed phenomenon.  It is unclear whether 
he has developed a coherent connection between the cause (‘conductor-ism’) and the 
effect (lack of sparks).  Even with well-developed classroom intuitions, it is difficult to 
distinguish whether John is thinking well about the wrong ideas (in which case his 
thinking need not be refined) or whether the thinking itself is inappropriate or ineffective 





 Our attempt to assess John’s explanation indicates that it may be especially 
difficult to identify the beginnings of scientific thinking, when our understanding of what 
we are looking for is at the level of “we know it when we see it.”  In order to reliably 
recognize and promote the fruitful seeds of scientific thinking in the classroom, we need 
to make these intuitions about when students are doing well more explicit.  There are two 
pedagogical reasons for this need.  First, those who do not share our intuition may find 
the above assessments inaccessible; it may be difficult for them to identify this type of 
reasoning as mechanistic.  Second, we must be able to state clearly and precisely what 
“good” reasoning looks like so that others, including our students, are aware of our 
expectations and can agree with or challenge them.  There are also ways in which making 
intuitions explicit will aid research.  Doing so will support systematic analysis of 
narrative data that may help discover patterns in student thinking.  Without a robust 
framework for identifying nascent versions of scientific thinking, researchers may not 
know what curricular elements will promote them, educators may not know how to refine 
or evaluate them, and students may not know when and how to use them. 
Theoretical Framework 
 As educators, we constantly use information about what we see students doing to 
make decisions about what is happening in their minds.  For example, in assessing Rick 
and John’s comments above (or grading a written exam question), we take what students 
say as evidence of what they understand.  To draw a parallel to traditional physics 
research, our theory of student thinking is grounded in our evidence of that thinking just 
as the theory about the wave nature of light is grounded in evidence such as Young’s 





and promote as valuable student contributions to science discussions is constrained by 
our ideas about what students can or cannot do and how they can or cannot think.  That 
is, how we conceive of what is going on in Rick and John’s mind affects our 
interpretation and assessment of their comments.  So although this work concerns the 
phenomenology of student thinking: what we see students doing or saying, it is grounded 
in and influenced by a particular ontology of mind: what cognitive structures we attribute 
to students’ minds that give rise to what they say and do in science classrooms.   
Much current science education research considers student knowledge in terms of 
the conceptions (mis-conceptions, pre-conceptions, alternative conceptions) that they 
have about certain science topics.  In this view of knowledge, researchers attribute 
students with stable units of cognition for particular areas of thought that always govern 
how the student thinks about a set of circumstances (Hammer, 2004).  Some central 
(perhaps tacit) assumptions of this perspective include the idea that these conceptions are 
the result of prior learning and are so entrenched as to interfere with new learning (Smith, 
diSessa, & Roschelle, 1993).  As such, the role of instruction is to evaluate the 
conceptions for correctness, eradicate or dislodge those that prove to be in conflict with 
canonical knowledge, and replace them with correct conceptions (Hammer, 1996).  An 
appropriate research agenda is then to “examine student data for a wrong but coherent 
way of thinking” (Scherr, accepted, p. 3, emphasis hers) and identify problematic 
conceptions.  We refer to this perspective as unitary (Hammer, 2004). 
 In contrast, the work presented here relies on a view of ontology in which student 
knowledge is composed of diverse smaller pieces, a variety of which might be applied to 





many fine-grained resources [pieces] that may be activated or not in any particular 
context” (Hammer, Elby, Scherr, & Redish, 2005, p. 92).  These pieces of knowledge 
themselves, unlike conceptions, are not intrinsically right or wrong; they are, instead, 
appropriately or inappropriately applied to a given situation.  In this view, the role of 
instruction is not to rid students of their wrong ideas but to help students select, evaluate, 
and refine which of their existing resources are productive in which cases.  Research is 
then designed to examine student data for appropriately applied resources as well as 
“potentially useful, but inappropriately applied ideas that could account for student 
responses” (Scherr, accepted, p. 3, emphasis hers) to identify valuable candidates for 
future reasoning.  We refer to this perspective as manifold (Hammer, 2004). 
 The differing instructional implications of these two theoretical viewpoints are 
best shown with an example.  Hammer (1996) describes a conversation from a non-
calculus based high school physics course in which students are discussing whether a ball 
rolling on a level surface will keep moving at constant velocity.   
 
Bruce:  If there is no gravity and no friction, and there is a force that’s 
making it move, it’s just going to go in a straight line at constant 
speed… What’s making the ball move? 
 Amelia: The forces behind it. 
 … 
 Steve:  The force that’s pushing it. (p. 1317) 
 
 We will first examine this episode from the unitary perspective.  These students 
have the misconception that a force is required to make objects move; Bruce questions 





and Amelia and Steve both claim that there some force behind the ball pushing it.  Their 
“explanation is assumed to stem from a ‘pre-compiled’ knowledge that is simply wrong” 
(Hammer et al., 2005, p. 95).  This wrong idea that motion is caused by force hinders 
these students’ ability to understand Newtonian mechanics and must be overcome before 
more instruction can occur (Hammer, 1996).  For an instructor with this view, helping 
these students gain correct science knowledge would involve either explicitly showing 
them evidence of or providing theoretical arguments for force not causing motion – 
perhaps using an air track table to show a hockey puck sliding long distances in low 
friction.  Either way, after students discovered that force does not cause (constant) motion 
the teacher could then present the idea that force causes acceleration. 
 From the manifold perspective, these students have perhaps activated a more 
general piece of knowledge about maintaining agency (Hammer, 1996).  While 
inappropriate in this case, there are many situations in which the idea that an effect 
continues when maintained by a cause applies; for example “an engine maintains the 
motion of a car” (Hammer, 1996, p. 1319).  The idea of maintaining agency is not wrong: 
it is just not relevant to objects moving on tables at constant speed.  An instructor would 
not want to eliminate the idea of maintaining agency because it can be usefully applied in 
other situations – such as in understanding momentum (Hammer, 1996).  Instead, they 
would want to activate another more appropriate resource.  These students no doubt have 
experience with actuating agency in which an effect outlasts it cause; for example “the 
strike of a hammer causes a bell to ring” (Hammer, 1996, p. 1319).  For an instructor 
with a manifold view, helping these students understand inertia would involve helping 





resources – possibly by drawing students’ attention to the push that started the ball rolling 
and contrasting that to the time when it keeps rolling at constant velocity.  In contrast to a 
unitary instructor who might focus on how to eliminate wrong ideas, one with a manifold 
view would helps students adapt and apply their existing intuitive knowledge to so that it 
is more productive in the particular context (Hammer, 1996).   
 A particular ontology of mind – either unitary or manifold - can influence our 
understanding of student reasoning as well as of student conceptual knowledge.  Those 
with a unitary model of learning may perceive students as either having or lacking 
general reasoning abilities just as they can have or lack knowledge elements (Hammer, 
1996).  Such a view may grow out of Piagetian developmental stage research where 
students progress through several “stable, equilibrated stages” (Hammer, 2004, p. 325).  
The manifold view in contrast argues for thinking of students as having finer-grained 
resources for reasoning skills.  In practice, this perspective translates into not assuming 
that how a student reasons in one particular context at one particular time represents the 
entirety of his or her abilities.  For example, although students may engage in concrete 
thinking in one situation they may also be capable of extremely abstract and sophisticated 
reasoning in others.  Classrooms then become venues to “draw out and support ways of 
thinking and talking that are, in general, productive for physical science” (Hammer, 2004, 
p. 336).   
 The present work is grounded in a manifold ontology of mind; that is, we expect 
student reasoning to be variable.  This theoretical framework affects our interpretation of 






Many of us who are physics instructors and physics education researchers use 
either the pieces [manifold] model or the misconceptions model to inform our 
instructional and research agendas (perhaps implicitly).  We necessarily see our 
students through a theoretical lens that shapes our interpretations. (p. 11) 
 
We do not assume that an observation that a student is not engaged in sophisticated 
scientific thinking at one time means they are incapable of such reasoning; John might 
reason in a more obviously productive way in other conversations than he did when 
talking about electrostatics.  Nor does seeing students reasoning well in one instance 
mean they will always do so; Rick might not have developed such a scientific explanation 
in his classroom as he did in his interview.  As a result, this work describes the 
possibilities of student thinking - what they can (but might not always) do in science 
classrooms.  By explicitly characterizing these possibilities, we as educators are better 
prepared to recognize and promote them so that they become the norm. 
Themes of the Dissertation 
This work is devoted to recognizing the conversations that occur when students 
are using productive resources for thinking about science.  This goal translates to 
providing some answers to the questions posed casually in the introduction: What do the 
fruitful seeds (resources) of scientific thinking look like?  And what should educators 
expect to see when their students are engaged in “good” scientific thinking?    
We attempt to make progress in answering these questions along one dimension 
of scientific thinking: reasoning about causal mechanisms for phenomena as one fruitful 
seed of scientific thinking ability.  There is good reason to suspect that such thinking, 





p. 13), is valuable for science.  Within the history and philosophy of science, the 
“scientific revolution” that gave rise to modern science as it is practiced today has been 
characterized as a shift from “occult” to causal mechanistic accounts of the natural world 
(Shapin, 1996; Teeter Dobbs & Jacob, 1995; Westfall, 1986). Mechanistic thinking is 
now firmly established as inherent in the values and practices of science (Kuhn, 1977; 
Nersessian, 1992; Salmon, 1978; Teeter Dobbs & Jacob, 1995).  
Given its prevalence in the values and practices of professional science, assessing 
student scientific reasoning should include assessments of when and how students seek 
causal mechanism in their understanding.  We explore science discussions centered on 
students’ “very rich starter-set of resources for understanding physical cause and effect” 
that are the building blocks for constructing mechanistic descriptions for phenomena 
(Hammer, 2004, p. 337).  In order to help educators recognize these kinds of productive 
conversations, we articulate an explicit characterization of mechanistic reasoning that is 
not limited to intuitive assessment of “goodness.”  The framework, developed from 
philosophy of science research (predominantly Machamer, Darden, and Craver, 2000), 
describes seven aspects of reasoning that students may engage in during their attempts to 
construct mechanistic explanations for phenomena.  While doing any of them alone does 
not constitute complete mechanistic reasoning, used together they allow students to make 
substantial progress in understanding physical phenomena.  This framework describes the 
components of mechanistic reasoning so as to make it more easily identifiable for 
instructors and researchers wanting to recognize and promote nascent or incomplete 





The framework not only helps reliably identify causal mechanistic reasoning but 
also provides an analysis technique for understanding the dynamics and value of student 
science discussions.  Our purpose in this work is both to describe the framework as a tool 
for detecting quality reasoning and to illustrate its use in several lines of study.  We 
present a range of case studies from first grade to college courses and small group work 
to large teacher-led discussions.  When taken together, these studies demonstrate the 
value of the coding scheme as a lens for assessing student inquiry across all levels of 
classroom science.  In doing so, the mechanism framework allows us to think about the 
kinds of progress students can make in understanding science.   
The analysis also challenges assumptions about science learning by revealing 
abilities that may be overlooked by more traditional assessments. While developmental 
stage models of reasoning skills might take a lack of student sophistication at one 
moment to indicate an overall lack of ability, analyzing student thinking using the 
mechanism coding scheme shows that students often transition quickly and fluidly 
between the least and most sophisticated aspects of mechanistic thinking (chapter four).  
Traditional conceptual assessments may underestimate the value of student conversations 
in which the correct canonical knowledge is not discussed; mechanism coding shows that 
students can be engaged in sophisticated mechanistic reasoning regardless of whether the 
concepts themselves are correct (chapter five).  The view that school science ought to 
consist predominantly of conducting and analyzing formal empirical investigations 
undervalues students reasoning in a productive way about informal, anecdotal evidence 
(chapter six) – reasoning that can be identified with the mechanism coding.  While many 





mathematical, analysis of upper level student work using the mechanism framework 
reveals the crucial and often unacknowledged role mechanistic reasoning plays in solving 
problems (chapter seven).  This work provides a lens for finding aspects of student 
reasoning that are intuitively valuable for science but are obscured by more traditional 
measures. 
Chapter Review 
Chapter Two: The Case for Attending to Mechanistic Reasoning in Student 
Inquiry 
The following chapter provides a of review existing research on student thinking 
and learning during inquiry.  We argue that the conceptions of inquiry heralded by much 
of this literature, while valuable in many ways, have two major weaknesses:  they are 
disconnected from the kinds of thinking that students engage in naturally in the everyday 
world, and they rely on incomplete and distorted views of professional science.  We 
outline literature that supports these claims, specifically work that suggests the inclusion 
of mechanistic reasoning in inquiry as a remedy for these problems.  Finally, we describe 
the strengths of conceiving of inquiry as largely including mechanistic reasoning and the 
limitations of current characterizations of mechanism that the present work is designed to 
overcome. 
Chapter Three: Methodology of Developing and Using the Mechanism 
Framework 
This chapter begins by reviewing the general literature from the philosophy of 





work by Machamer, Darden, and Craver (MDC) which serves as the basis for this 
dissertation research.  We present an initial attempt to use MDC’s mechanism language 
to analyze student reasoning from a first grade classroom discussion about whether or not 
seeds can grow in sand.  We then explain the development of a more systematic 
framework that is used throughout the rest of the work to reliably identify and track 
student mechanistic reasoning in nascent science.  We describe the coding scheme in 
detail including its stages of revision and then provide examples from science discussions 
to illustrate its use.  Finally, we discuss the methodology employed to analyze student 
thinking during inquiry with this framework. 
Chapter Four: Mechanistic Reasoning in Young Children 
This chapter presents the first of four case studies that provide phenomenological 
evidence of student mechanistic reasoning and demonstrate the usefulness of the 
framework for recognizing and tracking it.  Analysis of a transcript from a student 
discussion among first graders about the rate of falling objects confirms that the 
framework matches intuitive interpretations of the quality of student thinking.  This data 
also shows that the framework developed from accounts of professional science identifies 
corresponding mechanistic reasoning in first-graders, and so identifies the beginnings of 
science in children’s thinking as they move fluidly between various levels of mechanistic 
sophistication.  By applying the coding scheme, we gain insight into the dynamics of the 
discussion and identify several points of transition in their mechanistic reasoning that 





Chapter Five: Mechanistic Reasoning Independent of Correctness 
In this chapter, analysis of a discussion from a second grade science classroom 
about why empty juice boxes collapse when you suck on their straws helps challenge the 
assumption that inquiry is best evaluated by how well student conceptual understanding 
aligns with canonical knowledge.  We find that assessments of content can misrepresent 
and obscure the quality of student inquiry; students who give the wrong answer have 
mechanistic explanations equivalent in sophistication to students with the right answer.  
This analysis first shows the value of the coding scheme for analyzing reasoning in itself 
as distinct from the concepts.  Second, it calls into question whether conceptual 
correctness is always the appropriate instructional target for K – 16 science classrooms.  
Chapter Six: Mechanistic Reasoning with Informal Empirical Evidence 
The case study analyzed in this chapter comes from an introductory college 
physics course and differs from traditional conceptions of inquiry that focus on controlled 
experimentation.  During a small group discussion, students make qualitative 
observations and draw on their prior experiences to develop a model of static electricity.  
The mechanism framework is used to describe several ways their experiential and 
anecdotal evidence supports their construction of a mechanistic explanation even though 
that evidence is not produced by formal investigations.  We show several different 
manifestations of the cyclic relationship between mechanistic reasoning and informal 
results where each one informs the other.  We describe the strengths and weaknesses of 





Chapter Seven: Mechanistic Reasoning with Mathematics in Graduate Level 
Physics 
The final analysis chapter centers on upper level physics students’ solutions to a 
classical mechanics problem on a PhD qualifying exam.  Using both written data and 
interviews, we show that advanced students use mechanistic reasoning to supplement 
mathematical formalism in problem solving and that they use mathematics to express 
their sense of mechanism.  Another important result of this analysis is that the coding 
scheme developed from characterizations of professional bioscientists and successfully 
applied to elementary science and introductory physics can give insight into what 
mechanistic reasoning might look like in upper level physics.  The value of mechanistic 
reasoning is not limited to use in introductory or conceptual physics topics, it is part of 
the fabric of graduate (even expert) physics understanding.  
Chapter Eight:  Reflections on Current Work and Directions for Future Research 
 This chapter summarizes the work of this dissertation.  We describe both its 
motivating assumptions about student learning and the implications of the case studies for 
science education research and practice.   We then step back from the specifics of each 
case study and reflect on the “bigger picture” of the research.  Finally, we suggest that an 
appropriate avenue for future research involves studying the ontology that gives rise to 





Chapter 2: The Case for Attending to Mechanistic Reasoning in Student 
Inquiry 
Introduction 
 The discussion of what types of thinking and learning are productive for science 
is both fervent and long-standing.  It has become common for educators to use the term 
inquiry in describing the kinds of things that should happen in science classrooms.  
Research on student scientific inquiry spans several academic cultures – from science 
education to educational psychology to cognitive science to subject-matter disciplines.   
Despite its diversity of origin, much of this research shares a common conception of 
inquiry: it equates inquiry, either tacitly or explicitly, with formal empirical investigation.   
Educational literature suggests mechanistic reasoning is an additional, perhaps 
more essential feature of inquiry that maintains the strengths of controlled 
experimentation and avoids its weaknesses.  However, that literature is limited in that its 
characterizations of mechanistic reasoning are imprecise and rely on abstract notions of 
causality.  The rest of this dissertation constructs a framework for analyzing inquiry that 
overcomes the limitations of current characterizations of mechanism. 
Inquiry in Science Education  
The word “inquiry” is used extensively in literature on the teaching and learning 
of science.  Several decades of reform in science education that have encouraged a shift 
from teaching students a body of canonical conceptual knowledge to also helping them 





most prominent early educational reformers to suggest the value of teaching through and 
learning about scientific inquiry (NRC, 1996).  More recently the National Science 
Education Standards, which serve as a guideline for K-12 science education in this 
country, claim that “inquiry is central to science learning” and have thus called for 
“changing emphases to promote inquiry” (NRC, 1996, p. 2 & 113).  The National 
Research Council published an Inquiry Supplement to these Standards that not only 
provides detailed examples of inquiry but also uses current educational research to 
outline why inquiry is a valuable part of science classrooms (NRC, 2000).  Within the 
discipline of physics, research-based curricular materials for post-secondary students 
(including undergraduates and pre/inservice teachers) focus on using inquiry to develop a 
more complete understanding of traditional introductory physics concepts (e.g. 
McDermott et al., 1996).  Even for the more general population, the AAAS Benchmarks 
for Science Literacy (1990) and Science for All Americans (1993) emphasize that an 
understanding of scientific inquiry is central to an understanding the nature of science.  
The literature on inquiry is extensive and the work of educators, curriculum developers, 
and researchers all reflects a commitment to having inquiry as a vital part of science 
learning.   
Current Conception of Inquiry: Formal Empirical Investigation 
The challenge in achieving this ambition has been in defining inquiry and what it 
should look like in the classroom. Within the science education literature there are many 
descriptions of the kinds of things students should be doing during scientific inquiry.  
These characterizations share the assumption, either explicitly or implicitly, that the most 





Designing and Conducting Controlled Experiments 
Within the current practices of education, the ideal of scientific inquiry that is 
enacted is a highly empirical one that focuses on students’ abilities to design and conduct 
controlled experiments.  Science standards promote formal investigations in which 
students ask testable questions and negotiate among dependent, independent, and 
controlling variables during data collection (e.g. AAAS, 1993; MCPS, 2001; MSCS, 
2000; NRC, 1996).  “Full” inquiry is characterized for the various grade levels as: 
 
K - 4: students "asking a simple question, completing an investigation, answering 
the question, and presenting the results to others" (NRC, 2000, p. 122)  
 
5 - 8: students "begin with a testable question, design an investigation, gather 
evidence, formulate an answer to the original question, and communicate the 
investigative process and results" (NRC, 2000, p. 143) 
 
9 - 12: students identify questions for investigation based on prior knowledge, 
design and conduct those investigations, analyze evidence and data to formulate 
explanations, and communicate their arguments and respond to those of others 
(NRC, 2000) 
 
Maryland state standards for scientific inquiry focus on students' abilities to pose 
answerable questions with testable hypotheses, conduct "well-designed procedures" for 
appropriate investigations (including proper control and safety procedures), analyze data 
using mathematical tools, and communicate their findings (MSCS, 2000).  In these 
standards for inquiry, science learning proceeds by performing formal investigations and 





Literature from science education research on student inquiry similarly shares the 
assumption that the primary abilities of inquiry are designing and conducting formal 
investigations whose data analysis will help in developing explanations.  Chinn and 
Malhotra's (2002) evaluation of school inquiry tasks defines features of 
“epistemologically authentic inquiry.”  They claim that the cognitive processes used 
during authentic inquiry include generating research questions, designing studies by 
selecting and controlling variables, explaining empirical results, and developing theories 
from results and other outside knowledge.  In describing the ThinkerTools Inquiry 
Curriculum, White and Frederiksen (1998) explicitly state their view of inquiry expertise 
as movement through the Inquiry Cycle consisting of formulating a "well-formed, 
investigatable research question," generating "alternative, competing hypotheses and 
predictions," designing and carrying out real and virtual experiments, analyzing data to 
construct models, and applying models to new situations to help generate new questions 
(p. 10).  Roth and Roychoundury's (1993) study of student development of process skills 
relies on the notion that "identifying variables, interpreting data, hypothesizing, defining, 
and experimenting" are the most valuable "higher-order" abilities of scientific inquiry (p. 
148).  On Lawson’s widely-used multiple-choice diagnostic of scientific reasoning skills, 
eleven of the twenty-four questions probe student abilities to design or explain the results 
from valid experiments (Coletta & Phillips, 2005).  The following question from the test 







 Figure 1 
A pattern begins to emerge in conceptions of inquiry held by this literature.  As in the 
standards, evaluating scientific inquiry involves evaluating student abilities to design, 
conduct, and interpret empirical investigations.  
Researcher conceptions of inquiry can not only be identified from explicit 
statements like those given above, but also inferred from the context of their studies on 
scientific inquiry.  Much science education research is conducted in what its authors 
describe as "inquiry" settings.  Their choice of these settings represents their tacit views 
about the definition of inquiry.  For example, Sandoval and Morrison's (2003) work on 
biological theory change tracks student learning during an “inquiry unit” in which 
students pose and investigate questions, then use empirical (computer-simulated) data to 
support their claims.  Elder’s (2002) research into fifth graders’ epistemological beliefs 
takes place within an “inquiry model of learning” where students “manipulate equipment 
and materials, conduct experiments, and generate questions for further inquiry” (p. 351).  
Schauble (1996) purposefully designed her study of scientific reasoning to occur in a 







Scientists often design experiments to try to find out what makes a difference and 
what doesn't make a difference in how things work.  This week you are going to 
work like a scientist... To find out which features [of the system] do and do not 
make a difference in [the outcome] you can do some experiments with this 
system. (p. 106, emphasis mine) 
 
These are but a few examples of a common trend.  For a wide variety of topics within the 
science education literature, researchers conduct their work in “inquiry settings” that 
involve formal empirical investigations, thus revealing their underlying assumptions 
about what inquiry is. 
Interpreting Controlled Experiments 
Other literature on scientific inquiry focuses not on abilities to conduct formal 
experiments but on abilities for interpreting experiments by accepting or rejecting 
hypotheses based on purposefully accumulated empirical results.  D. Kuhn's work (1989) 
on coordination of evidence and theory describes the difficulties children exhibit in 
drawing appropriate conclusions about causality from empirical data.  To probe student 
abilities for evaluating evidence, Kuhn asked them to decide based on covariation data 
which of several variables “made a difference” in the outcome of a situation.  She found, 
for example, that students did not make claims that agreed with evidence about whether 
the size, color, or texture of balls affected the quality of a serve.  Instead, students relied 
on self-constructed theories about what variables might or might not affect outcome.  In 
Kunn’s estimation, the students demonstrated various “weaknesses in reasoning” (p. 683) 





the stance that theory “colors” valid evidence interpretation in her other studies on 
scientific reasoning.  In her review of a larger body of Kuhn’s work, Koslowski (1996) 
notices the following trends: 
 
  One is that Kuhn et al. treat theory or mechanism information as being quite 
distinct from, and inferior to, evidence that consists of covariation.  The other is 
that Kuhn et al. treat subjects’ reliance on theory to evaluate data as an example of 
flawed reasoning; it is citing covariation information that is treated as good 
thinking. (p. 35) 
 
In Kuhn’s heavily-cited work (the 1989 article alone is cited by 149 authors), 
experimental evidence is given precedence over theoretical ideas and is seen as the 
arbiter of ‘correct’ scientific knowledge. 
Value of Formal Empirical Investigation 
Conceptions of inquiry that center on controlled experimentation attempt to 
capture a portion of the processes of science rather than focusing solely on the products 
of those processes.  An explicit goal of the National Science Education Standards' focus 
on inquiry is to place “as much, if not more, emphasis on learning the processes of 
science as on mastering the subject matter of science alone” (NRC, 2000, p. 16).  These 
characterizations of inquiry have the potential to send students the message that science 
does not consist of a collection of facts that must be memorized but also (and perhaps 
largely) of the activities by which that knowledge came to be produced and accepted.  In 





the nature of science than those that treat science as an inert set of hard-and-fast rules 
about the natural world.   
Another value of functionally defining inquiry as formal experimentation is that 
the resulting empirical data provides support for new knowledge claims.   Within the 
science education literature, there has been significant focus on scientific argumentation 
and the use of empirical data to construct sound arguments (e.g. Driver, Newton, & 
Osborne, 2000; Kuhn, 1989).  Driver, Newton, and Osborne (2000) suggest that inquiry 
should include opportunities for students to generate well-supported claims and respond 
to counter-arguments because argumentation is a “core activity of scientists” (p. 287).  
They further note that within the professional scientific community, “scientists hold a 
central commitment to evidence as the ultimate arbiter between competing theories.” 
(Driver et al., 2000, p. 296)  Kuhn’s work (1989) on the coordination of theory and 
evidence also describes the value of empirical results for deciding among theoretical 
claims: 
 
A central premise underlying science is that scientific theories stand in relation to 
actual or potential bodies of evidence against which they can be evaluated.  (p. 
674) 
 
These authors point out that controlled experimentation is necessary for science because 
it allows scientists (and students) to test the predictions of a theory and thus assess its 
accuracy, scope, and relevance.  Experiments are one method by which scientists judge 





In this work we contend that while empirical results do provide necessary support 
for new theories, they are not the only appropriate information to use in arguing for or 
against rival accounts.  Literature on inquiry that heralds formal experimentation draws 
attention to only one of the means of justification for scientific argumentation.  
Limitations of Formal Empirical Investigation 
Formal empirical investigation risks conflating covariation with causation 
A strictly empirical definition of inquiry carries with it the danger of mistaking 
covariational relationships for causal ones.  Data from controlled experimentation only 
provides evidence about regularity and covariation among variables; even the best-
designed experiments only answer questions such as “Does Y change when X and only X 
is changed?”  During the formal investigations described in the literature, students are 
encouraged to collect and analyze data using appropriate mathematical tools and then use 
this information about the covariation relationship to draw conclusions about the causal 
connection between the variables. Koslowski (1996) describes this trend in education 
research and curriculum development as one in which “causation was operationalized in 
Humean terms, as being equivalent to covariation” (p. 20).  There is little within the 
literature on student or scientist reasoning to support a covariational view of causal 
understanding.    
Formal empirical investigation is not natural for laypeople or students 
  Inquiry that relies on formal empirical investigations to provide the sole basis for 
new understandings presents an activity disconnected from students’ natural abilities.  





laypeople naturally use when reasoning about novel causal situations.  This literature 
presents the case for the “ecological validity” of a focus on theoretical mechanism by 
describing “what people do most often, most typically, or perhaps, most naturally” during 
causal reasoning (Ahn & Kalish, 2000, p. 199).  Ahn, Kalish, Medlin, and Gelman (1995) 
performed a series of experiments to identify what information people request when they 
are asked to make causal attributions about everyday situations (e.g. “The musician 
learned to play chess last summer” (p. 342)).  They found that in order to make causal 
attributions, people requested “non-ANOVA” information that would help them 
understand how a particular mechanism acted in the target event, and not how the 
situation fit into a pattern of covariation data.  For example, in trying to decide the cause 
for “Dave would not eat rabbit meat on this occasion.” people ask “Did he [Dave] have a 
toothache?” more often than “Does Dave usually eat rabbits?” (Ahn et al., 1995, p. 315 & 
314)  Similarly, people’s explanations for those events are more commonly mechanistic.  
Ahn et al. found that   
 
people do not spontaneously seek out information about covariation between 
factors and effects, nor do they seem to use such information when it is provided.  
The preferred strategy seems to be to gather further facts about the particular 
event to be explained: facts that are used to test hypotheses about possible 
underlying mechanisms. (p. 336) 
 
They offer a possible explanation for the prevalence of this strategy; “Although 
covariation information allows us to identify a factor, we do not know the nature of the 
connection between the factor and effect [which the mechanism provides]” (Ahn et al., 





children and adults use information about generative transmission (i.e. mechanism) in 
making causal judgments about both familiar and unfamiliar situations (sound generated 
by tuning forks, wind generated by electric fans, light generated by flashlights).  His 
interview subjects ranged in age from 3 years to adulthood and came from both Western 
and traditional African cultures.  He found that all levels of observers most often 
“interpret physical causation primarily in terms of the concept of generative transmission 
[mechanism] rather than in terms of other well-known rules such as covariation, 
similarity, and temporal and spatial contiguity” (p. Abstract).  Koslowski, Okagaki, 
Lorenz, and Umbach (1989) studied the interaction of mechanism, sample size, sampling 
method, and covariation information in students’ causal attribution.  Subjects were 
presented with a story problem about a common event, for example: 
 
There is a new gas station in town that sells two types of gasoline, one that is 
regular and one that has a special additive designed to cover up the odor.  Larry 
wants to find out if using the gasoline with the special additive has something to 
do with making cars get worse gas mileage. (p. 1325) 
 
The subjects were then given four pieces of information about how Larry went about 
investigating the problem.  They were told Larry’s “way of finding out:” sampling 
method – direct intervention or natural occurrence, “amount of evidence:” sample size – 
small or large, “additional information:” mechanism – present, ruled out, or none 
available, and “results:” covariation – present or absent (Koslowski et al., 1989, p. 1325).  
From this information, subjects were asked to judge how likely it was that the additive 





all the variables and also make the more modest claim that “adults [though not 
necessarily adolescents] do not treat the presence and absence of covariation as definitive 
indices of the respective presence and absence of causation” but also treat mechanism 
information as evidential (p. 1323).  This literature supports the claim that when 
laypeople attempt to identify causes for events, covariation information does not serve 
the principal role in that attribution.  Instead, they rely on knowledge of underlying (or 
potential) mechanisms that provide the mediating processes between the events.   
There is also evidence that students not only can reason about mechanisms for 
scientific phenomenon but also that they do so spontaneously and from a very young age. 
In analyzing inquiry from elementary school classrooms, Hammer (2004) presents 
several instances of young students discussing physical mechanisms for phenomenon and 
“thinking about the question in ways that drew on their other knowledge and experience” 
(p. 286).  During science discussions about topics ranging from falling objects to 
earthquakes to magnets, students - sometimes spontaneously and sometimes with 
prompting - explained their ideas by appealing to underlying causal mechanisms 
(Hammer & van Zee, 2006).  Kuhn’s (1989) studies on children’s abilities to coordinate 
theory and evidence also revealed their tendency to spontaneously justify causal claims 
with mechanism rather than covariation information.  For example, when presented with 
covariation evidence between types of cake and illness and asked whether the type of 
cake affected sickness, a sixth grader replies: 
 
Peter:  Yes.  Carrot cake is made with carrots, and chocolate cake is made with a 





with less sugar… Less sugar means your blood pressure doesn’t go up.  It 
[type of cake] makes a difference [in whether you get sick]. (p. 676) 
 
Even when expressly and repeatedly pressed to use the provided covariation evidence, 
the student continued to justify his answer with mechanism.  Kuhn found that “subjects 
appeared unwilling to acknowledge the implications of evidence unless they had a 
compatible theory in place that provided an explanation of this evidence” (p. 678).  
Although Kuhn views this reliance on mechanism as a flaw in reasoning, her evidence 
supports the claim that students spontaneously use mechanism information in making 
causal judgments.  Chinn and Brewer’s (1998) study of the factors that influence people’s 
responses to anomalous data reveals the prevalence of considerations of mechanism:  
people may reject the data because it violates an understanding of “how a mechanism 
operates” or because “there is no mechanism that could account for both the present data 
and all of the data for the initial theory” (p. 638). Schauble (1996) also notices this trend 
for students to immediately look for plausible mechanisms to explain their covariation 
results.  When one student came across the surprising covariation between canal depth 
and boat speed she spontaneously constructed a mechanism to explain it: “The only thing 
I can figure out is that the depth of the water would have something to do with the 
buoyancy.  The added water, the depth of the water adds more buoyancy, making the 
boat, you know, sit up higher in the water, which makes it easier for the pulley to pull it 
through” (Schauble, 1996, p. 116).  Similarly, in developing a case for the use of 
Intermediate Causal Models in science instruction, White (1993) describes how students 
who were not given mechanistic models of circuit behavior “spontaneously invented their 





notes that students’ difficulties in reasoning about circuits decreased when they were 
given causal reductionist (mechanistic) explanations for the laws.  
Students can and do naturally make sense of the world around them using 
information about mechanisms.  Defining inquiry in a way that systematically requires 
students to approach science by conducting experiments runs the risk of disengaging the 
spontaneous sense of mechanism they have built from everyday experiences (diSessa, 
1993) in favor of engaging less organic knowledge about the logical structure of 
covariation. 
Formal empirical investigation is not representative of professional science 
Inquiry science learning is partly intended to reflect the practices of professional 
science.  However, by emphasizing procedural techniques for controlling variables and 
analyzing data for covariations, current conceptions of inquiry give an inaccurate 
representation of professional science by demoting the role of mechanistic reasoning.  
Hodson, in his 1988 article Towards a Philosophically More Valid Science Curriculum, 
argues that in current inductivist models of inquiry where theory is derived directly from 
observation, 
 
theories are subordinated to experimentally gathered “facts”…  As a consequence, 
children get an inflated sense of the importance of their “experimental results” 
and a grossly misleading view of the relationship between theory and evidence. 
(p. 26)  
 
In her review of the psychology and education literature on student scientific reasoning, 





experimentation distorts the nature of science by omitting one of its crucial aspects – 
considerations of mechanism.  To support this claim, she cites philosophy literature on 
the nature of scientific reasoning: 
  
 Realists and empiricists alike agree that, in actual practice of causal or scientific 
reasoning, Humean strategies (such as, identifying the cause of a phenomenon by 
finding out what covaries with it) cannot be applied independently of one’s 
knowledge about the phenomenon (including knowledge that, whatever its 
philosophical reconstruction, is represented by scientists as knowledge of 
unobservable causal mechanisms or processes). (p. 9) 
 
The work of scientists cannot accurately be described as relying only on covariation; it 
must also include searching for and using mechanisms to make sense of physical 
phenomena and data.  Mechanistic reasoning, at the very least, accompanies analysis of 
covariation data in scientific inquiry. 
Evidence from accounts of scientific practice strengthens the assertion that the 
role of mechanistic reasoning in inquiry should not be neglected.  The history and 
philosophy of science literature is filled with rich descriptions of historical and current 
scientific practice that depict an activity centered on the search for mechanisms. Westfall 
(1986) focuses on the notion of mechanism in his examination of the construction of 
modern science as it is known today.  He characterizes the 17th century scientific 
revolution as a shift from “occult” to mechanistic accounts of the natural world.  He 
claims that mechanical philosophers such as Galileo, Descartes, and Kepler “conceived 
of nature as a huge machine and sought to explain the hidden mechanisms behind 





scientific revolution in which “proper mechanical accounts of nature were widely 
recognized as the goal and the prize” (p. 30).   In these mechanical accounts: 
 
Everything in the natural world was to be explained with reference to the 
irreducible properties of matter and its states of motion: that was one thing that 
made the interpretation of nature like the interpretation of machines. (Shapin, 
1996, p. 46) 
 
These general trends of the scientific revolution were reflected in the work of individual 
scientists.  Teeter Dobbs and Jacobs (1995) describe the influence of the mechanical 
philosophy on Newton, especially in his early attempts to construct a mechanistic account 
of gravity using “an all-pervasive material medium that served as an agent of change in 
the natural world” (p. 12-13).  Newton’s subsequent decision to abandon this traditional 
mechanical account of inert matter in motion precipitated the reformulation of 
mechanical philosophy to include action-at-a-distance forces (Westfall, 1986).  
Nersessian (1992), who is known for her extensive analysis of scientific discovery 
episodes, characterizes Faraday and Maxwell’s study of electromagnetic fields in part as 
a search for mechanisms.  She highlights Maxwell’s own admission that he derived the 
field equations “by using a method he called ‘physical analogy’ to exploit the powerful 
representational capabilities of continuum mechanics” (Nersessian, 1992, p. 17).  He 
constructed a mechanical electromagnetic medium and used ideas about known 
mechanical phenomena (e.g. wheels turning, fluids moving) to guide his thinking.  These 





philosophy.  Literature from the history of science depicts these explanations as 
fundamental, privileged, and prevalent in scientific practice.  
Contemporary scientific practice continues to value mechanistic reasoning just as 
highly.  Salmon (1978) defines scientific explanation and our sense of what constitutes 
such an explanation in the following way: 
 
It [scientific explanation] provides knowledge of the mechanisms of production 
and propagation of structure in the world.  That goes some distance beyond mere 
recognition of regularities, and the possibility of subsuming particular phenomena 
there under.  It is my view that knowledge of the mechanisms of production and 
propagation of structure in the world yields scientific understanding, and that this 
is what we seek when we pose explanation-seeking why questions. (p. 701) 
 
In the biological sciences, philosophers have studied the structure and nature of 
mechanisms precisely because of the key role mechanisms play in explaining and 
understanding the world (e.g. Bechtel & Richardson, 1993; Glennan, 1996; Machamer, 
Darden, & Craver (MDC), 2000; Tabery, 2004).  Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000), 
whose work serves as the basis for much of this thesis, support their interest in 
mechanisms by noting that 
 
 in many fields of science what is taken to be a satisfactory explanation requires 
providing a description of a mechanism.  So it is not surprising that much of the 
practice of science can be understood in terms of the discovery and description of 






Tabery’s (2000) attention to mechanism is similarly grounded in the claim that “the 
search for and discovery of mechanisms in science abounds” and “what is taken to be a 
causal explanation [in science] often consists of the description of a mechanism” (p. 1).  
Glennan (1996) argues that mechanisms function as the basis for all causal understanding 
and that “all but the most fundamental laws of physics can be explained by reference to 
mechanisms” (p. 49).  Both Nersessian’s study (1992) of physicists and Dunbar’s study 
(1995) of geneticists suggest that analogies continue to play a part in how scientists think 
precisely because they give scientists access to more familiar mechanisms.  Beyond 
discussions from the philosophy of science, there is evidence that real scientists attend to 
mechanism in their research.  A quick literature search reveals that within the year 2005 
alone, there were 333 articles in Science and 1677 articles in all the APS Physical Review 
journals with the word “mechanism” in the title or abstracts (search modified from MDC, 
2000, p. 2).  For scientists in many fields of research, adequate explanations for natural 
phenomena require the identification and description of the underlying mechanisms at 
work.   
 Current conceptions of inquiry either altogether neglect mechanistic reasoning or 
relegate it to the job of interpreting of empirical results.  However, the practices of 
science value reasoning about mechanism in and of itself.  Literature from the history and 
philosophy of science gives reason to suspect that the search for mechanisms constitutes 
the central aim of scientific research.   
 If anything, empirical investigations occur in the service of that search for a 
mechanistic explanation and not vice-versa.  In focusing heavily on formal controlled 





Formal empirical investigation leaves out hypothesis generation  
Empirical investigations in school science often involve performing experiments 
in which the question, hypothesis, and relevant variables are already known or easily 
found.  Characterizing inquiry as that kind of experiments distorts the nature of science 
by placing undue importance on hypothesis testing, at the expense of hypothesis 
generation.  Professional scientists, however, often spend an extensive amount of time in 
hypothesis generation. One key means of identifying hypotheses involves using 
knowledge about mechanisms of physical change to develop theories or questions that 
may later be formalized by investigations.  Students and scientists develop that 
knowledge of causal mechanisms through their experiences (both informal and formal) 
with the natural world (diSessa, 1993).  In science, it is often necessary to take time to 
consider everyday phenomena and their underlying mechanisms in order to generate 
hypotheses to test. 
Imagine a simple example from an introductory physics class where students are 
investigating pendulum motion.  It is in thinking about what causes the pendulum to 
swing (namely gravity and the string) that students might reasonably decide to test the 
effect of mass and length on the system.  It is unlikely that students will control for color 
in the experiment precisely because there is not a plausible mechanism by which color 
affects the motion.  Dunbar (1995) describes another case from a molecular biology 
research lab studying retroviruses.  During one lab meeting, the group used an analogy to 
another class of viruses to understand the possible relations and mechanisms working in 
the retrovirus.  That theoretical discussion helped them generate questions to pursue in 





Klahr and Dunbar (1988) found that students who began with some theoretical basis for 
their experiments/hypotheses discovered the function in significantly less time and with 
fewer experiments.  The students’ search of the “hypothesis space” was aided by previous 
knowledge of and informal experiences with the subject area, which we suggest 
(following diSessa (1993)) contribute to a sense of the physical mechanisms at work.  
This search helped the students decide which experiments to pursue systematically.  If 
nothing else, exploration of mechanisms before experimentation helps to pare down 
which of the infinite number of possible variables will be tested (see a more in depth 
discussion of this point in a later section). 
Many educational researchers have made the case for including theory- and 
mechanism-generative conversations in scientific inquiry before beginning formal 
investigations. Hodson (1988) quotes distinctions made by Schwab (1962) between stable 
and fluid inquiry and T. Kuhn (1963) between normal and revolutionary science to justify 
including “creative speculation” (p. 29) in school science (i.e., fluid inquiry or 
revolutionary science).  Given the two phases of scientific discovery described by 
philosophers of science, Hodson claims that 
 
a child’s science education would be seriously deficient if it concentrated on the 
processes of hypothesis testing to such an extent that hypothesis generation was 
neglected. (p. 30) 
 
Windschitl (2004) agrees that inquiry must include time for generating questions or 
hypotheses and justifies his call for moving away from atheoretical, ungrounded 





483) from the work of Alters (1997), Knorr-Cetina (1999), McGinn and Roth (1999), and 
Latour (1987, 1999).  Klahr and Dunbar (1988) also cite literature from the history of 
science to support the claim that hypothesis generation is crucial to scientific discovery.  
They begin their work by noting that 
 
 The successful scientist, like the successful explorer, must master two related 
skills: knowing where to look and understanding what is seen.  The first skill – 
experimental design – involves the design of experimental and observational 
procedures.  The second skill – hypothesis formation – involves the formation and 
evaluation of theory. Historical analyses of scientific discoveries (e.g. Conant, 
1964; Mitroff, 1974) suggest that the interaction between experimental design and 
hypothesis formation is crucial to the success of the real scientific endeavor.  (p. 
2) 
 
Other literature advocates including time for making sense of anecdotal 
observations as a way to generate hypotheses that may later be formally tested.  Hawkin’s 
(1974) suggests that “messing about” in science inquiry is crucial because it allows 
students to become acquainted with new phenomena and “build an apperceptive 
background, against which a more analytical sort of knowledge could take form and 
make sense” (p. 68).  Without making informal observations of phenomenon, students 
have no sense of the mechanism behind it on which to base a hypothesis test.  In his brief 
survey of student abilities for scientific inquiry, Hammer (2004) suggests that students 
should be encouraged to spend time thinking about things they notice (perhaps 
accidentally) about the natural world and tossing around hypotheses that may never make 





work of Jocelyn Bell, the physicist who discovered pulsars: when Bell informally 
observed an unknown radio signal, she first searched through her sense of mechanism to 
discover plausible causes for it before she began honing these hypotheses for further 
study.  The practice of science and its characterizations in the science education literature 
attest to the value of using knowledge of mechanisms that exist in the world to formulate 
questions and hypotheses – regardless of whether they lead to controlled investigations. 
The logical steps of controlled experimentation fail to capture this informal “jumble of 
irrational goings-on” (Hodson, 1988, p. 28) of hypothesis generation so crucial for 
science.   
By leaving out the phase preceding hypothesis testing, current characterizations 
of inquiry fail to help students learn the value of hypothesis generation strategies (such as 
searching for mechanisms) that are crucial for scientific discovery. 
Another Conception of Inquiry: Mechanistic Reasoning 
 A new conception of inquiry is needed to address the limitations of the controlled 
experimentation model.  In particular, we agree with other educational researchers who 
describe a new conception that includes theoretical mechanistic reasoning in scientific 
inquiry.  Such a characterization of valuable classroom practice is at least on par with 
empirical ones in that it captures the processes of science and helps students form 
reasonable arguments.  In addition, it more accurately represents both professional 
science and how people reason naturally.  Literature supporting this view of inquiry 
suggests that having students make sense of the world by reasoning about causal 





attempt to explain how things happen and teachers should recognize and promote their 
efforts.   
Definitions of mechanism 
In the following section we review what this literature defines as mechanistic and 
thus valuable for science. 
Non-teleological 
 Educational research has made progress in defining the mechanistic explanations 
crucial for scientific inquiry by contrasting them with teleological ones.  In describing the 
cognitive development of causal understanding, Carey (1995) distinguishes between 
mechanistic reasoning and a functional mode of explanation in which changes in the 
properties of objects are attributed to their desire/intent or their vital nature/function. 
Similarly, Abrams and Southerland (2001) contrast students’ causal mechanistic 
explanations and those that are goal driven or describe “the why (the rationale)” for 
change (p. 1276).  In tracking the development of students’ explanations for how a set of 
gears works, Metz (1991) found that although some students attribute the action of the 
gears to its function or purpose, “no aspect of teleological thinking is manifested [in 
mechanistic explanations]” (p. 795).  Her more current work echoes the distinctions 
Piaget (1927) made in his early studies of children’s causal understanding between 
animistic, artificial, moral, or finalistic explanations and mechanistic ones.  This literature 
claims that students in science classrooms should not use teleological explanations to 






Many characterizations of mechanism in the literature on student reasoning center 
on giving causal stories for how phenomena occur.  Brewer et al. (1998) describe the 
mechanical explanations given by scientists and students as causal models that go 
“beyond the original regularity” of the phenomenon (p. 127).  They suggest that students 
can and should be encouraged to explain natural phenomena using a causal/mechanical 
conceptual framework, but do not further spell out the specifics of these frameworks.  
Hammer (1995) also considers mechanistic reasoning productive for scientific inquiry; he 
finds value in a student discussion about how objects move partially because they are 
relying on a sense of mechanism.  He describes that sense as follows: 
 
Students and physicists have rich stores of causal intuitions; reasoning about the 
causal structure of a situation can help them tap these resources. (p. 422) 
 
Both Brewer et al. and Hammer approximate mechanistic reasoning as causal reasoning.   
Other research in the education literature extends this definition to include the process of 
causality.  Koslowski (1996) claims that scientific reasoning consists largely of giving a 
mechanism that “explains the process by which a cause brings about an effect” (p. 13).  
In her study of students’ reasoning about causal situations, Schauble (1996) uses the same 
language; causal mechanism is “the process of how a cause brings about an effect” (p. 
112, emphasis hers).  She also defines mechanisms as “explanatory models, … either 
structures or processes, that account for the observed phenomena” and “usually link 
causes with effects” (p. 103).  Carey’s (1995) work on the origin of causal reasoning 





brings about another (the effect)” (p. 268) are crucial to adequate understanding of 
science. Abrams and Southerland (2001) claim that students should give mechanistic 
explanations that identify physical causes and “the how (the process)” of a phenomenon 
(p. 1276).  Metz (1991) similarly describes mechanistic reasoning in which students 
account for how changes in a system occur.  Literature advocating the use of mechanisms 
to explain phenomenon generally describes them as identifying the process between 
causes and effects. 
Reductive 
Some researchers rely less directly on causality and instead focus on the reductive 
nature of mechanistic explanations. Chin and Brown (2000) articulate the features of 
sophisticated mechanistic thinking engaged in by students with a deep approach to 
science.  These students  
 
give “microscopic” explanations which described nonobservable theoretical 
entities and cause-effect relationships. This type of explanation [mechanistic] was 
like a model or a minitheory which served as a link between the macro and micro 
levels. (Chin & Brown, p. 121) 
 
Similarly, Chinn and Malhotra (2002) describe the theoretical mechanisms constructed 
during authentic science inquiry as composed of “entities that are not directly observable” 
and linked by causal, contrastive, analogical, and inductive connections (p. 186).  White 
(1993) found that students have the most success in understanding new topics when they 
use “reductionist physical models” of causal mechanisms that involve “phenomena that 





claims that causal mechanisms rely on “interactions among the entities in the domain” to 
explain phenomena (p. 273).  Researchers commonly use reductionist models to describe 
the structure of causal mechanistic explanations.  In these characterizations, mechanisms 
account for observations by showing that underlying objects cause local changes in the 
system by acting on one another.   
Built from phenomenological evidence  
diSessa's (1993) ontological approach to mechanistic reasoning leads to a 
different characterization.  Instead of describing the overall structure of a mechanistic 
explanation, he discusses the individual cognitive elements called “phenomenological 
primitives” from which our sense of mechanism is built.  These p-prims are abstracted 
from common everyday experiences and used to reason about novel situations. For 
example, Ohm’s p-prim (“An agent or causal impetus acts through a resistance or 
interference to produce a result”) is relevant to a number of physical mechanisms – from 
pushing a book across surfaces with different friction to inserting new resistors in a 
circuit (p. 217).    diSessa provides numerous other examples and a list of heuristic 
principles for identifying p-prims.  During mechanistic reasoning, students use p-prims to 
assess the likelihood of events, explain what will happen given the past state or what 
must have happened given the current state, and assign causal credit for what happens in 
certain circumstances (p. 106).   
Value of Mechanistic Reasoning 
The value of mechanistic reasoning for scientific inquiry need not only be that 





students to emulate (for example, deciding on a budget for grant proposals).  A 
theoretical justification of mechanistic reasoning is crucial for establishing its role in 
scientific inquiry.  The literature offers several reasons that a focus on mechanism might 
be more appropriate for students than a focus on controlled experimentation.  
Mechanistic reasoning is more effective than formal empirical investigation 
One motivation for including mechanistic reasoning in scientific inquiry is purely 
practical:  it would take too much time to perform all the possible controlled experiments 
on all the possible causal variables for a given phenomenon.  As Ahn and Kalish (2000) 
point out in their article on the role of mechanistic reasoning in causal attribution, 
 
To determine causal candidates for covariational analyses, one must start out with 
some understanding of causal mechanisms because, otherwise, one soon runs into 
a computational explosion. (p. 216)  
 
This “computational explosion” arises because there exist an infinite number of possible 
correlations in the world.  Luckily for scientists, many of them are spurious and only a 
few are causal.   Koslowski (1996) claims that mechanism information helps decide 
which correlations to take seriously: 
 
In most circumstances, people do not (nor should they nor can they) treat all 
covariations are equally indicative of plausible causes.  And distinguishing 
correlations that are genuinely causal from those that are merely artifactual is 






Schauble (1996) observed this behavior in students performing experiments to determine 
which variables caused changes in the buoyant force of water (as measured by spring 
stretch).  She found that subjects decided which variables were worth testing based on 
their beliefs about “mechanisms that could and could not plausibly be operating in the 
spring system” (p. 115).  Educators do not ask students to perform experiments testing 
every correlation or to take all evidence of covariation as an indication of causality; such 
a method would be ineffective and inefficient for identifying causes for phenomena.  
Koslowski (1996) presents a striking example to justify this claim: 
 
If simply applying the covariation rule were sufficient, then we would all be able 
to contribute to cancer research.  The fact that we are not all able to do so 
illustrates the most basic suggestion about what is rational and important to 
communicate to students… we need to rely on information about the area 
[mechanisms] to decide which covariations to look for in the first place, which 
ones to take seriously when they occur, and which alternative hypotheses to treat 
as plausible. (p. 276) 
 
Even though many students can perform controlled experiments, they cannot all solve 
pressing problems of science because it is by knowing what mechanisms act in the 
systems that scientists pare down the number of variables for further rigorous study.  If 
scientists or students relied only on covariation data, they would be working forever 
testing infinite numbers of variables only a few of which would actually be important in 
the situation.  Such a method of scientific inquiry “would take unlimited computing time 





objects in the world” (Ahn & Kalish, 2000, p. 205).1  Considering plausible mechanisms 
streamlines scientific inquiry by determining which experiments are most likely to yield 
causal information. 
Mechanistic reasoning is more likely than formal empirical investigation to yield correct 
conclusions 
Once the number of possible experiments is reduced to something manageable, 
there is still the task of deciding whether the covariation information from those 
experiments gives sufficient evidence of causality.  There may be cases where the 
observed covariation is merely specious and drawing conclusions based solely on that 
covariation evidence would yield incorrect conclusions.  Koslowski (1996) describes one 
such scenario: although there is evidence that ice-cream consumption is positively 
correlated with the incidence of violent crime, it would be absurd to assume that eating 
ice cream causes people to commit violence.  Instead, we would look for other 
mechanisms that might explain the correlation, such as that both ice cream and violence 
increase in warm weather.   In his theory of causal mechanisms, Salmon (1984) provides 
an example that illustrates the opposite problem, concluding a lack of causality from a 
lack of correlation.  He describes a situation in which a golfer hits a terrible tee shot that 
goes into the trees; his ball accidentally hits a tree and bounces back in play for a hole-in-
one.  It could be said then that the tree caused his hole-in-one.  However, if we looked at 
data between tree hitting and hole-in-ones, we would likely find no or negative 
                                                
1 It is true that scientists may sometimes comb extensive amounts of data looking for significant 
correlations to give them clues as to how a phenomenon occurs.  However, the amount of time required to 






correlation.  The presence of correlation does not necessarily indicate causality, nor does 
its absence necessarily imply a lack of causation; relying on covariation is an unreliable 
method of judging causality. 
Causal attributions are much more likely to be accurate if a mechanism is known 
to underlie an existing covariation.  Ahn et al. (1995) describe this asymmetry between 
covariation and mechanism information; while “covariation is perfectly confounded with 
mechanism: the presence of a mechanism necessarily implies the presence of covariation 
among the factors involved in the mechanism,” the reverse is not true (p. 340).2  MDC’s 
(2000) account of mechanisms describes the reason why covariation follows mechanism.  
They claim that mechanisms for phenomena “work always or for the most part in the 
same way under the same conditions” (MDC, 2000, p. 3). The regularity of a mechanism 
contributes to regularity in the resulting phenomenon.  Glennan (1996) explains how a 
mechanism approach to causality exploits this fact to overcome the “connection-
conjuction” problem of misleading correlations. 
 
If one can formulate and confirm a theory that postulates a mechanism connecting 
two events, then one has produced evidence that these events are causally 
connected.  The necessity that distinguishes connections from accidental 
conjunctions is to be understood as deriving from an underlying mechanism. (p. 
64) 
 
                                                
2 Salmon’s example of the hole-in-one may seem to contradict the claim that mechanisms always produce 
covariations – tree hitting does not correlate with hole-in-ones, though it was the mechanism that produced 
that particular one.  Salmon’s example, like other anomalous cases, occurs precisely because some part of 
the mechanism does not occur “in the same way under the same conditions.”  The hole-in-one mechanism 
usually (I imagine) consists of hitting the ball down the middle of the fairway towards the hole; in 
Salmon’s example the tree prevented that mechanism from working.  The result is an anomalous 





Shultz’s work (1982) investigating which rules of causal attribution are most commonly 
used revealed two trends relevant to this discussion.  The first is that “generative 
transmission [mechanism] yields fewer attribution errors than do any of the other causal 
rules [covaration, regularity, similarity, temporal/spatial continguity]” (p. 46).  The 
second is that people are significantly more confident about their assessments of causality 
when mechanism information is present.  Knowledge of mechanisms makes us more 
certain of which covariations indicate causality.  In Schauble’s experiments (1996), she 
found that subjects adjusted their analysis criteria for what counted as legitimate 
covariation based on their beliefs about possible mechanisms.  When mechanism 
information is known, the decision about whether two events are causally related is more 
likely to be accurate than relying on covariation alone.  Ahn and Kalish (2000) make the 
even stronger claim that “without constraints from existing causal mechanism 
knowledge, probability information can be vacuous and inapplicable” (p. 218).  They 
contrast themselves with researchers who have essentially empirical conceptions of 
inquiry that allow theory to be used to make sense of data.    
 
Our claim is stronger than that existing causal mechanism knowledge helps 
[explain covariation data].  It is that such knowledge does essentially all the work. 
(Ahn & Kalish, p. 206)   
 
Students should be encouraged to use knowledge of mechanisms to draw causal 
conclusions because with it they can be more confident that they have done so correctly 





Mechanistic reasoning is more helpful than formal empirical investigations for 
understanding novel situations 
Students should not only be able to make correct causal conclusions about 
situations they have empirically investigated; they should also be able to make sense of 
novel phenomena.  When faced with new physical situations, it is unlikely that students 
will already have a store of covariation information collected under the exact same 
conditions with which to draw conclusions.  Covariation information is narrow; it only 
gives insight into the precise case that generated it.   Establishing that a particular 
variable is associated with a particular result in a very particular set of circumstances (a 
controlled experiment) does not help predict what will happen when that same variable is 
found in a different set of circumstances. Only in knowing the properties of a variable 
and the process by which a cause brings about an effect – the mechanism - can we know 
what that variable may or may not do in another situation.  Information about 
mechanisms, unlike covariation, is generalizable.  Ahn et al. (1995) claim that this fact is 
exactly why people prefer mechanism-based explanations to those based on covariation. 
 
[M]echanism-based explanations are projective or generative in the sense that we 
can make predictions about novel situations…Suppose John had a traffic accident 
and the mechanism-based explanation for the event is that John is drunk.  What if 
a particular factor were different?  For example, what if John was wearing a hat?  
Would the effect still have occurred?  The explainer already knows the 
preconditions for accidents involving drunk driving and he/she knows that the 
effect would occur by necessity as long as the conditions are satisfied.  Therefore, 






The example of John changing his hat may seem silly, but the silliness arises precisely 
because we have no mechanism relating hat-wearing to car accidents.  Less extreme 
examples also illustrate the insufficiency of formal experimental evidence in novel 
situations.  For example, in a first-grade classroom in which a teacher asks her students 
whether or not a seed can grow in sand (Hammer & van Zee, 2006), the students have 
performed experiments growing seeds in soil and have discussed how seeds grow, but 
have not yet tried to grow seeds in sand.  They have no relevant covariation information 
to use in answering the question.  However, they are still able to make predictions, 
because they have a sense of the mechanism by which seeds grow in soil.  They then 
decide whether or not the elements and processes for growth are similar enough in sand 
to soil for the mechanism to run.  The prior experimental evidence was not sufficient 
because the new situation did not have the same variables.  Mechanism information is 
more valuable than data from controlled experiments because it is more generalizable; it 
provides a means to predict what will happen in novel situations. 
Limitations of Current Characterizations of Mechanistic Reasoning  
Lack of precision  
 While the value of including mechanistic reasoning in inquiry is agreed on by the 
researchers cited above, the exact nature of that reasoning is not.  There has not been the 
same progress with respect to making explicit what constitutes mechanistic reasoning as 
there has been in making explicit what constitutes controlled experimentation.  Research 
focused on understanding students’ mechanistic reasoning provides many models of 
exemplary mechanistic descriptions.  Consider an example that Brewer et al. (1998) call 






 Interviewer:  Where is the sun at night? 
Third Grader: On the other side of the earth.  Because when night comes  
over here the sun goes onto the other side of the earth and 
it’s day on there. 
 Interviewer:  How does this happen? 
 Third Grader: The earth turns around. 
 Interviewer:  Does the earth move? 
 Third Grader: Yeah. 
 Interviewer:  Does the sun move? 
 Third Grader: No. (p. 127) 
 
Unfortunately, not all explanations are as complete as this one; many examples from 
student discourse represent more partial or ambiguous versions of mechanistic reasoning.  
Consider the following episode from a college course in which a student studying 
buoyancy explains her idea about why hollow objects float.   
 
Kelly:  ...I would say, I would agree that it’s something, it’s the air inside of it that 
[object]…it’s just like in the bath, like when you, like if you have a bubble 
at the bottom, it floats to the top, you know? So that’s why I think that the 
air, the mass of the air inside an object will hold it up in the water. 
 
It is not immediately obvious whether Kelly’s explanation is mechanistic, partially 
mechanistic, or non-mechanistic.  Does her explanation do the same “kind of thing” that 
the day/night explanation did?  What insight does the canonical example of the day/night 
cycle provide in making sense of this possibly ambiguous or incomplete explanation? 





students should be doing, it is difficult to use completed, exemplary explanations to 
identify specific aspects of mechanistic reasoning that is “in progress.” Comparing all 
explanations to canonical ones forces judgments of mechanism to be all-or–nothing: 
either an explanation matches the exemplar or it does not. 
Reliance on Causality 
Mechanistic reasoning is often loosely defined as “causal,” and we might hope 
that cognitive psychology literature on causal learning would provide insight into 
mechanistic reasoning.  Gopnik and her colleagues (2000, 2001) have carried out work 
prototypical in this field on young children’s causal inferences.  They designed a “blicket 
detector” that lights up and plays music whenever “blickets” are brought near it.  Their 
studies have shown that children aged 2-4 can categorize blickets based on their novel 
“causal power” to set off the detector.  They claim that the older of these children also 
appear able to ignore information about perceptual similarity or covariation in assigning 
causal power.  Das Gupta and Bryant (1989) performed a series of experiments in which 
they asked children to identify which of several instruments caused the change in another 
object.  For example, children had to decide whether a hammer, scissors, or water caused 
a wet cup to become a wet broken cup.  They conclude that the ability to make “genuine 
[full] causal inference” in which “the person takes into account the difference between 
beginning and end states in order to work out a cause” develops around 4 years of age (p. 
1138).  This work shows that very young children can select which objects cause which 
effects. 
In reflecting on these experiments, it becomes clear that what these authors call 





Gopnik et al.’s (2000, 2001) children may recognize that blickets cause the detector to go 
off it is unlikely that they have any conception of how blickets do so.  These two levels of 
explanation parallel T. Kuhn’s (1977) distinction between the “narrow” and “broad” 
causes used in physics explanations.  He defines “narrow causes” as particular active 
agents from earlier events that exert a force to cause subsequent events, similar to 
Gopnik’s causal power.  He claims that within the field of physics, this concept of cause 
has proven too limited to provide adequate explanations.  Instead, “broad causes” explain 
events by showing how 
 
effects are deduced from a few specified innate properties [mechanical or 
mathematical] of the entities with which the explanation is concerned.  (T. Kuhn, 
p. 28) 
 
These “broad causes” are more like what we have identified as mechanistic reasoning.  
Mechanistic reasoning in physics is more than noting which causes are associated with 
which effects; it describes the process underlying them.  Characterizations of mechanistic 
reasoning that rely mainly on causality risk underestimating its breadth by equating it 
with the kinds of reasoning described by the cognitive psychology literature. 
Other researchers have made the claim, either tacitly or explicitly, that causality in 
the narrow sense is not sufficient to capture the meaning of mechanism.  Piaget (1927) 
interviewed young children on phenomena ranging from air to bicycles and documented 
seventeen different types of causality in children’s explanations.  Although he defines 
them all identifying causes for effects, only the most sophisticated are termed 





physical “contact and transference of movement” for explanation (Piaget, 1927, p 263). 
The language White (1993) uses in her work on Intermediate Causal Models makes a 
similar distinction.  She describes the causality of circuit behavior by laws such as “A 
change in conductivity can cause a change in voltage, and a change in voltage can cause a 
change in device state” (p. 189), and the mechanism of circuit behavior as “resistance 
inhibits charge from flowing freely through a substance by atoms it encounters and 
collides with within the material” (p. 207).  Mechanism both accounts for the causal law 
governing physical behavior and is more than the causal law.  In their study of student’s 
explanations for biological phenomena, Abrams and Southerland (2001) classified 
students as able to give causal explanations that were still “scientifically inappropriate” in 
that they failed to describe mechanisms for physical changes.  Newton (1996) describes 
how students generate mental models to make sense of cause-effect relationships.  He 
hypothesizes that it is the desire for more in depth causal understanding that prompts the 
construction of models that I would call mechanistic.  Again, mechanism is something 
more “in depth” than causality.  diSessa (1993) specifically draws attention to his 
decision to distinguish between mechanism and causality.   
 
An alternate, simple description of the sense of mechanism would be causality.  
Which events follow which others regularly, and why do they do so?  I 
deliberately use the term sense of mechanism [instead of causality] to emphasize 
that the picture I want to paint of human causality is dramatically different from 
many other characterizations.  It involves diverse and diffuse judgments and 
impressions more than it consists of some small set of sharply defined and 






Carey (1995) is also explicit about “input-output relations” (also similar to Gopnik’s 
causal power) not being sufficient for causal understanding involving mechanism.  She 
claims that studies like those from the cognitive psychology literature described above, 
which attempt to show that children have (or can construct) domain specific causal 
knowledge, are flawed because     
 
until a child has constructed an intuitive theory of how [a phenomenon occurs], 
knowledge of mere ‘input-output’ relationships does not constitute causal 
understanding (p. 284). 
 
In addition,  
 
   knowledge of input-output relations is not the same as a domain specific 
mechanism - an underlying process of how one event brings about another. (p. 
287)  
 
Causal reasoning in the sense described by the psychology literature serves as a starting 
point for the pursuit of underlying mechanistic explanations, but causal reasoning alone 
does not define mechanistic reasoning.  Characterizations of mechanism cannot be 
grounded in the notion of cause lest they be confused with this impoverished, less 
complete notion of narrow cause.  Instead, mechanism must be explicitly defined so that 
its nature and structure can be identified without worrying about which definition of 






This review of previous research presents two main arguments.  The first is that 
there is a pervasive tendency in current education research to conceive of inquiry in an 
inappropriately empirical way.  This conception supports students learning about new 
phenomena by performing controlled experiments and analyzing the resultant covariation 
data.  While valuable in some ways, this conception significantly misrepresents students’ 
natural abilities and scientists’ practice.   
The second argument is that mechanistic reasoning is an appropriate focus for 
scientific inquiry independent of controlled experimentation.  Students should explain 
natural phenomena by making sense of the underlying causal processes that produce 
them.  Mechanistic reasoning is valuable and productive for science learning. 
However, there is a critical need to supplement the characterizations and 
examples of mechanistic reasoning from previous research by articulating an explicit 
definition so that progress can be pursued and evaluated systematically during inquiry. 
Chinn and Malhotra (2002) acknowledge this deficiency in the literature and claim that 
researchers in science education must “develop a better understanding of the strategies 
that scientists use when reasoning on such [inquiry] tasks” (p. 214) and developing 
mechanistic explanations.  In the following chapter, we address this need by using 
detailed characterizations of the structure and nature of mechanism from the philosophy 
of science literature to develop a framework for identifying mechanistic reasoning in 





Chapter 3: Methodology of Developing and Using the Mechanism 
Framework 
Introduction  
It remains a central ambition of science education reform to help students develop 
abilities for scientific inquiry, as outlined in the National Science Education Standards 
calling for “changing emphases to promote inquiry” (NRC, 1996, p. 113).  To meet this 
objective, science education research has attempted to describe particular aspects of 
“inquiry” so that it can be assessed in students.  Student abilities to engage in controlled 
experimentation (e.g. Kuhn, 1989) and scientific argumentation (e.g. Driver, Newton, & 
Osborne, 2000) have been studied with the goal of positing schemes for assessing the 
sophistication of those abilities.   
The progress in defining scientific inquiry with respect to experimentation and 
argumentation can be characterized as progress in understanding the structure of inquiry.  
However, that structure cannot be the whole of what constitutes scientific inquiry; it is 
possible to study abilities for coordinating variables in contexts that are not scientific and 
frameworks for analyzing argumentation can apply to politics or law as easily as to 
science.  In addition to frameworks for analyzing that structure of inquiry we need 
frameworks for analyzing the substance of that inquiry.  The purpose of the present work 
is to draw attention to and evaluate the substance of student thinking, particularly their 
mechanistic thinking, as part of inquiry-oriented assessment. 
As discussed in chapter two, other research has begun to attend to students’ 





have relied on exemplary cases and heuristic, intuitive characterizations of causal 
mechanism in making assessments.  These methods are both insufficient and unreliable 
for understanding nascent mechanistic thinking.  In this chapter, we present the origin 
and development of the framework designed to bring rigor and precision to these 
assessments of inquiry.  As such, the framework may begin to bring our understanding of 
mechanistic reasoning on par with our understanding of controlled experimentation or 
argumentation.   
We provide a brief review of the philosophy of science literature that led us to 
suspect that a more articulate language for thinking about mechanistic reasoning was 
possible.  We then more fully describe one strand from the literature that forms the basis 
of our mechanism framework: Machamer, Darden, and Craver’s (MDC, 2000) 
characterization of the mechanisms studied in contemporary professional science.  We 
present an initial attempt to use MDC’s language to analyze student inquiry to 
demonstrate how discussions of scientists’ search for mechanisms informed our thinking 
about student mechanistic reasoning.  This analysis represents an intermediate stage in 
the development of the coding scheme used throughout the rest of the dissertation. 
After describing the origin and transitional stages of our framework, we provide 
both theoretical and practical justifications for the series of revisions required to make 
MDC’s work align with our goals.  The current version of the coding scheme that is used 
to recognize nascent mechanistic reasoning in student science discussions is presented 
along with examples of the codes and explanations of their use.  We give details as to 





the qualitative research methodology of this dissertation including a practical discussion 
of data sources and steps of analysis. 
Characterizations of Mechanisms in Professional Science 
The “mechanical philosophy” arose in the 16th and 17th centuries, espoused by 
Descartes, Galileo and others as a new way of understanding and describing the natural 
world without recourse to psychic and occult powers (MDC, 2000; Westfall, 1986).  It 
conceived of the world as a machine of inert, passive bodies that moved only through 
physical causation by direct contact, with Newton (and others reluctantly later) adding 
“action at a distance” later (Westfall, 1986), and it culminated in Newtonian mechanics.  
Mechanistic thinking is now firmly established as inherent in the values and practices of 
science (Kuhn, 1977; Nersessian, 1992; Salmon, 1978), to the point that scientists 
themselves no longer explicitly discuss its presence.   
Mechanistic thinking is, however, the focus of many historical and philosophical 
studies of scientific progress (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005; Glennan, 2000; Tabery, 
2004; Thagard, 1998), and the descriptions of what constitutes mechanism have 
progressed.  Glennan (2000) describes a mechanism as “a complex system that produces 
that behavior by the interaction of a number of parts, where the interactions between parts 
can be characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations” (p. S344).  He 
focuses especially on the parts and how they interact (as characterized by law-like 
generalizations) such that changes in one part bring about changes in another part.  
Similarly, Thagard (1988) characterizes mechanisms as “a system of parts that operate or 
interact like those of a machine, transmitting forces, motion, and energy to one another” 





of activities of entities that bring about the finish or termination conditions [from the set-
up conditions] in a regular way” (p. 7). 
Machamer, Darden, and Craver’s Characterization of Mechanisms 
We have found Machamer, Darden, and Craver (MDC, 2000) to be the clearest 
synthesis of contemporary accounts of mechanism in professional science, and we will 
use it as the principal basis for our analysis of student scientific discourse.   It also aligns 
well with our own perceptions of how research science is practiced.  These authors define 
mechanism as: 
 
Entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular 
changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions. (p. 3)  
 
Scientists are interested in phenomena that are stable and reliably produced, 
because they are most useful for ascertaining mechanisms that “work always or for the 
most part in the same way under the same conditions” (MDC, 2000, p. 3).  Typically the 
search for mechanism follows the identification of these regular phenomena, including 
the specification of starting and final conditions.   
Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000) focus on elaborating “a mechanistic 
approach for analyzing neurobiology and molecular biology that is grounded in the 
details of scientific practice” (p. 2).  They take as prototypical those mechanisms from the 
biological sciences: chemical transmission at synapses (Craver, 2002b; MDC, 2000), 
protein synthesis (Darden & Craver, 2002; MDC, 2000), and long-term potentiation 





first stage of chemical transmission – to highlight crucial aspects of their characterization 
and elaborate some of its finer-grained aspects.   
Depolarization is a regular and predictable phenomenon that begins the process in 
the synaptic gap during which electrical signals in one neuron are converted to chemical 
signals in another.  Specifically, “depolarization is a positive change in the membrane 
potential” of the neuron (MDC, 2000, p. 8).  At the start of depolarization, neuron cells 
have a negative membrane potential - the fluid inside is more negatively charged than the 
fluid outside.  Positively charged Na+ ions outside the neuron cell are attracted to the 
negatively charged fluid inside.  They diffuse through a channel in the membrane and 
reverse the polarity until the fluid inside is more positive than the fluid outside.  The Na+ 
selective channel itself consists of four alpha helix (corkscrew-shaped) portions of the 
protein that each contain positively charged amino acids and a “hairpin turn” (MDC, 200, 
p. 11).  The channel is opened when the Na+ ions inside the cell repel the evenly spaced 
positive parts of the corkscrew alpha helix and rotate them to create an opening (or pore) 
in the membrane.  The “hairpin turns” that bend into the pore are charged so as to select 
only Na+ ions to flow into the neuron cell (Craver, 2002b).  We will use the 
depolarization mechanism throughout this section to describe features of MDC’s 
characterization of mechanisms.3 
The mechanisms that underlie phenomena are composed of entities and 
activities.4  Activities are the components of mechanisms that produce change – they are 
                                                
3 A figure depicting the stages of the depolarization mechanism can be found in Machamer, P., Darden, L., 
Craver, C.F. (2000).  Thinking about mechanisms.  Philosophy of Science, 67, 1-25. 
4 Unlike other philosophical accounts of mechanism that focus on interaction among entities, 
MDC stress the ontological distinction of entities and activities; both can exist independently and 





the “things that entities do… and they constitute stages of mechanisms” (Craver, 2002a, 
p. S84).  The activities in the depolarization mechanism include repelling, rotating, 
bending, and moving.  Other common activities in biological mechanisms include 
bonding and docking among molecules; physical mechanisms might more commonly 
refer to pushes and pulls among objects.  Entities are the things that engage in the 
activities:  the entities in the depolarization mechanism are neuron cells with membranes 
and fluid.  Other biological entities for other phenomena might include cell nuclei, 
organisms, or populations.  Physics entities might be electrons, macroscopic objects, or 
stars.  The general properties of the entities involved determine the activities that can 
occur in a mechanism. In the depolarization mechanism, the membranes have channels 
made of proteins with alpha helixes and hairpin turns while the fluid has an electric 
potential that is dictated by free Na+ ions.  The entities and activities that can be used in 
acceptable descriptions of mechanisms vary; “for a given field at a given time there is 
typically a store of established or accepted components out of which mechanisms can be 
constructed and a set of components that have been excluded from the shelves” (Craver 
& Darden, 2001, p. 123).  It is the activities and the relevant entities that constitute the 
mechanism and produce the phenomenon of interest. 
In general, whether a mechanism can proceed depends on the entities’ “spatial 
and temporal organization” (Craver, 2002a, p. S84).  If two entities that need to connect 
in some way are spatially distant or misaligned or if a given activity takes too long to 
occur or occurs out of turn, then the mechanism cannot proceed (Craver & Darden, 
2001).  For example, Na+ ions cannot diffuse and depolarization cannot occur unless the 





the membrane.  Understanding a mechanism involves “understanding how one activity 
leads to the next through the spatial layout of the components and through their 
participation in a stereotyped temporal pattern of activities from beginning to end” 
(Craver, 2001, p. 61).  The productive continuity of the mechanism for the phenomenon 
is contingent on the appropriate location, structure, and orientation of entities and 
temporal order, rate and duration of activities.   
Mechanisms are nested within one another such that “higher level activities of 
mechanisms as a whole are realized by the organized activities of lower level components 
and these are, in turn, realized by the activities of still lower level mechanisms” (Craver, 
2002b, p. 69).  Although this hierarchical structure makes it possible in principle to 
reduce all phenomena to atoms and molecules, it is not always desirable or appropriate to 
do so.  For a given domain, there exist different “bottom-out” levels for mechanistic 
descriptions “that are accepted as relatively fundamental or taken to be unproblematic” 
(Darden, 2002, p. S356).  For example, the depolarization mechanism currently bottoms 
out at the level of alpha helices of proteins and ions; the fact that those entities and their 
behavior result from quantum mechanisms involving protons and electrons does not add 
to biologists’ insight about the phenomenon.  Similarly there exist “top-off” levels 
beyond which mechanisms lose explanatory power:  studying knee joint reflexes would 
not give insight into depolarization partly because the physical behavior is too many 
levels above the mechanism of interest.  In general, a complete description of the 
phenomenon involves “‘looking down’ a level and showing that properties or activities of 
an entity can be explicated in terms of lower level mechanisms” and “‘looking up’ a level 





Each component in a mechanism both contributes to the productive continuity of a 
mechanism and can be accounted for by some other productively continuous mechanism.  
MDC’s framework describes several reasoning strategies that scientists use as 
they construct their descriptions of mechanisms in a piecemeal fashion (Craver & 
Darden, 2001; Darden, 2002).  One strategy, schema instantiation, involves making an 
analogy with a known mechanism from another context or field, abstracting the general 
structure by removing any details about specific components, and then instantiating this 
schema by filling functional roles with components appropriate to the new situation.  The 
researchers who identified the depolarization mechanism would have known of selective-
channel mechanisms in other cellular phenomena, and might have imported that 
knowledge to account for Na+ ion diffusion with neurons. In the modular subassembly 
strategy, scientists begin with groups of components commonly used elsewhere in the 
field – modules – and cobble them together to build an organized mechanism (Darden, 
2002).  For example, the helix-turn-helix is a common motif is common in DNA binding 
proteins (Brennan & Matthews, 1989), making it more likely for scientists to use them 
together in constructing an account of the depolarization mechanism.  Finally, 
construction may proceed through forward and backward chaining by “reasoning about 
one part of a mechanism on the basis of what is known or conjectured about other parts in 
the mechanism” (Darden, 2002, p. S362).  By knowing the general properties of entities 
and activities, much can be said about what must have produced them at earlier stages 
and what they can produce in subsequent steps.  For example, knowing that alpha helices 
of proteins (entities) are corkscrew shaped with evenly spaced positive charges 





membrane repel (activity) those in the helix and cause it to rotate (activity).  In 
discovering mechanisms, scientists use the structure of mechanistic schemas, modules, 
and components to reason about the phenomena. 
MDC’s characterization of mechanism also describes several experimental 
strategies for discovering mechanisms that take advantage of their hierarchical structure  
(Craver, 2002a; Craver & Darden, 2001).  Activation strategies work down from the top 
levels by stimulating a certain phenomenon to occur and detecting component properties 
that contribute to it.  Interference strategies are the reverse - “bottom-up experiments in 
which one intervenes to diminish, retard, eliminate, disable, or destroy some component 
entity or activity in a lower level” and observe the effects on the phenomenon at a higher 
level (Craver, 2002a, p. S93).  Additive strategies work like interference strategies except 
that instead of diminishing a lower level component, one augments or intensifies it and 
then observes the effects at the higher levels.  In an attempt to discover the mechanism 
for depolarization, scientists might have used additive or interference strategies by adding 
or removing variously charged ions from the fluid outside and observing the resulting 
depolarization.  These experimental strategies give evidence for various components of 
the mechanism by integrating its multiple levels. 
Initial application of Machamer, Darden, and Craver to Understand Student 
Thinking 
Here we present an initial attempt to use MDC’s characterization of mechanisms 
as a lens for looking at student discourse.  We analyzed a discussion among first graders 
about whether or not seeds can grow in sand by looking for patterns that resembled the 





described above can be applied to student discourse.  It represents the first stage in what 
would later become more refined and systematic analysis with the development of a 
coding scheme. 
Example from Student Discourse 
The discussion analyzed here involves sixteen first grade students at a public 
elementary school in Montgomery County, Maryland.  The students are engaged in 
science lessons one to three times a week for approximately forty-five minutes each time.  
Their regular classroom instructor, Ms. Mikeska as her students call her, conducts these 
activities and discussions; a science education graduate student from the University of 
Maryland, Mr. Paul, sometimes observes or participates.  At the time of this classroom 
conversation, the instructor was participating in the “Case Studies of Elementary Student 
Inquiry in Physical Science” (NSF ESI-9986846).  This project was to develop materials 
for teacher education, to help prospective and current elementary teachers gain 
experience in interpreting and assessing the substance of student reasoning (Hammer & 
van Zee, 2006). 
As part of their science lessons and in accordance with county curriculum, these 
students have been exploring different aspects of rocks, soil, and sand.  They have 
designed and carried out an experiment to test the effect of vermiculite, an additive in 
some soils, on bean and flower seed growth.  They have observed the growth of the seeds 
in soil as well as the properties of soil and sand samples brought from home.  They have 
had several conversations prior to this one in which they have discussed their 





will grow in sand as a supplement to these previous conversations in class and asked the 
students to draw or write their answer and an explanation for homework. 
The discussion presented here begins with the teacher reintroducing the question 
“Can seeds grow in sand?”  The class then progresses in the following general way.  
Mark and Aaron both assert that seeds cannot grow in sand, but they provide different 
reasoning for their answers.  Mark focuses on the seeds’ supposed need for protein while 
Aaron talks about the effects of wind and water on the seed.  Juan interjects that the seed 
will grow, but his idea is temporarily set aside to further explore Mark and Aaron’s 
positions.  After Aaron suggests that water might be an important element for seed 
growth, Emily and Brandon both give their models for how water and the sand interact.  
Bernat interjects a comment about people stepping on the seed, a line of reasoning the 
rest of the class does not pursue.  Juan is given the opportunity to explain to his peers his 
belief that the seed will grow.  Keith and Emily talk with one another in an attempt to 
flesh out Juan’s argument.  Alisha wraps up the bulk of the discussion by presenting the 
idea that the seed cannot grow because sand lacks food for the seed.  Emily notices that 
Alisha’s idea is similar to Mark’s previous one.  The conversation concludes with Emily 
explaining why she feels that Alisha and Mark’s ideas are similar.  Throughout the 
conversation, most students seem to believe that the seed will not grow in sand, although 
their explanations for their conclusion are varied.  
Analyzing Student Discourse 
When attentively viewing this discussion from Ms. Mikeska’s class, we were 
impressed with how well the students were doing.  They seemed to be engaged in some 





exactly what we were seeing that gave us that sense.  However, in reading MDC’s (2000) 
account of mechanisms, we realized that their descriptions might possibly give us a 
language to talk about the substance of the children’s ideas in this discussion.  Below was 
an initial attempt at such an analysis.  In it, we looked for and found correspondences 
between student reasoning and MDC’s framework. 
Identifying Relevant Entities and Activities by Analogy  
After the teacher solicits volunteers to begin the conversation, Mark expresses his 
belief that the seed will not grow in sand. 
 
Mark:   I think that, I think that seeds will not grow in sand because I wrote 
[for homework] that it [sand] doesn’t have the protein that soil 
does for the seeds for, for any seed for a plant to grow. 
 
In this comment, Mark suggests that there is something in soil (call it protein) that is 
necessary for seed growth.  He implies that protein does something to make seeds grow. 
His suggestion seems to correspond to what MDC would term identifying protein as an 
entity in the mechanism of seed growth; protein is some thing that affects whether or not 
seeds can grow.  It is worth noting that Mark’s choice of the term protein is probably not 
random; he might plausibly imagine that protein is required generally for “growth” 
because he has heard from others (or the media) that protein helps people grow strong 
and healthy.  Mark also makes a comparison between soil and sand; he uses the idea that 
seeds grow in soil because they have access to protein (which may not be correct) and 
applies that same model to seed growth in sand to conclude that seeds will not grow 





generally) to make claims about what entities are needed in the new situation (growth in 
sand).  In doing so, Mark seems to be engaging in the first step of MDC’s schema 
instantiation: identifying similar mechanisms through analogy.  Like their descriptions of 
scientists, Mark uses “closely related areas of contemporary science… [as] a source for 
mechanism schemata” (Darden, 2002, p. S360) to aid him in thinking about new 
mechanisms.   Other students in the class follow this strategy. 
When the teacher asks for clarification, Mark further explains his idea about seed 
growth. 
 
Mark:  It [the plant] wouldn’t, wouldn’t grow a thing because like the 
minerals and all the other good stuff that’s in soil to feed the seed 
isn’t in sand. 
 … 
Mark:  Because it’s like, it [the plant] stops.  It, it’s like without it 
[protein] the seed, the seed would just be there.  It wouldn’t, 
wouldn’t grow a thing because like the minerals and all the other 
good stuff that’s in soil to feed the seed isn’t in sand. 
Mr. Paul:  So protein is something that the seed needs?  It’s food for the seed? 
Mark:   Mmm hmm.  Like food. 
 
In this excerpt, Mark articulates his idea about what protein (and minerals and other 
“good stuff”) does to help seeds grow; protein feeds the seed.  In the language of MDC, 
Mark identifies feeding as an activity in the mechanism when he describes it as “things 
that entities do” (Craver, 2002a, p. S84) and details “how an item [protein] fits into the… 
mechanism (showing exactly how it contributes to S’s [seed’s] y-ing [growing])” 





white balls in potting soil (vermiculite additives) providing food for the seed.  Again, his 
reasoning resembles MDC’s strategy of schema instantiation.  Mark’s suggestion that 
‘protein feeds the seed to help it grow’ corresponds well to MDC’s characterization that 
mechanisms, which may be discovered from other related fields (seed growth in soil) and 
used to make sense of novel situations (seed growth in sand), are made up of entities 
(protein) that engage in activities (feeding).  
Specifying Set-Up Conditions of the Mechanism 
Following Mark’s comments about protein’s role in seed growth, Aaron offers his 
explanation for why seeds cannot grow in sand. 
 
Aaron:  … When I pick up sand it easily kind of goes through my fingers 
really fast but when I do with soil it really does not do that.  So see 
sand is like rocks- sand is like beat up rocks – 
Ms. Mikeska: Mmm hmm  
Aaron: - and so when you are like when you plant it and when there was a 
windy day, cause it’s rocks and rocks do not help stuff.  But it 
could help some stuff but maybe it can help something. But I’m 
but when wind comes what happens is the sand will just blow right 
like blow away.  The sand would just go. 
 
Aaron begins by describing how sand is like crushed rocks that can be easily blown 
away.  In doing so, Aaron seems to identify what MDC call the “certain kinds of [entity] 
properties [that] are necessary for the possibility of acting in certain ways” (Darden & 
Craver, 2002, p. 4).  Aaron then suggests that seeds cannot grow in sand because sand 





identifies a new entity (wind) and activity (blowing) in the mechanism for seed growth.  
Also, like Mark, Aaron engages in simplified schema instantiation when he uses 
comparisons to rocks and soil to help him identify important aspects of the situation.  
Aaron goes on to say more about the seeds needing protection. 
 
Aaron:  - Oh yeah, when the wind comes the sand would just blow away it 
just would be and it blow be gone unless to be the seed is standing 
on the plate or the plate what you like put it on.  But if you have a 
cup it could just be like protected.   
 
Here, Aaron suggests that putting the seed into a protected environment in the cup might 
eliminate the problem of wind blowing the sand away.  He seems to be specifying what 
MDC would call a set-up condition that is required for the mechanism to reliably produce 
the phenomena of seed growth.  Just as scientists often “begin with idealized descriptions 
of the start or set-up conditions” (MDC, 2000, p. 11) such as frictionlessness, so Aaron 
presents a constraint that must be initially in place to enable the mechanism to run.  His 
set-up of the problem “includes various enabling conditions” which are “not inputs to the 
mechanism… [y]et these factors… are crucial to seeing how the mechanism will go” 
(MDC, 2000, p. 11).  The rest of the class can now ignore the problem of wind blowing 
away the sand because the seed is protected by the set-up condition. 
Forward Chaining Using the Properties of Entities and Animated Models 
Immediately following his ideas about the need for protection, Aaron offers 






Aaron:  And cause sometimes when I see some stuff come out of my 
mouth that’s wet and when it drops on the sand I see a little round 
dot of water and and the sand is like sucks UP the water.  [Like??] 
like keeps it to itself like takes the water away from the seed and 
the seed doesn’t have any water but the sand does. 
 
Other students help Aaron clarify his idea. 
 
Ms. Mikeska: What do you guys think about Aaron’s idea.  He brought up a a a 
little bit of a different reason.  He said well the water if you put 
water in the sand [unrelated comment to another student] if you put 
the water in the sand what’s going to happen?  What’s he saying is 
going to happen? (Nods to Juan.) 
Juan:   Um the sand takes it away. 
Ms. Mikeska: Takes it away.  What is it taking it away from? 
Aaron:  The water, it’s like keeping the water to itself. 
 
Here, Aaron suggests that water plays a role in seed growth.  As with Mark, he seems to 
be identifying what MDC call an entity in the mechanism.  Aaron also proposes that sand 
has properties we might describe as sponge-like: sand sucks up all the available water.   
In MDC’s language, he identifies an entity property.  He then uses that property to claim 
that the seed is left without any water because the sand takes the water away and keeps it 
to itself.  Aaron seems to be doing some sophisticated cause and effect reasoning that we 
want to articulate: he uses properties of sand to explain how it prevents water from 
getting to the seed.  
MDC’s language helps that articulation.  Aaron’s reasoning strategy is similar to 





mechanism to reason about possible activities.  Often, “discovering the structural 
properties of an entity can … give clues as to the kinds of activities in which it is likely to 
engage in the next stage of the mechanism” (Darden & Craver, 2002, p. 22).  By 
exploring the “activity-enabling properties of entities” scientists can answer the question, 
“What could these entities with these properties in these set-up conditions be expected to 
do?” (Darden & Craver, 2002, p. 23)  Aaron’s reasoning allows him to answer that 
question: Sponge-like sand (protected from the wind) will not allow water to flow to the 
seed, thus the seed cannot grow.  
Although Aaron’s peers accept that water is an important entity to consider in the 
mechanism of seed growth, some of them do not agree with the properties of sand he has 
articulated.  Emily responds to Aaron by saying: 
 
Emily:  [The seed] is just left alone without the s- the water that helps it 
grow in soil.  Because the soil is like hard and the water is like, 
pssshhh, blocked.  Like with all those sticks and stuff- it’s real hard 
so the water won’t get through.  But in sand since usually sand will 
be blown away not sticks into the sand- it’s easy that it’s not 
blocked so it just goes—shhhhhhwweeee.  (Motions with both 
hands water flowing down.) 
 
Brandon continues Emily’s line of reasoning. 
 
Brandon:  I don’t think that the seed will grow in sand because um it [the 






Brandon:  Pretend this is the se-sand and this is the water.  (Mimes the water 
going through sand with his hands)  It just goes out. 
 
Emily thinks that since sand doesn’t have any sticks to block the water (as opposed to a 
comparison with soil which does have such sticks), water will just go straight through the 
sand, leaving none for the seed.  Although Brandon does not comment on sticks blocking 
the water, both he and Emily seem to suggest that sand has properties we might call 
sieve-like: when water is poured onto sand, sand’s properties allow the water to pass all 
the way through to the bottom.  They then use this property to make claims about what 
will happen to the seed: since the water goes through the sand there will be no water 
available for the seed.  Emily and Brandon, like Aaron, seem to be engaging in MDC’s 
‘chaining’ by describing how the properties (sieve-ness) of the entities (sand) lead to 
particular activities in the mechanism (water goes through the sand and doesn’t reach the 
seed).   
Forward Chaining from Activities and Clarifying Spatial Organization of Entities 
Following Emily and Brandon’s explanations, Juan uses their idea of sand as a 
sieve to support a new conclusion – the seed will grow.   He is the first student to make 
this claim. 
 
Juan:   I think it would grow because, because the water goes through it, 
and if if the water goes through it might receive some water. 
 
Juan uses the same sieve-like property of sand.  However, he then claims that water going 





appears to be another example of MDC’s chaining when scientists “use knowledge of the 
occurrence of an activity in the mechanism to conjecture as to the consequences of that 
activity for entities and properties in the next stage”  (Darden & Craver, 2002, p. 22).  To 
apply MDC’s terminology, Juan begins with an activity of an entity and then claims that 
this activity brings about changes in the surrounding entities: water goes through the 
sieve-like soil, reaching the seed on its way through so that the seed can grow.   
Emily disagrees with Juan’s inferences about the properties of seeds that result 
from water filtering through sand.   
 
Emily:  Because if the water is going through it’s not exactly where the 
seed is if you put it near the top.  Cause the s, cause the water is 
going near the bottom…and if it’s going near the bottom it’s not 
near the seed it’s by the top. 
 
Following Juan’s chaining to a contradictory prediction about seed growth, Emily 
explicitly states her underlying assumption that water must not only be present in the 
sand, it also must be located near the seed in order for the seed to grow.  In her statement, 
she clarifies what MDC describe as the required spatial organization (near-ness) of the 
entities (sand/seed/water combination).  For scientists attempting to articulate 
mechanisms for physical phenomena, “[d]etails concerning the geometrical structure and 
orientation of the entities in a mechanism… are important for understanding the 
productivity of the mechanism” (Craver & Darden, 2001, p. 126, emphasis theirs).  In 
MDC’s language, Emily’s comment indicates that her seed growth mechanism “relies 





Even though they use the same entities with the same properties and activities, Emily’s 
required organization leads her to a different conclusion that Juan. 
Consolidating Entities with Common Activities 
After the students have had several exchanges about the interaction between the 
sand, soil, seed, and water, Alisha changes the focus of the conversation. 
 
Alisha:  Maybe if you, even if you put a seed in the sand it won’t grow 
because there’s no food for the plant. 
 
Here, Alisha suggests what she thinks is a new important factor to consider: food. Again, 
MDC would consider ‘food’ a candidate entity for the seed growth mechanism.  
However, another student recognizes that Alisha’s idea resembles Mark’s original idea. 
 
Emily:  I think they’re [Mark’s idea and Alisha’s idea] similar, but he 
added protein and she didn’t.  They’re still similar- cause she just- 
even though she just said food, he said food too and that’s similar I 
think she’s agreeing.  Because they’re similar by what I’m hearing 
with my ears. 
 
When Mark first specifies protein as relevant to seed growth, he does so with a ‘science’ 
word that other students may not understand; Alisha appears not to have recognized that 
food is functionally the same as protein.  However, Emily notices that Alisha’s ‘food’ 
does the same thing as Mark’s ‘protein.’  In MDC’s language, Emily notices that Alisha 





it is the activity that is the important part of each of their mechanistic explanations, not 
the specific words they used to describe the entities.   
Summary of Student Discourse: Mechanism Language 
In this analysis, we were able to describe the students’ comments using MDC’s 
language.  That is, we successfully identified several elements in student discourse that 
corresponded to MDC’s rich descriptions of professional science activity.  There 
appeared to be significant overlap between the mechanisms that scientists discover in the 
world and the kinds of things we see students doing when reasoning about mechanisms in 
the classroom.  This initial analysis suggested that MDC’s language might help us pin 
down exactly what we see in students’ reasoning.  It provided hope that an analysis of 
student mechanistic reasoning more systematic than those previously undertaken in the 
literature was possible.  Below we describe the development of a coding scheme to aid 
that analysis. 
Developing a Framework to Analyze Student Thinking  
Since MDC’s language helped us articulate our assessment of student ideas in the 
seeds discussion, we decided to develop it into a more systematic coding scheme. 
However, although their language overlapped with our assessments, their goal is different 
from ours.  While their purpose is largely to describe mechanisms – to depict the 
structure of complete mechanisms that scientists find in the world and invoke to explain 
physical phenomena, we want to characterize student thinking about mechanisms - what 
students do and say when reasoning about new mechanisms for phenomena they observe.  





in some aspects from our attempts to identify when and how students generate 
mechanistic explanations.  The overall structure and nature of completed mechanisms, 
while important for MDC, is less relevant for us than the individual pieces and reasoning 
strategies used in constructing them. 
Adapting Machamer, Darden, and Craver’s Account of Mechanisms 
We started with their proposal that mechanisms explain how phenomena are 
produced by tracing the productive changes continuously from set-up conditions through 
intermediate stages to termination conditions.  If a completed mechanism traces this 
entire process, then identifying any part of that process would constitute a valid approach 
constructing an unknown mechanism.  MDC’s description of the parts of a mechanism 
helped us recognize those parts that students might identify in their initial discussions of 
new phenomena.  Specifically, we use their idea that mechanisms for phenomena (seen in 
the termination stage) involve entities, which have particular properties and 
organizations, and activities among these entities that regularly take place given set-up 
conditions.   
We also translated two of the three reasoning strategies from MDC’s framework 
into language that appropriately describes the work of students:  abstract schema 
instantiation and chaining.5  Based on what we saw happening in the seeds discussion and 
in an attempt to use language more common in the education literature, we code for a 
simpler version of abstract schema instantiation by looking for students using analogical 
                                                
5 MDC’s modular subassembly strategy is not relevant for the data we have considered thus far, 
because the mechanisms involved have not been sophisticated or intricate enough to warrant the 
use of groups of entities and activities.  However, we can imagine that looking for this type of 





reasoning.  By not requiring students to abstract before instantiating the new case, we 
connect this aspect of MDC’s account to discussions of analogy more common in science 
education literature.  Finally, we explicitly code for forward and backward chaining and, 
as discussed below, consider it the heart of quality mechanistic reasoning.  
Other aspects of their framework are not helpful for our purpose of identifying 
how students reason about mechanisms.6  We do not attend to levels of hierarchy because 
this facet of MDC’s framework describes the overall structure of mechanistic 
explanations rather than its parts.  We do not look for students using the various empirical 
strategies for discovering mechanisms because we are interested in informal science 
discussions when students use information from their everyday experiences.  Aspects of 
MDC’s framework that are not relevant for our purposes might be valuable for other 
analyses of student reasoning – for example, analyses of the kind of inquiry that centers 
on controlled experimentation. 
The Coding Scheme  
Our initial analysis suggested that MDC’s characterization of mechanisms in 
professional science could be used to describe students’ mechanistic reasoning during 
inquiry.  As a result, we developed their language into a more systematic coding scheme 
that could be applied to episodes when students describe their reasoning either verbally or 
in written form.  There are nine categories in our coding scheme, derived from MDC’s 
work:  (1) Describing the Target Phenomenon; Identifying (2) Set-Up Conditions, (3) 
                                                
6 Although it is of central concern to MDC and their colleagues in philosophy of science, the 
question of whether there is an ontological difference between entities and activities is not 





Entities, (4) Activities; (5) Properties of Entities, (6) Organzition of Entities; (7) 
Chaining; Analogies; and Animated Models.  We describe and give an example of each 
in turn.  A summary table of the codes can be found in Appendix A. 
1. Describing Target Phenomenon (DTP) 
The phenomena scientists identify are stable, regular, and reliably produced.  
Scientists may either begin with knowledge of the phenomenon and then inquire into the 
mechanism that produces it, or they may describe phenomena as predictions based on 
their prior knowledge of the relevant components.  When students clearly state or 
demonstrate the particular phenomenon or result they are trying to explain, we code their 
comments as “Describing the Target Phenomenon.” An example would be a student 
saying “A can of diet coke floats and a can of regular coke sinks in water” during a 
discussion about buoyancy. 
This first code went through two major revisions during the development of the 
coding scheme as a result of disagreement among coders about its meaning (see Data 
Analysis section below).  Although the code was initially “Establishing Phenomenon,” 
we find that students, unlike scientists, do not always try to reach a consensus about the 
phenomenon and may report contradictory results without concern.  As a result, we 
changed the code to “Describing Phenomenon” and did not attempt to distinguish times 
when students intended to reach consensus and times when they did not.  Fortunately, this 
distinction was often made for us by patterns in the coding.  When students reported 
results in an attempt to reach consensus (to establish the phenomenon), there were only a 
few “Describing Phenomenon” comments followed by further elements of mechanistic 





consecutive “Describing Phenomenon” comments not followed by other aspects of 
mechanistic reasoning.   
Further problems with the “Describing Phenomenon” code occurred because it 
was unclear which phenomenon the code referenced.  For simplicity, we decided not to 
include comments describing tangential or peripheral phenomena in this code (they are 
covered by later ones).  Instead, we changed the code to “Describing Target 
Phenomenon” to reflect that convention and used it only when students describe the 
overall phenomenon being discussed (often dictated by the question the teacher posed).   
2.  Identifying Set-Up Conditions (SC) 
Set-up conditions are descriptions of the spatial and temporal organizations of 
components that begin the regular changes of the mechanism that produce the 
phenomenon.  We code as “Identifying Set-Up Conditions” the moments when students 
identify particular enabling conditions of the environment that allow the mechanism to 
run.  For example, a student discussing the buoyancy experiment might say, “I held both 
cans of coke under the water before I released them.”  
3.  Identifying Entities (IE) 
Scientists recognize that one component of mechanistic descriptions are entities: 
the things that play roles in producing the phenomenon.  When students recognize objects 
that affect the outcome of the phenomenon, we code such comments as “Identifying 
Entities” even if the entity has been previously identified.  For example, a student might 
say, “I am thinking about the role of each individual water molecule.”   
There are times when students may identify entities unproductively using 





several times), we decided to still code the students as “Identifying Entities.” We use later 
codes to distinguish between students using unfamiliar terms and those who are 
presenting entities meaningfully.   
4.  Identifying Activities (IA) 
Along with identifying the entities in a mechanism, scientists also identify the 
relevant activities: “the various doings in which these entities engage” (Craver & Darden, 
2001, p. 113).  Students who articulate the actions and interactions that occur among 
entities are coded as “Identifying Activities.”  We use this code whenever students 
describe the things that entities do that cause changes in the surrounding entities, even if 
the activity has been previously identified.  For example, a student might say, “Each 
individual water molecule pushes up on the molecules on top of it.” 
We decided to code all the activities that students suggest the entities do, 
including potentially inappropriate ones (e.g. ones that anthropomorphize inanimate 
entities).  We also use this code in conjunction with the previous one (IE) to code the 
components of tangential phenomena that students describe, instead of using the “DTP” 
code reserved for the specific phenomenon they are trying to explain. 
5.  Identifying Properties of Entities (IPE) 
Identifying and isolating only those properties of the entities relevant to the 
outcome is a vital part of scientific discovery.  When coding for “Identifying Properties 
of Entities,” we look for students who engage in this scientific practice by articulating 
general properties of entities that are necessary for this particular mechanism to run. For 






This code helps distinguish between students using unfamiliar vocabulary and 
those suggesting entities that make sense to them.  When students are unable to articulate 
general properties of the entities because they are using unfamiliar scientific terminology, 
corresponding “IPE” codes tend not to accompany the “IE” code. 
6.  Identifying Organization of Entities (IOE) 
In most cases the mechanism depends on how the entities are spatially organized, 
where they are located, and how they are structured.  When students attend to those same 
features, we code their comments as “Identifying Organization of Entities.” For example, 
a student may say, “The water below the oil pushes on it, while the alcohol above the oil 
also pushes on it.”   
This code was not initially part of the coding scheme but was added later when 
we attempted to code a new piece of data.  Several student comments in that data (see 
chapter five) were important to their explanations of the mechanism but were not 
captured by any of the existing codes.  We returned to MDC’s account of mechanism to 
search for a description of the activity and added this code. 
7.  Chaining: Backward and Forward (C) 
A general reasoning strategy that aids the discovery and articulation of 
mechanisms involves using knowledge about the causal structure of the world to make 
claims about what must have happened previously to bring about the current state of 
things (backward) or what will happen next given that certain entities or activities are 
present now (forward).  By knowing the general properties of entities involved, much can 
be said about the activities that must have produced them and about the activities in 





clues as to the entities that engaged in it” and the entities that it produced (Darden & 
Craver, 2002, p. 24).   
We observe students reasoning about one stage in a mechanism based on what is 
known about other stages of that particular mechanism and code this type of reasoning as 
“Chaining.”  When students chain backward, they answer the questions “What activities 
could have given rise to entities with these properties?” - or “What entities were 
necessary in order for this activity to have occurred?”  When students chain forward, they 
answer the questions “What activities could these entities with these properties be 
expected to engage in?” - or “If this activity occurred, what changes would I expect in the 
surrounding entities and their properties?” For example, a student might say “I know that 
objects fall straight to the ground in air but not in liquids, so there must be some force 
pushing up on objects in liquids that keeps them from falling.” 
Initially, the chaining code was two codes, forward chaining and backward 
chaining.  However, several attempts to use the two codes to analyze student discourse 
revealed that it was difficult to tell whether the students had reasoned backward/forward 
to reach their conclusion, or whether they were just reporting their reasoning in that way.  
We also found some confusion over what exactly backward and forward meant: Was it 
referring to the direction of reasoning (i.e. A implies B implies C vs. C implies B implies 
A) or was it referring to whether students were reasoning about something that occurred 
before or after that observed phenomenon.  Not only were the two codes difficult to 
apply, it also appeared that distinguishing between them did not add anything to our 
understanding of students’ reasoning.  For these reasons, we merged the forward and 





The “Chaining” code helps identify students using unfamiliar scientific 
vocabulary or inappropriately assigning activities.  Those using vocabulary without 
meaning are usually unable to reason backward or forward because they do not articulate 
general properties of the components that caused one event to occur instead of another.  
Similarly, students who inappropriately assert that certain entities can perform certain 
activities tend not to say why those particular activities should be expected and not other 
ones.    
Analogies (A)  
Scientists also use analogies to similar mechanisms in other contexts or fields as a 
framework for understanding new situations (Darden & Craver, 2002; Dunbar, 1995).  
They frequently begin with a previously articulated mechanism and attempt to fit various 
aspects from the new phenomenon into the functional roles and constraints of the original 
mechanism.  An “Analogy” code is used whenever students compare the target 
phenomenon to another.  For example, a student trying to describe the properties of water 
that allow it to support heavy objects on its surface may say “I am thinking about the 
surface of water like a rope with tension that can be pushed down but still resists.”  
Animated Models (AM) 
Reasoning about mechanisms is a potentially taxing cognitive activity, and 
external models provide the “vehicle for keeping in mind all the complex interactions 
among the operations” (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005, p. 427).  A good diagram or model 
illustrates the entities, their activities, their organization, and the productive continuity 
from one stage to the next.  When scientists reason about mechanisms by “running them 





“supplement human abilities to imagine a system in action”  (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 
2005, p. 431).  
We code as “Animated Model” students using external animated models 
(gestures, body movements, etc) to help their peers conceptualize how they were “seeing” 
certain entities acting in the mechanism.  For example, students might hold hands and 
then link arms to model the idea that the surface of water acts like a tight rope with 
tension.   
Hierarchy of Codes 
We arranged the first seven codes in a numerical sequence based primarily on 
their logical connections and in part on our intuitions about what seems more difficult.  
For example, identifying the properties and organization of entities would generally 
require identifying entities, and chaining would involve using information about entities, 
their activities, properties, and organization to construct a step-by-step story for how the 
mechanism runs.  Chaining seems to be the most difficult.  The evidence from coding 
student conversations bears this out: Higher numbered codes, chaining in particular, 
rarely appear without lower number codes. 
Support for this intuitive arrangement comes from Metz’s (1991) work on student 
explanations of sets of gears.  She identifies three phases of explanation that coincide 
with our hierarchy of mechanistic reasoning - “(a) function of the object as explanation, 
(b) connections as explanation, (c) mechanistic explanation” (p. 785).  In associating 
causality with the function of an object, the youngest students are identifying entities in 
the mechanism.  By attending to connections, students are considering properties and 





children is equivalent to our identification of activities and subsequent forward and 
backward chaining.  However, although Metz’s ranking is developmental (she only 
observes older students doing the last phase), we expect to see all ages of students 
reasoning at all levels of the coding scheme.  
The last two mechanism codes can be used in different ways.  Students may use 
analogies simply as direct mappings to describe phenomena and identify components, 
and this may or may not be sophisticated; or they may use them as source of relationships 
for chaining from one stage of the mechanism to another.  Similarly, animated models 
may be used as visible manifestations of sophisticated reasoning, or they may merely 
demonstrate the phenomenon that has been observed or predicted. As a result, for these 
two categories we code their occurrence but do not include them in the hierarchy.  
Refined Methodology: Systematic Application of the Coding Scheme 
We use this coding scheme when students describe their reasoning about a 
scientific phenomenon.  These descriptions may be verbal descriptions during class or 
small-group discussion or written explanations such as test or homework solutions. 
Although my initial analysis of the seeds discussion analyzed blocks of transcript 
for general trends, we now use the mechanism framework to systematically unpack every 
student comment for evidence of any of the nine categories.  We code each individual 
student conversational turn, however long it might be.  One comment may have 
numerous codes: for example, it may include identification of both entities and activities.  
Comments may also have no codes at all, if none of the categories apply.  We do not code 






 In Table 1 below we code an excerpt from the first graders’ discussion about seed 
growth to contrast this more systematic analysis with what was presented above.  
Underlined portions of the transcript indicate evidence of the particular codes that were 
assigned.  Although we have only shown three conversational turns from the discussion, 




 Ms. Mikeska: And so that seed in the sand?   
 Emily: Is just left alone without the s- the water that IE 
  helps it grow in soil.  Because the soil is like hard IE, IPE 
  and the water is like, pssshhh, blocked.  Like with  IE, IA 
  all those sticks and stuff- it’s real hard so the IE, IPE 
  water won’t get through.  But in sand since  IE, IA, C 
  usually sand will be blown away not sticks into  A, IPE, IE 
  the sand- it’s easy that it’s not blocked so it just IE, IA 
  goes—shhhhhhwweeee.  (Motions with both IA, AM 
 hands water flowing down.)   
…     
 Juan: I think it would grow because, because the water DTP, IE 
  goes through it, and if if the water goes through it  IA 
 might receive some water. IE, IA, C 
…     
 Emily: Because if the water is going through it’s not IE, IA 
  exactly where the seed is if you put it near the IE, IA, C 
  top.  Cause the s, cause the water is going near the IE, IA, IOE 
  bottom…and if it’s going near the bottom it’s not IA, IOE 






Data Analysis Methodology 
 In the previous sections we explained the development of the framework used in 
this dissertation to analyze episodes of student mechanistic reasoning.  We now describe 
the more practical aspects of the research methodology: how we selected and analyzed 
data. 
Case Study Methodology 
The analysis in this dissertation follows the tradition of case study methodology 
from qualitative research.  Quantitative methods are not feasible or appropriate here 
because although there has been much discussion on student mechanistic reasoning in the 
literature (see chapter two), research in this area has not yet identified what variables 
determine that reasoning.  There is hence no basis for collecting data from a large 
population, and no well-defined set of quantities on which to perform statistical analyses.  
Instead, we analyze a small number of science discussions to develop case 
studies: rich, detailed descriptions of student reasoning in each episode.   Case study 
analysis is especially well suited to the purpose of this work: to use the mechanism 
framework described above to develop an in-depth understanding of the phenomenology 
of student mechanistic reasoning during scientific inquiry.  It is possible that this 
understanding may later lead to the identification of variables that can be tested using 
more quantitative methods (and the mechanism framework may provide clues to those 
variables), but we do not undertake or speculate about that task here. 
This case study methodology is consistent with the style and tradition of analysis 





Maryland, College Park (e.g. Hammer, 2004; May, Hammer, & Roy, 2006; Rosenberg, 
Hammer, & Phelan, 2006). 
Data Selection  
In this work, we had access to more than 500 hours of previously collected video 
data and written work from two different research projects conducted by the Physics and 
Science Education Research Groups at the University of Maryland, College Park (Case 
Studies of Elementary Student Inquiry in Physical Science: NSF ESI-9986846, Learning 
How to Learn Science: Physics for Bioscience Majors: NSF REC-0087519).  The data 
from these projects spanned contexts from elementary school classrooms to introductory 
college courses.  None of this data was collected for the purpose of studying student 
mechanistic reasoning; it was collected more generally to study issues of student science 
learning and inquiry.  We also had the opportunity to collect additional data specifically 
for analysis of mechanistic reasoning as part of a project analyzing student physics 
learning in grades K-16 (Towards a New Conceptualization of Progress, K-16: 
Resources, Frames, and Networks: NSF REC-0440113).  We obtained copies of students’ 
written responses to physics examination problems and interviewed them about their 
solutions. 
We had three goals in analyzing episodes of student discourse: to test the 
reliability of the coding scheme, to check whether the coding scheme corresponded to 
intuitions about mechanistic reasoning and understandings of professional science 
practice, and to begin to study the dynamics of mechanistic reasoning and other aspects 
of science learning.  To achieve those goals, it was necessary to select episodes of student 





with the mechanism framework.  Episodes were initially selected from all the available 
data based on our sense of what contexts and content topics would most likely generate 
conversations centered on students’ sense of physical mechanism.  Preliminary, cursory 
investigations of possible candidate cases revealed whether the episodes contained ‘good 
code-able stuff;’ if our initial sense in watching the video was that it did not contain 
significant mechanistic reasoning and that systematically coding it would yield mostly no 
or low-level codes, we did not further analyze that episode.  We also selected episodes 
based on a desire to study mechanistic reasoning at all levels of science learning; we 
looked for conversations at both ends of the educational spectrum, from lower elementary 
grades to college and graduate courses.  The episodes presented here are not meant to 
represent a random sample of student science discussions; they are exemplary in their 
sophistication and clarity.  However, while the discussions themselves might not be 
typical, there is no reason to suspect that the students in these episodes are not generally 
representative of their peers.    Thus these conversations do represent possibilities of the 
kinds of things that can happen in K – 16 classrooms. 
The first two case studies (chapters four and five) involve students in the lower 
elementary grades at two suburban public schools in Montgomery County, Maryland.  
The third case study (chapter six) occurs in a reformed, introductory, algebra-based 
physics course at the University of Maryland, College Park.  The final case study (chapter 
seven) analyzes graduate students’ written responses to a classical mechanics qualifying 
exam question in the Department of Physics at the University of Maryland, College Park.  





Data Analysis: Chapters 4,5, and 6 
To study the selected video data, we followed a multi-phase analytical model 
adapted from the methodology developed by several mathematics educators at Rutger’s 
University (Powell, Francisco, & Maher, 2003).     
Phase One: Attentively Viewing and Describing Video Data 
 After video was selected, the first step in analysis was to watch the video 
attentively several times.  In this viewing, we carefully attended to the substance of 
student ideas.  Powell et al. (2003) suggest that the purpose of this stage is to become 
intensely familiar with the content of the video without trying to interpret that content.  In 
as much as is possible, we “watch and listen without intentionally imposing a specific 
analytical lens on [our] viewing” (Powell et al., 2003, p. 415-416).  
 Video data of student discussions was often so dense and lengthy that it was 
difficult to become familiar with the details of its content solely by watching it several 
times; the data needed to be parsed in some way to help make sense of it.  To do so, we 
sometimes divided the video into thirty second time intervals and then ‘stop, watch, and 
describe’ each interval.  As Powell et al. (2003) propose, we tried to be sure that “the 
descriptions are indeed descriptive and not interpretative or inferential” (p. 416) and that 
they remained both simple and factual.  The process of observing strict time intervals was 
very helpful in that it forced us to attend to each individual student comment instead of 
only noticing longer, more developed statements.  This phase was especially helpful for 
analyzing conversations among younger students as their language was less articulate and 





describing the data, we became extensively familiar with the video and with each student, 
his voice, his comments, and the gestures and movements he makes. 
Phase Two: Transcribing the Video Data 
After selecting episodes, we transcribed the video and audio data into written 
form.  This process involved recording not only students’ verbal remarks, but also actions 
or gestures that were relevant to their explanations.  Completed transcripts used in 
analysis included teacher and student utterances, important non-verbal cues, descriptions 
of any external props used, and the length of pauses in the discussion.  However, these 
transcripts were somewhat interpretive; what we chose to record in the written account 
was necessarily influenced by what we were ultimately looking to study.   
Transcription of video data has several benefits for research.  As Tuminaro (2004) 
points out, constructing a written record, like phase one of the methodology, also requires 
the researcher to watch the video several times and attend to students’ exact language; 
this in turn helps him/her become more familiar with the data including potentially 
important subtle details.  The written record also makes it easier to study particular 
comments in depth or to compare across comments.  As Powell et al. (2003) note, “The 
production of the transcript and the physical, static rendering of a research session affords 
researchers opportunities for extended, considered deliberations of talk and noted 
gestures… with transcript data, one can consider more than momentarily the meaning of 
specific utterances” (p. 422).  Transcript data may also give researchers unfamiliar with 





Phase Three: Coding the Video Data and Identifying Critical Events 
In the next phase of analysis, we coded the transcript data line-by-line using the 
mechanism framework described above.  At least two researchers independently coded 
each comment in the transcript.  In addition to assigning a code to each line, we also 
provided memos that described our sense of the students’ meaning or elaborated why we 
coded in particular ways.  Powell et al. (2003) describe this process when “researchers 
write commentary that discusses and justifies the identified material.  At this phase, such 
commentary [in conjunction with the codes themselves] often manifests analytic threads 
of the narrative or storyline [phase four]” (p. 430).  Coding and memo-ing allowed us to 
be precise and articulate about the mechanistic reasoning we observed in each student 
comment. 
Coding of the data presented some methodological challenges.  Although our 
analysis of the data began with some “deductive or a priori codes” (Powell et al., 2003, p. 
429) informed by MDC (2000), part of the objective of this work was to develop codes 
appropriate for identifying mechanistic reasoning in student discourse.  As was expected 
during this development stage, the first few attempts at coding yielded some 
disagreements among coders that required resolution and subsequent modification to the 
coding scheme.  In addition to the changes made to individual codes described above 
(notably the DTP and C codes), several conventions were adopted.   
First, we decided to code every time a student identified an entity, activity, entity 
property or organization instead of only coding it the first time it was said (either by the 
same or a different student).  This convention freed us from having to decide whether a 





own.  Second, we decided not to code all comments literally; prior student comments 
could be used to interpret student meaning in later comments (i.e. to give meaning to 
pronouns such as ‘it’) but later comments could not be used to infer meaning of prior 
comments.  We felt this was appropriate because meaning evident in later comments 
might not yet have been developed in earlier comments.   
Thus initial attempts to code the data in this phase of analysis led to modification 
(e.g. DTP), addition (e.g. IOE), and merging of codes (e.g. C) discussed above as well as 
overall methodological conventions.  We do not consider these modifications to indicate 
a failure in some a priori coding scheme; instead we view them as necessary refinements 
that help us better capture the meaning in our data.  As such, our mechanism framework, 
while grounded in MDC’s characterization, is also appropriately “inductive and 
emergent” (Powell et al., 2003, p. 429) from student data.  This iterative application and 
modification of the coding scheme is similar to aspects of grounded theoretical methods 
but is different in that the codes did not entirely emerge from the data. 
The independent coders checked their agreement and resolved all discrepancies 
through discussion.  Inter-rater reliability was calculated for the first two of the four 
episodes during which most of the modification to the coding scheme occurred.  We 
calculated inter-rater reliability along two dimensions: Data Identification and Coding. 
The first dimension (Data Identification) is a check on whether the researchers identify 
the same conversational turns as relevant data for analysis.  The other (Coding) is a check 
on whether the researchers apply the same category of the framework to a given 





After an entire video transcript was coded, we constructed graphs of mechanism 
code (1- 7) versus utterance (related to time) for the episode.   The relationship between 
the graphs and the video data was bi-directional; patterns in the graphs indicated 
moments in the video that deserved closer study and moments in the video that seemed 
especially mechanistic indicated places in the graph to observe possible trends.  In this 
way, study of both the video and the graph helped identify what Powell et al. (2003) call 
“significant moments” or “critical events” (p. 416).  In addition, in citing Gattegno (1970, 
1974, 1987, 1988), Powell et al. also describe how “these [critical] events or moments 
often compel researchers to reflect on their antecedent and consequent events” (p. 418).  
Constructing a detailed account of the video transcript (coding) and a corresponding 
graphical plot of those codes helped indicate critical moments that guided our 
interpretation of the rest of the data.   
Phase Four: Constructing a Narrative 
The final phase of the methodology was a more free-form, narrative-style analysis 
aimed at making meaning from the data.  It involved “trying to discern an emerging and 
evolving narrative about the data” that resulted from “making sense of the data with 
particular attention to identified codes” (Powell et al., 2003, p 430). That process of 
“constructing a storyline” of the data required us “to come up with insightful and 
coherent organizations of the critical events” (p. 430) that spoke to the research question.  
We attempted to precisely describe the dynamics of student mechanistic reasoning in 
each episode based on the line-by-line coding and critical moments.  That is, we were 
interested in obtaining a picture of how mechanistic reasoning develops in addition to just 





discussions with other members of the research group (primarily Hammer, Redish, 
Scherr, and Elby); “shared viewing involving participants or other researchers… can 
enhance the quality of the interpretations” (Powell et al., 2003, p. 430) because ideas 
were subjected to critique from multiple perspectives.  Building the narrative was the 
most interpretive and inferential of all the methodological stages because we used the 
data to tell a story about the nature and value of student mechanistic reasoning.  One 
encouraging result of our analysis with the coding scheme was that the coding supported 
this phase of the analysis both by helping us identify phenomena in student discussions 
and by suggesting ways of interpreting the dynamics of those discussions. 
Data Analysis: Chapter 7 
One notable exception to the multi-step methodology described above is the 
analysis presented in chapter seven, which comes from the written work of two students 
on a graduate physics qualifying exam.  The written work did not require “attentive 
viewing” or transcription in the sense described above.  However, we did spend extensive 
time going through student responses in at attempt to understand the meaning of each part 
of their solution.  The written work also did not lend itself to any line-by-line coding; it 
was unclear what appropriate ‘lines’ would be since each written line of text did not 
necessarily correspond to time or anything meaningful.  Instead, it was coded more 
holistically as in the example at the beginning of the chapter, by looking for general 
patterns that corresponded to mechanism codes.  The video interview data corresponding 
to the written work was attentively viewed and transcribed as described above, but it was 







This chapter describes the motivation and development of a framework for 
reliably recognizing nascent mechanistic reasoning in student scientific inquiry.  
Although influenced by the entire tradition in the philosophy of science literature that 
describes the history of science as the pursuit of mechanisms, we draw most heavily on 
Machamer, Darden, and Craver’s (2000) characterization of mechanisms in 
contemporary professional science.  The language of their account not only aligns well 
with our conception of how science is practiced by research physicists, it also overlaps 
with the kinds of things we see students doing in the classroom.  We explain how MDC’s 
work was modified and refined into a coding scheme that is used to systematically 
analyze case studies of student discourse, and described how that analysis is carried out. 
The rest of this dissertation (specifically the next four chapters) provides the 
results of using the mechanism framework to analyze episodes of student reasoning.  We 
show the usefulness of this framework not only for identifying mechanistic reasoning, but 
also for understanding the dynamics and value of student science discussions.  The 
mechanism framework provides a richer description of the quality of inquiry than is 





Chapter 4: Mechanistic Reasoning In Young Children7 
Introduction 
 Science educators regularly attempt to characterize what school aged children can 
and cannot do or how they can and cannot think in designing standards, curricula, or 
assessments. As Metz (1995) notes: 
 
The field of science instruction has long struggled to define constraints on 
developmentally appropriate science curricula for children.  At the heart of this 
debate is the issue of what aspects or forms of scientific inquiry are within reach 
of young children. (p. 93) 
 
The National Science Education Standards (NRC, 1996) claim that the science content 
standard for elementary school “sets forth some abilities of scientific inquiry appropriate 
for students in grades K – 4” (p. 121).  Educators are rightly focused on designing 
scientific inquiry that is age-appropriate so that students can engage in it meaningfully. 
 Given that inquiry should be age-appropriate, the question becomes: What is age-
appropriate?  Metz (1995) describes that school science assumes that young students 
should be limited to concrete thinking “with a focus on the processes of observation, 
ordering, and categorization of the directly observable” because “abstractions, ideas not 
tied to the concrete and manipulable, are inaccessible to concrete operational children”  
(p. 93, 95).  Hammer (2004) similarly claims, “the lists of process skills organized by 
                                                
7 A version of this chapter (authored by Russ, R.S., Scherr, R.E., Hammer, D., & Mikeska, J.) has 





developmental level remain the basis for thinking about objectives and assessments with 
respect to science as inquiry” (p. 326).  For example, the National Science Education 
Standards (1996) encourage elementary teachers to help their students explore the world 
through “observation, manipulation, and classification of common objects” (p. 123) and 
“examining and qualitatively describing objects and their behavior” because these 
activities are “the necessary precursors to the later introduction of more abstract ideas in 
the upper grade levels” (p. 126).  The standards go on to describe several difficulties and 
limitations of young students’ thinking, including that they cannot understand many 
complex, theoretical concepts.  Current school science creates inquiry experiences for 
elementary students based on the assumption that they are developmentally constrained 
to concrete tasks and thus cannot generate theories. 
However, much of this work systematically underestimates children’s abilities; it 
is grounded in an inaccurate perception of what is age-appropriate for elementary school 
children.  In her examination of the assumptions of school science, Metz (1995) provides 
examples from Piaget’s work and non-Piagetian developmental literatures and finds that 
they both “indicate that elementary school children are actually capable of much richer 
scientific inquiry than these assumptions imply” (p. 120).  Hammer (2004) and Hammer 
and van Zee (2006) present a series of case studies from grade school classrooms 
depicting students engaged in rich, sophisticated inquiry not characterized by 
experimental process skills; the students engage in theoretical discussions about physical 
cause and effect using their own common sense and everyday reasoning.   These 
examples “give a general appreciation of the sorts of things children are capable of doing, 





work with children includes similar examples of the richness of students’ theoretical 
reasoning (e.g. Brewer, Chinn, & Samarapungavan, 1998; Kuhn, 1989; May, Hammer, & 
Roy, 2006).  These possibilities for student thinking suggest that age-appropriate inquiry 
for elementary school students should not be limited by traditional ideas about 
developmental constraints. 
 This chapter presents further evidence that the assumptions made by current 
curriculum designers about elementary student abilities are invalid and that young 
children are in fact capable of rich, mechanistic reasoning.  In it, the mechanism coding 
scheme that was developed from descriptions of professional science is used to analyze a 
discussion among first-grade students about falling objects.  Mechanistic reasoning is 
abundantly present even in these young students and appears episodically throughout 
their conversation.  At one moment, the students may be engaged at the highest levels of 
the coding scheme and the next they are not.  As such, this analysis shows that it would 
be inappropriate to characterize the students as either having or lacking the ability to 
reason mechanistically based only on a few episodes.  Application of the framework 
gives results consistent with our intuitive assessments and also offers new information 
about the students’ inquiry: it identifies specific transitions into and out of mechanistic 
reasoning.  The framework also gives insight into those transitions. 
Context for Analysis 
We illustrate the use of the coding scheme with a discussion among first grade 
students about falling objects.  Because the discussion is rich with student statements that 
seem intuitively to resemble causal mechanistic reasoning, analysis allows us to check 





This discussion involves first grade students at a public elementary school in 
Montgomery County, Maryland.8  The students are engaged in science lessons one to 
three times a week for approximately forty-five minutes each time.  At the time of this 
classroom conversation, the instructor was participating in a project to develop materials 
for teacher education and help prospective and current elementary teachers gain 
experience in interpreting and assessing the substance of student reasoning (Hammer & 
van Zee, 2006).   
Educational policy in Montgomery County specifies that first graders should be 
able to “describe the different ways that objects move (e.g. straight, round and round, fast 
and slow)” (MCPS, 2001).  With this goal in mind, as well as personal and mandated 
inquiry goals, the instructor Ms. Mikeska (as her students called her) introduces a 
question to her students about two falling objects: a book and a piece of paper.   
Synopsis of Classroom Inquiry  
On the first day, Ms. Mikeska asks the students to predict what will happen if she 
drops a book and a flat piece of paper at the same time from the same height.  The 
students all agree that the book will hit the ground first and offer several explanations as 
to why.  At the next science lesson, Ms. Mikeska shows the students a tape of their 
discussion and has them help her summarize their ideas.  The students then break up into 
small groups to test their prediction.  After conducting their experiments, students report 
their results to the class.  Different groups report different results (in fact, all possible 
                                                
8 The instructor of the class has written an analysis of this class that appears elsewhere, including 
both video and transcript data. To be consistent with the video, we use the children’s real first 
names, with consent from their parents.  Mikeska, J. (2006).  Falling Objects.  In D. Hammer & 
E. van Zee (Eds.), Seeing the Science in Children’s Thinking: Case Studies of Student Inquiry in 





results are represented).  The students show no concern over the disagreement.  Ms. 
Mikeska then asks them to predict what will happen when she drops a book and a 
crumpled piece of paper from the same height at the same time.  They briefly make 
predictions before breaking into small groups to try the experiment.  In the discussion 
that follows those experiments, the students all agree that the book and the paper hit the 
ground at the same time, and spontaneously offer their reasoning for why that occurs.   
We have discussed this pair of classes elsewhere (Hammer, Russ, Scherr & 
Mikeska, in press) with respect to students shifting into and out of modes of inquiry we 
consider scientific.  There our analysis is qualitative and informal; in this chapter we 
present a more rigorous analysis of mechanistic thinking as one aspect of scientific 
thinking.  Our data for this analysis is the transcript of the second day’s discussion, which 
we provide in full in Appendix B. 
Mechanism Coding Inter-rater Reliability 
There are two tasks in coding transcripts.  One is to recognize that a 
conversational turn has meaning in it to code; that is, to identify relevant data in the 
transcript (Data Identification).  The other is to decide which categories of the framework 
apply (Coding).  Ultimately, we hope the coding scheme will facilitate both recognition 
and analysis of mechanistic reasoning, and so we considered inter-rater reliability for 
each of these tasks. 
Moreover, we first assessed inter-rater reliability between R. Scherr, a research 
scientist in the Physics Education Research group, and myself.  Because both are 
education researchers who work closely together, their agreement might reflect their 





strength or a weakness of the coding scheme – a strength in that the coding scheme 
captures those shared perspectives, but a weakness in that the coding scheme might not 
be accessible to those not sharing that perspective.  As a check against the latter concern, 
we assessed inter-rater reliability among R. Scherr, myself, and the classroom teacher 
Ms. Mikeska.  The result showed a somewhat lower agreement in Data Identification 
(0.79 instead of 0.88), but a comparable agreement in those codings (0.88 and 0.86).9 By 
separating these two groups, we were able to determine whether the coding scheme 
matched both educational research intuitions and tacit instructional perceptions.    
A summary of the pre-discussion inter-rater reliability scores is given in Table 2 
below.  After discussion, there was 100% agreement among all coders for both 
categories. 
 
  Data identification Coding 
1st and 2nd Author 0.88 0.86 
1st, 2nd, and 4th Author 0.79 0.88 
Table 2 
 
These figures for inter-rater reliability do not include the first code (now “Describing 
Target Phenomenon”) because it was revised twice during the analysis of this transcript.  
An initial check for agreement among coders revealed that the first code had significantly 
lower inter-rater reliability than the rest of the coding scheme; discussion indicated 
differences in code interpretation.  Originally, the first code in the coding scheme was 
                                                
9 Agreement in Coding among R. Scherr, Ms. Mikeska, and me is higher than among just R. 





“Establishing Phenomenon,” a code ideally meant to capture times when students, like 
MDC’s scientists, were attempting to reach consensus about the outcome of the 
phenomenon.  Practically, however, we found it difficult (perhaps impossible) to tell 
whether students were intending to come to agreement.  To avoid having to make such 
judgments but still maintain the spirit of recognizing when students discuss phenomena 
they hope to explain, we changed the code to “Describing Phenomenon” and did not 
attempt to tease apart times when students agreed and when they did not.  Another 
problem with the “Describing Phenomenon” code occurred because it was unclear which 
phenomenon the code referenced: the primary phenomenon of the discussion, or also 
possible tangential or peripheral phenomena.  For simplicity, we changed the code to 
“Describing Target Phenomenon” and used it only when students described the primary 
phenomenon being discussed (often dictated by the question the teacher posed).  Since 
these changes occurred during the coding of this transcript, independent inter-rater 
reliability of the new code (DTP) could not be calculated for this data set.  However, 
subsequent application of this coding scheme to other data with other independent coders 
has shown comparable inter-rater reliability when including this code (Russ & Hutchison, 
2006).   
Student Mechanistic Reasoning 
In what follows, we highlight several portions of the second day’s discussion, 
starting when the student groups present their results for the experiment with the book 





Low-level Mechanistic Coding 
1.  Class discussion 
Ms. Mikeska began the large class discussion by asking students to report their 
results. She expected all students to report that the book hit the ground first, and was 
surprised when three different results were reported. 
 
Teacher:  What, what happened when you dropped the book and the piece of 
paper at the same time, at the same height? Huh, what happened? 
(Students raising hands.)  Okay, Ebony why don’t you go ahead 
and begin. 
Ebony:  To me, first, the paper fell first. 
Student 1:  No way, no! 
Brianna:  Whoa!!  The book fell first. 
Ebony:  No, to me the paper fell first. 
Students:  No! 
Student 2:   It fell at the same time. 
Ebony:  No, the book, um – the paper fell – the paper fell first to me! 
Henok:   Yeah, but not to me! 
Ebony:   To me, it fell, the paper fell first (Voice trailing off.) 
Jorge:   Yeah, but did the book fall first, just like the paper? 
Ebony:   No, the papers fell first. 
Henok:   The book fell first. 
Ebony:   No, the paper – to me. 
Alison:   To Ebony – to Ebony the paper fell first. 
Student 3:  To me, not to you. 
Brianna:  And to all of us the book might’ve fell first to us. 





Jorge:  Our paper – our paper goes slowly.  It’s, it’s, it’s a little bit out of 
[practice?]. 
Rachel:  With me and Julio twice the book and the paper tied – twice. 
 
2.  Informal observations 
Ms. Mikeska was frustrated when the students showed no interest in reconciling 
their contradictory observations.  Her instructional assessment was that the students were 
not doing quality scientific reasoning in this segment.  Indeed, the students’ lack of 
interest in establishing a common phenomenon is in contrast to the ideal behavior of 
scientists, for whom the first step in accounting for a phenomenon is agreeing on its 
existence.  In this segment, we see the students as participating in a “show-and-tell” 
activity, in which everyone is entitled to her or his own account:  “To Ebony, the paper 
fell first,” and to others “the book might’ve fell first” or tied with the paper. 
3.  Mechanistic analysis 
Ms. Mikeska asked the students to observe and explain the result of the “race” 
between the book and the flat piece of paper.  Ebony began the discussion by describing 
the target phenomenon (DTP) that he supposedly observed in his small group: the paper 
fell before the book.  Brianna, Student 2, Henok, Jorge, and Rachel all responded to 
Ebony by reporting other phenomena (DTP) – either the book falling first or the book and 
the paper reaching the ground at the same time.  Alison, often a leader in class 
discussions, firmly restated Ebony’s phenomenon (DTP) as “his,” giving other students 
license to have their own potentially different results.   
Analysis of this segment shows repeated “DTP” codes that are not followed by 





chaining).  Were the students working together to describe a phenomenon they could then 
explain, there would more likely be only a small number of “DTP” comments followed 
by other elements of mechanistic reasoning.  The students’ acceptance of unreconciled, 
contradictory phenomena indicates that they may not be approaching the conversation in 
a scientifically sophisticated way; scientists often attempt to agree on targets for 
explanation and then proceed to construct those explanations.  By using the mechanism 
coding scheme we are able to identify and articulate the nature of students’ lack of 
progress during this part of the discussion. 
Intermediate-level Mechanistic Coding 
1.  Class discussion 
In response to Ms. Mikeska’s explicit request for an explanation of the conflicting 
results — “How could it be that we got different results when we did the same thing?” — 
many of the students shrugged their shoulders and claimed ignorance about the question.  
One student suggested an answer. 
 
Teacher:  Do you have an idea? Rachel has – 
Rachel:  Forces of gravity? 
Henok:  Yeah. 
Teacher:  Rachel has an idea. 
Rachel:  Forces of gravity. 
Alison:  Yeah! 
Diamond:  What are forces of gravity? 
Rachel:  Gravity is what –  
Alison:  Gravity, gra  – you know how when we jump we always land back 





Rachel:  Exactly. It’s what keeps us down on the ground.  (Patting the 
ground.) 
Student 1:  Yeah. 
Autumn:  Like ground magnets. 
Ebony:  And no gravity.  No gravity is when you’re like in space and you 
can never ever really fall down. [??] 
Julio:   You know, you just float in the air. (Ebony nods in agreement.) 
Alison:  Gravity – see how when I jump (Stands up and jumps.) I’m just 
landing at the same place on the ground that - because gravity, 
gravity is just pulling me down. 
… 
Teacher: Okay, so, so what you’re saying is that a for – what is a – you’re 
saying that the force of gravity –  
Rachel: - is pulling it down at different times. 
Teacher: So you’re saying the force of gravity is pulling the book down at a 
different time than the paper. 
Rachel: Yeah probably, and sometimes it’s pulling it down at the same 
time, or pulling the paper down… before the book and then the 
book’s pulling it down before the paper.  Gravity’s pulling the 
book down before the paper. 
 
2.  Informal Observations 
Although it seems good for the students to move beyond declaring their 
contradictory outcomes, we have mixed feelings about Rachel’s use of the term 
“gravity.” Rachel may have been making a substantive suggestion, trying to identify a 
relevant causal agent for falling that could somehow account for the results – perhaps 





times.  Or she may have seen Ms. Mikeska as looking for a more scientific-sounding 
answer, and responded with a science vocabulary word for that reason.   
3.  Mechanistic analysis 
Rachel identifies gravity as an entity in the mechanism (IE) and both Henok and 
Alison agree with her. Alison and Rachel both use analogies (A) to jumping to help them 
identify a property of gravity (IPE): it keeps us on the ground.  Autumn makes the 
analogy (A) of gravity being like magnets.  Alison presents the animated model of 
jumping (AM) to draw the other students’ attention to the role of gravity and specifically 
identifies the activity that gravity engages in: pulling down (IA).  In response to the 
teacher’s questioning, Rachel reasserts that gravity is pulling (IA) and suggests that it can 
pull at different rates. 
Unlike in the previous episode, intermediate-numbered codes appear in this 
segment of the discussion.  However, the students do not identify any set up conditions 
(SC), general properties of gravity (IPE), or spatial organization (IOE) that would cause 
gravity to pull things at different rates.  The presence of IE codes without corresponding 
IPE codes in this section of the transcript provides some evidence that Rachel is using 
unfamiliar scientific vocabulary she does not understand; if students use entities that are 
meaningful and make physical sense to them, we would expect to see them also able to 
identify relevant properties of those entities.  In addition, the students do not do any 
backward or forward chaining (C), perhaps because they have not identified general 





High-level Mechanistic Coding 
1.  Class discussion 
Ms. Mikeska decided to conduct several trials of dropping the book and the flat 
sheet of paper, so that the students could all see and agree on what happens.  She went on 
to pose the question of what would happen if she crumpled the paper, and the students 
predicted that the book and paper would then fall at the same rate.  They went off to try 
it, and then gathered again to discuss their results.  This time they all quickly agreed that 
the book and paper fell at the same time, and without prompting they began to discuss 
differences between the flat and crumpled pieces of paper. 
   
Julio:   Um, crumpled up paper us is kind-of heavy. (7 second pause) 
Brianna:   If it’s balled up it’s still not heavy it’s the same size. 
Autumn?:   It’s just a little bit like -   
Brianna: If you need the heaviest. (She picks up the crumpled paper and 
uncrumples it.) 
Autumn:   Why are you doing that? 
Students:  [Laughter.] 
Brianna:   It’s still at the same size. (Lifts the paper up and down in front of 
her.) It still feels – (Crumples the paper back up.) 
Students:  [Laughter] 
Brianna:   - it still feels um – 
Student 1:  Can I see? 
Autumn:   It’s not heavy. 
Brianna:   It still feels –  
Alison:   My, my dad could probably throw that –  






2.  Informal observations 
The students were now talking about the “heaviness” of the ball of paper 
compared to the flat piece, returning to a theme from their conversation on the first day 
when they had predicted the book would fall more quickly because it was heavier (or, 
they also said, had more “strength”) than the flat sheet of paper.  They disagreed, though, 
over whether the crumpled paper is heavier, with Brianna offering her argument for why 
it cannot be heavier:  The paper is “still the same size” whether it is crumpled or flat.     
3.  Mechanistic analysis 
Julio identified a property of the crumpled paper  – it is heavy (IPE).  It is possible 
he inferred its heaviness from his reasoning, like everyone’s the day before, that heavier 
objects fall faster; it is also possible that the paper felt heavier to him and he was using 
this property to explain the result.   
Brianna responded to Jorge by forward chaining (C) from an activity to an entity 
property, making the argument that the activity of crumpling (IA) cannot change the size 
(presumably associated with weight) of the paper (IPE).  Brianna then picked up the 
paper, flattened it, and crumpled it again (AM), demonstrating that nothing is lost or 
gained in the process.  She “weighed” the paper in her hand to support her claim (AM).  
Autumn, who had earlier asked Brianna why she was manipulating the paper, supported 
Brianna’s conclusion about heaviness (IPE) after seeing the visible model.   
Brianna’s comments convinced the students to drop the idea that “heaviness” 
caused the book to fall faster and pursue other mechanisms for the phenomenon, in spite 
of the fact that the students had all agreed on the “heaviness” explanation the previous 





stated that the crumpled paper’s weight had changed, without backward or forward 
chaining from any other known properties of the entities.  Brianna, in contrast, turned the 
class’s attention to the only activity that could have caused any change in the paper’s 
properties – the crumpling – and helped the other students recall that crumpling doesn’t 
change an object’s amount of “stuff.”  Second, Brianna’s use of an animated model helps 
the students follow each step in her mechanism, thereby reducing the amount of cognitive 
work they have to do to understand her idea.  Our understanding of the value of Brianna’s 
reasoning emerges from the mechanistic coding scheme: Brianna supported her idea to 
the class by forward chaining from known activities and providing an animated model. 
Recognizing Shifts between Levels of Coding 
In addition to aligning with our intuitive impressions from the conversation, the 
mechanism coding scheme has also helped us recognize phenomena in the data that we 
might otherwise have missed.  That, in the end, is our purpose with it: Having a 
systematic coding scheme allows us to establish target phenomena for our research, 
ultimately to support development of models of knowledge and reasoning.   
Coding mechanistic reasoning for the entire conversation revealed patterns in the 
students’ thinking:  High level codes tended to cluster, a phenomenon that seems to recur 
in our data and that we can then try to explain (Hammer, Russ, Scherr & Mikeska, in 
press).  The graphical display in Figure 2 shows the occurrence of mechanism codes (on 
the vertical axis) over time (indicated on the horizontal axis by transcript line number).  A 






Figure 2: Mechanism coding of student conversation about falling objects.  Arrows 
indicate apparent shifts in the conversation.  The mechanism codes are as follows: 
(1) Describing Target Phenomenon, (2) Set-Up Conditions, (3) Identifying Entities, 
(4) Identifying Activities, (5) Identifying Properties of Entities, (6) Identifying 
Organization of Entities, (7) Chaining (Backward and Forward). 
 
The graph shows that the pattern of codes shifts several times over the course of 
the conversation; we note three significant shifts with vertical arrows.  
The first shift, at line 82, shows students transitioning between low-level codes to 
high-level codes.  This transition corresponds to the point in the conversation when the 
students move from describing the target phenomenon in a “show-and-tell” manner to 
identifying entities, activities, and properties through analogies and animated models 
(from episode one to episode two in the above analysis).    Line 82, interestingly, is the 





that happen?  How could it be that we all got these different results?”  After her question, 
intermediate mechanistic codes prevail for several minutes but do not progress to higher-
level codes.  The students then revert to the lowest level, describing the phenomenon, 
around line 130.  We can make sense of why the students could not go further:  The 
unfamiliarity of the entity they identified (“gravity”) made identifying properties, set-up 
conditions, or organization of entities inaccessible. 
The reasoning remains at a low level until the teacher again explicitly asks them 
to explain their results at line 175.  The graph suggests that the students transition again 
into a higher level of sophistication.  However, inspection of the transcript reveals that 
during this time, the students are joking about gravity being “tired” – engaging in a 
“fantasy mechanism” rather than a serious one.  The mechanism coding does not 
distinguish the two, which highlights, for us, the importance of closely inspecting the 
transcript.  It is interesting to observe that this particular episode of fantasy reasoning 
does not include analogies and animated models, which are common when these young 
students explain their understanding.  The teacher recognizes that the students are being 
silly and attempts to move them out of this mode.   
The next shift occurs around line 215 after several students have predicted that the 
book and the crumpled piece of paper will fall at the same time.  The students quickly 
reach consensus and spontaneously jump to a higher level of sophistication (as described 
in episode three above).  Identification of entities and their properties and activities is 
followed by attempts to causally connect them through chaining (e.g., when Diamond 
says that crumpling the paper cannot cause a change in its heaviness).  The students’ 





necessary building blocks for chaining, after which students look for new aspects of the 
mechanism to pursue.  For example, though some students originally attribute the paper 
falling first to it being heavier (IPE, code 5), it is Brianna’s attention to the crumpling 
(IA, code 4) that allows her to chain (C, code 7) that the property they identified cannot 
be relevant in this case.  After that chaining eliminates the properties students were using 
in their explanations, the students automatically return to reasoning at mid-level codes by 
looking for other causal components of the situation (either IE, IA, or IPE).  Diamond 
suggests that the shape of the paper (IPE) is potentially important because flat paper 
rocks back and forth  (IA) on its way down but the book and crumpled paper do not.  She 
explains:  
 
Diamond:  ‘Cause the piece of paper was balled up, it don’t go like this no 
more (Shows a rocking motion with her right arm.) 
Brianna:  No, yeah.  It don’t, yeah.  It just drops, kind of like the booklet. 
 
The students use the shape (IPE) and activity of rocking (IA) of the paper to 
reason as to why (C) the crumpled paper falls at the same speed as the book.  The coding 
scheme helps identify these more subtle shifts in reasoning as well as larger transitions.   
We can also begin to speculate about why those shifts might occur.  For example, 
the initial transition from the lowest to the middle level codes is transitory; the students 
fall back into lower level quickly.  This shift back to the lower level may result from 
students’ unfamiliarity with the entities they are discussing (which prevents them from 
identifying properties or chaining to construct a complete mechanism for the 





discussion.  These possibilities give clues as to how the students may be viewing the 
purpose of the conversation, either as show-and-tell story time or a sense-making 
discussion.  
When studying the episodic nature of the conversation, it is important to note that 
some of the same students who in one episode are reasoning at the lowest levels shift to 
higher levels in another episode.  In that way, not only does the conversation transition 
among levels (as indicated by the graph), the individual students do as well.  If we were 
to assess student abilities based only on one episode, we might obtain an impoverished 
view of their ability to reason mechanistically.  Consider Alison as an example.  In the 
first episode she helps lead the class in a less sophisticated, low-level show-and-tell 
conversation.  However, in episode two she identifies entity properties and activities with 
analogies and animated models.  Brianna is a more striking example.  Like Alison, in the 
first episode Brianna engages in the show-and-tell conversation by unproblematically 
reporting her contradictory results (the lowest-level code, DTP).  In contrast, during 
episode three Brianna engages in the highest level codes – chaining - to show other 
students that changes in weight cannot cause the phenomenon they observed.   
By looking across episodes we discover that both students can, but do not always, 
reason in a sophisticated way.  As such, it is not appropriate or necessary to teach them to 
reason mechanistically; instead they should be given opportunities to practice and refine 
the resources they already have (and use at some times) with subject matter that lends 
itself to mechanistic thinking.  That practice will hopefully encourage them to use 





phenomenon so that episodes filled with high-level codes will become both more 
frequent and longer lasting.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, the framework developed from accounts of professional science 
identifies corresponding mechanistic reasoning in first-graders and so identifies the 
beginnings of science in children’s thinking.  This case study adds to others by providing 
evidence that young children are capable of the kind of rich, theoretical reasoning often 
excluded from scientific inquiry based on developmental constraint arguments.  In doing 
so, it “suggests higher ceilings [in the possibilities of young children’s science 
instruction] than have previously been assumed” (Metz, 1995, p. 121).  The analysis 
supports previous claims that students, even young children, arrive in our science classes 
with productive intellectual resources for scientific thinking (e.g. Hammer, 2004; 
Hammer & van Zee, 2006).  
The analysis here also shows that children may only apply their resources for 
mechanistic thinking episodically and as such demonstrates some of the variability we 
expect from our manifold resources ontology (see discussion in chapter one).  At some 
moments of the conversation, there is evidence of mechanistic reasoning up to and 
including chaining, “reasoning about one part of a mechanism on the basis of what is 
known or conjectured about other parts” (Darden, 2002, p. S362).  At other moments, 
students do not even identify entities or activities that could participate in a mechanism. 
To judge students based on their performance in any one of those moments might 





that student thinking is variable with context (e.g. diSessa, 1993) and inappropriately 
characterized by developmental levels (e.g. Metz, 1995).   
The mechanism framework also provides insight into the dynamics of this 
variability.  Whether students transition into or out of mechanistic reasoning may depend 
on the entities and activities they have nominated.  
Finally, the fact that the framework developed from Machamer, Darden, and 
Craver’s (2000) characterization of professional bioscientists successfully identifies 
aspects of mechanistic reasoning in young children has implications for studying student 
learning.  It seems that an understanding of mature science can inform an understanding 
of nascent science.  In later chapters the framework is also used to identify mechanistic 
reasoning in college and graduate physics students, indicating that it may provide one 





Chapter 5: Mechanistic Reasoning Independent of Canonical 
Correctness10 
Introduction 
Given its prominence in science reform, educators and researchers quite 
reasonably want to assess the quality of students’ inquiry.  However, for many of them, 
evaluating student inquiry equates to assessing whether the conceptual understanding that 
results from that inquiry is consistent with canonical knowledge of the field, i.e. whether 
the answer students arrive at is correct (e.g. Lee & Songer, 2003; Marx et al., 2004).  For 
example, Marx et al. (2004) evaluate sixth grade students’ learning in an inquiry-based 
curriculum with questions such as “Which substance occurs in the largest amount in 
‘clean’ air?” and “Explain why it is easy to use a screwdriver to open a can of paint.  Use 
the terms machine, force, and distance in your response” (p. 1076-1077).  They also note 
that assessments of inquiry based on content (and experimental process skills) are 
ubiquitous in the science education research community.  This commitment to assessing 
students against the canon of accepted science knowledge manifests itself in how teachers 
respond to incorrect comments, how educational researchers define their research 
questions and goals, and how policy makers design curriculum and standardized tests. 
 Despite this trend to formally assess student inquiry along conceptual measures, 
many educators would agree that having the right answer is not the only important part of 
inquiry.  There are other aspects of inquiry that deserve careful attention.  In particular, 
                                                
10 This chapter is an extension of work published elsewhere in  Russ, R. S. & Hutchison, P. (2006).  It’s 
Okay to be Wrong: Recognizing Mechanistic Reasoning during Student Inquiry.  Proceedings from the 7th 





many educators intuitively value student ideas that are mechanistic; there is something 
‘good’ about mechanistic explanations (see chapter one).  If a teacher hears two 
explanations, one that is mechanistic and one that is not, he will probably have a sense 
that the mechanistic one is better and more scientific in some way.  In addition to this 
informal sense that educators have about the value of mechanistic reasoning, reasoning 
about mechanisms is also one of the primary ways that scientific knowledge is 
constructed (chapters two and three) and an integral part of how students make sense of 
novel phenomenon (chapters two, four, six, and seven).  Inquiry surely has value beyond 
whether its products are correct when judged against the canon. 
 Consider also that within the practice of science itself, the work of scientists is 
valued regardless of whether or not it turns out to be right.  The history of science is full 
of examples where eminent scientists arrived at conclusions later judged incorrect 
(Darden, 1998).  For example, Isaac Newton formally proposed the Corpuscular Theory 
of Light in 1704. 
 
 Luminous bodies emit corpuscules that are tiny point particles of light with no 
mass.  The properties of light (as observed at that time) can be explained by 
applying Newton’s laws of motion developed for objects with mass to these 
corpuscules.  Specifically, light reflection occurs in the same way balls bounce off 
walls: the surfaces exert a normal (contact) force in the opposite direction on the 
moving light particles, changing the direction of their acceleration.  Light refracts 
at the boundary between materials because light particles are accelerated at 






There are two points worth noting about Newton’s theory.  First, at the time he presented 
it Newton’s theory was not judged for “correctness” because there was no accepted 
answer with which to compare it.  Instead, it was judged on whether or not it provided a 
logical, mechanistic picture of the physical world that accounted for all the evidence 
available to him at the time and made sense based on other experiences (in this case, 
experience with massive objects).   Second, scientists now know that Newton’s 
corpuscular theory does not correctly explain either the reflection or refraction of light; 
the wave nature of light is needed.  However, both Newton and his theory are still valued 
for making scientific contributions to the study of light. 
Bearing in mind Newton’s theory, recall the explanation given by the Rick for 
why salt water has a higher boiling point than fresh water (Chin & Brown, 2000).   
 
Rick:  Salt in it… makes the water thicker.  And it kind of took more heat to melt 
the water that had salt in it…  It [salt] kind of fills up a lot of empty spaces 
between the [water] molecules.  And so the heat couldn’t pass through it 
as fast as it did through the plain water.  So it had to add more heat to 
break through the salt particles and heat up the water. (p. 122) 
 
Rick does not give an entirely canonical answer; salt water actually takes longer 
to boil than fresh water because the salt molecules replace water molecules on the surface 
so that fewer water molecules can vaporize, making it take more heat for the vapor 
pressure of the water to equal the external pressure.  However, he reasons mechanistically 
that the salt fills up the empty space between the water and thus prevents heat from 





to him and makes sense based on other experiences: we can imagine some molecules 
blocking others from heat in the same way having more people in a room might block a 
person on one side from finding a person on the other.  The nature of Rick’s sophisticated 
thinking during inquiry warrants attention even though his answer is wrong.  As in this 
case, valuing mechanistic reasoning may involve valuing inquiry even when it leads to 
incorrect answers, in the same way that valuing Newton’s work means valuing it even 
when it was incorrect.   
 Educators who want to be aware of and promote mechanistic reasoning in their 
classrooms cannot reasonably limit assessment of student inquiry to conceptual 
correctness because such assessments miss the mark.  Judging student work against the 
canon cannot capture the sophistication of mechanistic reasoning.  For example, 
evaluating Newton and Rick based on how well their conceptual understanding aligns 
with canonical concepts misrepresents their inquiry by giving an impoverished view of 
good scientific inquiry that arrives at incorrect conclusions.  Alternatively, such 
assessments might judge inquiry highly in instances when the students provided correct 
answers they do not understand.  Such judgments assume (perhaps tacitly) that if students 
do inquiry well they’ll get the right answer.  Good scientific inquiry does not guarantee 
true knowledge - either historically or in the classroom. 
In this chapter, the framework for identifying mechanistic reasoning is used to 
reveal valuable aspects of student inquiry overlooked by current research that focuses on 
correctness.  The coding scheme is applied to a discussion between second grade students 
about why empty juice boxes collapse when you suck on the straw; we find that it is 





correctness.  While traditional conceptual assessments may dismiss student conversations 
in which the correct canonical knowledge is not discussed, analysis with the mechanism 
coding shows students engaged in sophisticated mechanistic reasoning regardless of 
whether the concepts themselves are correct.  Evidence from the transcript suggests that 
in overly attending to correctness, teachers may actually undermine their own objectives 
by pushing students out of a more sophisticated reasoning mode that would help them 
make sense of current and future inquiry. 
Context for Analysis 
In the discussion analyzed here, seven second-grade students talk with a science 
teaching specialist about why juice boxes collapse when you suck on the straw.  This data 
was chosen for two reasons after initial observations revealed that the conversation is rife 
with both correct and incorrect student mechanistic explanations.  First, application of the 
coding scheme helps check whether the mechanism framework can reliably identify 
quality student reasoning distinct from conceptual correctness.  Second, although some 
educators may respond negatively to this conversation because students do not come to 
the correct answer, analysis using the mechanism coding scheme helps articulate other, 
perhaps more important, value of their inquiry. 
The conversation takes place in a public elementary school in Montgomery 
County, Maryland.  In addition to their regular science lessons with their classroom 
teacher, these students also met several Friday’s throughout the year for 50-minute 
science enrichment sessions.  As with the teacher in chapter four, this instructor 





education and help prospective and current elementary teachers gain experience in 
interpreting and assessing the substance of student reasoning (Hammer & van Zee, 2006). 
Since he did not have to cover the standard county curriculum in this context, the 
teacher was free to choose topics based on what he thought would engage the students.  
The teacher chose to have students discuss collapsing juice boxes because he speculated 
the students would have productive intuitions about it based in their everyday 
experiences. In reflecting after the lesson, the teacher was pleased with the ideas the 
students generated and pursued in their conversation. 
Synopsis of Classroom Inquiry 
The teacher begins the discussion by giving the students full juice boxes and 
having them drink out all the juice.  After the boxes are empty, the students observe that 
the sides of the box cave in when they suck on the straws.  When the teacher asks them 
why that happens, several students reference the air inside the box.  One student suggests 
that the air inside the box blows out on the sides of the box and the box caves in because 
there is less air inside.  Another student suggests that the air outside the box pushes in on 
the sides of the box and when air inside is removed, the outside push crushes it.  Other 
students present ideas similar to the two already given, either that air and juice inside the 
box push out to hold the box’s shape, or that air outside forces the box in.  One student 
combines these ideas; he suggests (correctly) that both the air inside and the air outside 
box push on the box, and their unequal pushing is what causes the box to cave in.  After a 
few more student explanations corresponding to one of these three models, the teacher 





a large orange juice carton.  This analysis is focused on the time before the teacher 
demonstration.  The full transcript of this discussion is found in Appendix C. 
Mechanism Coding Inter-rater Reliability 
The transcript of the class discussion was coded by P. Hutchison, another 
graduate student at the University of Maryland, and myself.  Inter-rater reliability was 
evaluated along two dimensions.  The first dimension (Data Identification) is a check on 
whether the researchers code the same conversational turns as examples of mechanistic 
reasoning.  High inter-rater reliability, 93%, was obtained for Data Identification, which 
indicates the coding scheme is very reliable at recognizing statements that are relevant to 
mechanistic reasoning.  The second dimension, Highest Coding, is a check for agreement 
on the highest code that the researchers assigned to each comment.  This measure 
hopefully indicates whether the coding scheme reliably identifies the highest level of 
sophistication of each comment.   This measure is important given that we are making 
claims about the overall sophistication of student reasoning.  Our inter-rater reliability on 
this measure was 74% before discussion and 97% after.  Our discussion revealed that low 
initial agreement did not result from difficulties with the coding scheme itself but was 
partly due to ambiguity in second graders’ language.  In addition, some discrepancies 
arose from different coding methodologies: one coder used adjacent lines from the 
transcript to interpret student meaning and the other coder interpreted each line 
individually.  These two methods led to different interpretations of student meaning that 
were resolved with discussion.  To avoid the same differences in future coding, we 
adopted the convention to use only previous and not later comments in interpretation of 





Student Mechanistic Explanations 
During the discussion the students presented three possible explanations for the 
phenomenon - only one of which is correct when judged against the physics canon.  The 
analysis below provides an account of those of the explanations including excerpts from 
the student discussion.  These particular examples of dialog show how the mechanism 
framework can be used to reveal valuable aspects of student reasoning obscured by 
measures of conceptual correctness.  They also show that two explanations, one correct 
and one incorrect, can have the same high level mechanistic sophistication. 
Correct Explanation:  An Imbalance of Pushes from Inside and Out 
Only one student in the class gives a correct explanation for why the juice box 
caves in – noting that both the air inside and outside the box play an important role.  He 
states an ‘imbalance of pushes’ model - air inside actively pushes to hold the sides out 
while the air outside pushes in.  When air from the inside is removed, the amount of air 
(and thus the push) on the inside and outside are no longer equal, so the box collapses. 
 
Hunter: Um.  What I was thinking was when it's empty there's air 
inside -   
Teacher: Okay. 
Hunter: - and if you suck up, and there's like air pushing on the 
sides.  And there's air pushing on the inside, there's air 
pushing on the sides to keep them out.  And outside, um 
there's air pushing on the outside. [?And it - ] 
Teacher: Pushing.  So the air outside is pushing which way? 
Hunter:  Um it's, um the sides in. 





Hunter: And then [??when we took] some of the air out it won't be 
equal so, um, the sides start to [?cave/get] in. 
Teacher: Equal.  That sounds like a math term.  What do you mean 
by that?   
Hunter: Um. 
Teacher: What’s not equal? 
Hunter: They both um, the amount of air is the same. 
Teacher: By the amount the same you mean on the inside and on the 
outside? 
Hunter: Yeah.  
 
The quality of Hunter’s inquiry does not lie solely in the fact that he gives the correct 
answer.  He does provide a correct explanation, but even more importantly he gives a 
mechanistic explanation.  Figure 3 indicates some of the evidence of mechanistic 




Figure 3:  The mechanistic coding of Hunter’s explanation for the juice box collapsing.  
Hunter’s redundant and teacher comments have been removed. 
 
                                                





Hunter begins by giving the starting conditions and entities that are important to his 
explanation of the phenomenon - the empty juice box begins filled with air.  He also 
identifies where that air is located – inside the box - and what activities air engages in – 
pushing.  In a similar way he describes another relevant entity, its location, and its 
activity – the air outside pushes the box in.  Hunter then forward chains, laying out a 
causal sequence of events that follow from one another based on the entities, activities, 
and properties he has asserted – sucking on the straw removes air from inside the box, 
which causes an imbalance of the in and out pushes.  Since the inward push is now 
greater the box caves in.  This forward chaining provides evidence that Hunter is thinking 
mechanistically.  To assess his response based solely on his conceptual understanding 
misses the sophistication of his reasoning. 
Incorrect Explanation:  A Push from Inside the Juice Box 
Three of the students focus on the role of the air and/or juice inside the juice box.  
In one form of this ‘inside-pusher’ model, students suggest that the juice inside the box 
pushes out on all the sides of the box.  Another student explains that the air inside the 
juice box actively blows out or pushes against the sides of the box, holding the box in its 
flat, “normal” shape.  Thus whenever juice or air is removed from the box, there is no 
longer anything pushing from the inside to hold the box out, so the sides cave in.  Some 
students articulate that the amount the sides of the box cave in is related to the amount of 
air left inside the box.  While some of these students merely do not mention the air 
outside, others explicitly assert that air outside the box is either not present or not relevant 





For example, Erin explains her reasoning by discussing the role of the air inside 
the juice box. 
 
Erin: I think because since you sucked out the air, it's like, it 
caves in because there's not any air so it has no, nothing's 
pushing it in from the inside to make it like [?flat] -  
Teacher: Like this? 
Erin: - like its normal shape.  Yeah. 
Teacher: Nothing’s inside there so -  
Erin: There's not much, not as much is inside so it's, it, there's not 
mu, as much pushing out so it caves in. 
Teacher: Oh.  So you mean right now there's air in there pushing out 
to make it the box shape. 
Erin:  I think so.   
Teacher: And then what happens when I suck?  What's -  
Erin: You take some of the air out so -  
Teacher: - and so why should the sides. (Side comment to another 
student.) Why should the sides then cave in?  I mean, is 
there anything pushing – 
Erin: No –  
Teacher: - the outside in? 
Erin:  - there's nothing pushing. 
Teacher: There’s nothing pushing. 
Erin: So when –  
Teacher: Nothing pushing where, on the inside or the outside? 
Erin: Inside. 
 
Erin’s explanation of the phenomenon should not be disregarded solely because she lacks 





to our aid in accounting for the value of her inquiry.  Although Erin’s answer is 
incomplete (she explicitly rejects the idea of the air outside pushing on the box), her 
reasoning is mechanistic.  Figure 4 illustrates some of the evidence of that reasoning in 




Figure 4:  The mechanistic coding of Erin’s explanation for the juice box collapsing. 
Erin’s redundant and teacher comments have been removed. 
 
Erin begins by identifying the starting conditions – the sides of the box are in their 
“normal shape” and then you start sucking the air out.  She then describes a relevant 
entity and its location/organization – the air inside the box – that pushes out (activity) on 
the sides holding the box in its starting conditions.  Erin forward chains and claims that 
when some of the air that was pushing out on the box from the inside is removed, the box 
collapses.  The inferences she makes in her forward chaining are all plausible based on 
her everyday experiences; for example she may have observed that balloons collapse 
when they are not filled with air or pillowcases collapse when the pillow inside is 





intuitions that makes her explanation valuable even though it is incorrect.  A conceptual 
assessment would give an impoverished view of the quality of Erin’s inquiry. 
Incorrect Explanation: A Push from Outside the Juice Box 
Two students explain the collapsing juice box by appealing to the air outside the 
box; the outside air actively pushes in on the sides of the box at all times.  In the most 
well articulated form of the ‘outside-pusher’ model, the air and juice inside the box play 
the role of passively resisting the outside push.  Thus when the juice and air inside the 
box are removed, there is less resistance so the outside air can push the box more easily, 
causing it to cave in.   
For example, Ben gives the following explanation for what makes the box 
collapse. 
 
Ben:  - The air pushing. [Pushes his hands forward in front of him.] 
Teacher: Tell me w, which air.  Where is the air that’s pushing? 
Ben:  Outside. [Pushing in on the sides of his juice box with his hands.] 
Teacher: Outside.  And its pushing what? 
Ben:   Pushing the sides in.  Because there’s not much [?] -  
… 
Ben:   - every time you drink it there’s less, there’s less stuff inside it. 
… 
Teacher: So there you talked about air, I think outside pushing. 
Ben:   Yeah pushing it. [Pushes in on the sides of his juice box.] 
Teacher: Like you're doing it with your hands.  But if I do it this way, 
[Sucks on his juice box.]  you're saying that it’s the air that's 
pushing on it. 





Teacher: Why should it do that?  Why is the air on the outside pushing? 
Ben:  'Cause there's less stuff inside, and where there's less stuff inside, 
it's easier to push. 
 
Ben does not give a completely correct answer to the question; he does not articulate that 
the air inside also actively pushes on the sides of the box.  However, as with Erin there is 





Figure 5: The mechanistic coding of Ben’s explanation for the juice box collapsing. 
Ben’s redundant and teacher comments have been removed. 
 
Ben first describes a relevant entity, its location/organization, and the activity it engages 
in – the air outside pushes the sides of the box in.  He implicitly states the starting 
conditions of the box by explaining how they are changed when you drink from the straw 
– the box begins with “stuff” (entity) inside and that “stuff” (which he in other places 
identifies as air) resists the push from outside (entity property).  Notice that Ben does not 
articulate an activity for the inside air; unlike Erin, the inside air does not actively 





described – when some of the inside air is removed, the outside air can more easily 
collapse the box because its push is not encountering as much resistance.  His explanation 
makes sense based on his experiences (for example that its easier to push an empty box 
than one filled with toys).  Analyzing Ben’s explanation for mechanistic reasoning 
reveals sophistication missed when it is labeled as conceptually incomplete or incorrect.  
Teacher Attention and Instructional Interpretation 
 Analyzing student explanations for evidence of mechanistic reasoning shows that 
Erin and Ben’s incorrect explanations are equivalent to Hunter’s correct one along that 
measure.  Comparing Figures 3, 4, and 5 reveals striking similarity in the coding of each 
explanation.  In addition to the lower codes, each explanation also contains evidence of 
sophisticated chaining. 
Whether teachers attend predominantly to mechanistic reasoning or instead to 
conceptual correctness has a significant impact on how they interpret and respond to 
student ideas.  Below are possible responses to Erin and Ben’s incorrect but mechanistic 
explanations from each of these perspectives.  These different instructional 
interpretations beg the question of whether canonical correctness or mechanistic 
reasoning is the more appropriate instructional agenda for these second graders (and for 
science students more broadly).  We use data from the class to suggest some negative 






Possible Responses to Incorrect Explanations 
For some educators the primary target for science is the learning of conceptual 
knowledge.  Other skills may be important in achieving the goal (e.g. experimentation, 
reasoning, argumentation), but their role is largely one of support.  Hammer (1995) 
describes this stance as: 
 
traditional content-oriented, because it assesses student contributions with respect 
to what is traditionally seen as the content of the course.  Traditional content-
oriented evaluation pertains to the correctness of students’ reasoning vis-à-vis an 
accepted body of knowledge.  (p. 403, emphasis his) 
 
A content-oriented teacher whose main concern is whether students obtain a canonical 
understanding of air pressure would interpret Erin and Ben’s explanations as close, but 
not quite complete. A likely reaction would be to start thinking about possible 
instructional moves to get the students to the right answer before the end of the lesson.  
The teacher might respond to Erin and Ben by saying “You’re almost there!” and then 
help them identify the conceptual pieces their explanations are missing.  For example, to 
Erin he might ask whether air exists all around the room and if so, what that air does near 
the box.  Were Erin and Ben to turn in their explanations at the end of class, such a 
teacher might give them partial credit for their “half-right” explanations that are well 
reasoned, but would certainly deduct points for their lack of correct physics knowledge.  
Although the teacher might value and encourage their mechanistic reasoning, it is 





prompts teachers to respond to incorrect students comments with specific conceptual 
feedback rather than more general feedback about the quality of their reasoning. 
A different primary target for student inquiry is the development of sophisticated 
mechanistic reasoning abilities.  While conceptual correctness may be a goal of 
instruction, it is not necessarily one that needs to be reached immediately.  A teacher with 
this perspective might encourage students to spend much of their time reasoning through 
ideas until they make sense, even if it means the students leave that class period still not 
understanding correct physics.  From this perspective, a teacher might interpret Erin and 
Ben’s explanations as right on target because they are engaged in high-level mechanistic 
reasoning.  A likely reaction might be to think about ways to help the students recognize 
the sophistication of kind of thing they are doing.  The teacher might respond to Erin and 
Ben by saying “You’ve got a great idea.  That makes sense!”  For example, he might give 
Ben an example from everyday life of pushing getting easier with less resistance (say 
pushing a small or a large person on a swing) and ask whether its similar to the air 
pushing on the full or empty juice box.  This intervention is less explicit than targeted 
conceptual feedback.  Instead, it sends Ben the tacit epistemological message that 
drawing on personal experiences with mechanisms is an appropriate thing to do in 
science class.  Such a teacher values and encourages mechanistic reasoning in and of 
itself as a productive means to produce and evaluate science knowledge regardless of 
whether that knowledge is canonically correct.  Attention to mechanistic reasoning 
prompts teachers to respond to incorrect student comments in the same way he responds 
to correct ones, by providing feedback about whether they are engaging in behavior that 





provide conceptual feedback after (if at all) the students have developed a stable 
mechanistic approach to science.  
Pitfalls of Primarily Attending to Conceptual Correctness 
It is important to notice that the direction of primary teacher attention leads to 
dramatically different interpretations of Erin and Ben’s incorrect explanations.  For a 
teacher focused on canonical correctness, Erin and Ben have almost reached the goal but 
need to be pushed a little further conceptually.  In contrast, for a teacher focused on 
mechanistic reasoning Erin and Ben, like Hunter, have already reached a major goal and 
only need to be shown that their reasoning is productive and desirable for science 
learning.  These different interpretations influence how teachers respond (either 
positively or negatively) to students, which in turn influences (either positively or 
negatively) how students engage in inquiry. 
There may be significant negative consequences on both student participation and 
epistemology if teachers allow their desire for correctness to precede their desire for 
quality mechanistic reasoning.  We find evidence of this in the air pressure discussion.  
The teacher’s primary focus on correctness leads him to repeatedly push the students to 
give the correct answer even when the students have developed a reasonable wrong 
explanation that is plausible and makes sense to them.  This instructional move has an 
immediate impact on how one of the students engages in inquiry in the moment and also 
sends the student an inaccurate message about productive approaches to learning science. 
Recall the sophisticated mechanistic explanation Erin gives when the teacher asks 






Erin: I think because since you sucked out the air, it's like, it 
caves in because there's not any air so it has no, nothing's 
pushing it in from the inside to make it like [?flat] -  
Teacher: Like this? 
Erin: - like its normal shape.  Yeah. 
Teacher: Nothing’s inside there so -  
Erin: There's not much, not as much is inside so it's, it, there's not 
mu, as much pushing out so it caves in. 
Teacher: Oh.  So you mean right now there's air in there pushing out 
to make it the box shape. 
Erin:  I think so.   
Teacher: And then what happens when I suck?  What's -  
Erin: You take some of the air out so -  
Teacher: - and so why should the sides. (Side comment to another 
student.) Why should the sides then cave in?  I mean, is 
there anything pushing – 
Erin: No –  
Teacher: - the outside in? 
Erin:  - there's nothing pushing. 
Teacher: There’s nothing pushing. 
Erin: So when –  
Teacher: Nothing pushing where, on the inside or the outside? 
Erin: Inside. 
 
Erin responds to the teacher’s request with a well-articulated inside-pusher 
explanation that is mechanistic.  Erin continues to reason mechanistically about ideas that 
make sense to her even after the teacher hints at the correct answer by asking “Is there 
anything pushing the outside in?”  The teacher then asks her to explain more fully and his 






Teacher: So why, if there's nothing pushing on the inside, why should the 
outsi, why should the box's sides cave in?  [3 second pause]  
(Unrelated comment to another student) 
Erin:  'Cause uh, there's not as much air in [this/it?]. 
Teacher: Okay, so there's less air in the inside that way. 
Erin:  Yeah. 
Teacher: But I don't understand why that makes the sides have to go in. [5 
second pause] 
Erin:  Maybe its pressure I don't know. 
Teacher: What's that?  Pressure? 
Erin: It's something that's hard to explain. Um. [4 second pause]  It's 
something that's [6 second pause] like, it's hard to explain. 
Teacher: Okay.  Let's try, as a group and individually.   
 
What is startling about this episode is the change in Erin’s reasoning from her previous 
mechanistic explanation.  The first time the teacher asks for clarification, Erin responds 
with a meaningful restatement of her mechanism.  Erin reads his question as a request for 
a causal story and responds accordingly; she is still trying to makes sense of the situation.  
However, the second time he asks, Erin spends five seconds considering his question 
before changing both her response and the type of response.  Instead of continuing with 
her mechanistic reasoning, she responds to the teacher’s repeated question by adding 
pressure to her explanation in what seems to be an attempt to satisfy him.  The 
instructional push for correctness causes Erin to shift from reasoning mechanistically 
with entities and activities that make sense to her (air and pushing) to invoking technical 
vocabulary she does not understand (pressure).  Erin’s suggestion of a new entity 





identifying entity properties or organization, activities, or chaining.  Her more productive 
reasoning strategies are suppressed in the moment by the need for conceptual correctness. 
12 
Following Erin’s introduction of pressure, the teacher turns the conversation away 
from making sense of how pressure fits into her previous mechanistic story and towards 
defining the term pressure “as a group and individually.”  In doing so, he may tacitly (and 
inadvertently) confirm Erin’s suspicion that correct vocabulary was what he wanted.  We 
do not claim that the teacher is explicitly looking for scientific vocabulary; he may only 
be searching for a correct answer, which in Erin’s case manifests itself as terminology.  
Instead, we suggest that Erin may interpret his question and response in that way.  The 
teacher’s response to her pressure idea sends Erin the epistemological message that 
inquiry is about producing correct, scientific-sounding answers rather than about 
constructing causal mechanistic accounts for phenomenon.  This experience may 
inappropriately teach Erin that mechanistic reasoning is neither appropriate nor valuable 
for science.  As such, she may be less likely to engage in it when she is asked to learn 
scientific concepts in the future. 
Interventions such as this one that are driven primarily by a desire for students to 
learn the right answer might also ultimately damage those conceptual goals.  As Hammer 
(1995) describes:  
 
                                                
12 It is possible that the teacher is only pushing Erin in this way because he thinks her sophisticated 
reasoning indicates she is prepared to go farther with her explanation.  However, the result remains that his 





Instructors may too quickly undermine their own objectives for students 
understanding by insisting too quickly on correctness…  Students may learn to 
produce correct statements without developing understanding. (p. 427)  
 
If students are pushed too quickly toward a correct answer that does not make sense to 
them over an incorrect answer that does make sense to them, they may accept that correct 
statement without attempting to understand it.  In the air pressure discussion, the 
teacher’s focus on achieving complete conceptual correctness forces Erin out of a 
productive reasoning mode that would help her make sense of that correct knowledge.  In 
addition to suppressing mechanistic reasoning in this episode, his attention to correct 
vocabulary may also discourage Erin from engaging in reasoning in future inquiry that 
would help her construct meaningful science knowledge.  In allowing their desire for 
correctness to overcome their desire for quality reasoning, teachers may lose access to the 
very reasoning that would support an understanding of correct canonical concepts. 
Discussion: Mechanistic Reasoning as an Appropriate Instructional Target 
Analysis of the air pressure discussion demonstrates that the mechanism 
framework can be used to evaluate student inquiry independent of whether the products 
of that inquiry are correct.  As such, the framework helps to more rigorously define an 
instructional target that teachers might want to pursue; just as canonical correctness has 
been easy to assess because it is well defined, assessments of mechanistic reasoning may 
now be more accessible.  In addition, our assessment of the three explanations identifies 
similar value in all of the students’ reasoning, despite the fact that two are wrong and the 
other is right.  Assessing their mechanistic reasoning allows us to observe student 





valuable for understanding science but are obscured by traditional measures of 
conceptual correctness. 
Like the teacher in this discussion, educators are often faced with incorrect 
explanations during inquiry.  How teachers respond to those explanations depends on 
their primary instructional agenda for the class.  For a teacher focused on correctness, 
Erin and Ben have not yet met the goal for the discussion (a balance of pushes model of 
the juice box phenomenon) and thus need more conceptual guidance.  For a teacher 
focused on mechanistic reasoning, Erin and Ben have met an important goal 
(sophisticated mechanistic reasoning) and thus should be helped to recognize the value of 
that approach to inquiry.  Although the teacher in this classroom might see value in Erin 
and Ben’s reasoning, there is evidence that he makes the former interpretation.  The 
analysis suggest that if educators truly want to promote mechanistic reasoning as a 
productive way to construct scientific knowledge, they may ultimately be required to 
value inquiry that leads to sophisticated, mechanistic, but incorrect answers. 
Close analysis of the transcript reveals some possible pitfalls of attending too 
heavily or pushing too quickly for complete conceptual understanding.  Repeatedly 
pushing students who articulate mechanistically plausible but incorrect explanations 
towards the right answer may in turn push students out of a productive mechanistic 
reasoning mode.  It may also send students the message that such reasoning is 
inappropriate for scientific inquiry.  In doing so, teachers who focus on correctness may 
ultimately suppress their students’ abilities to understand and make sense of the canonical 





We assert that mechanistic reasoning is an appropriate instructional target for 
these second graders.  We suggest this not only because of the negative consequences of 
attending primarily to correctness presented in this chapter, but also because we suspect 
more generally that mechanistic reasoning is the kind of thinking that contributes to the 
progress of science.  Forward and backward chaining allows scientists (and students) to 
assess hypotheses by pursuing the implications of an idea to a place where they can be 
empirically tested (see chapter five).  Similarly, it may help students trace and evaluate 
the individual steps of rival hypotheses to identify inappropriate conclusions and 
ultimately decide among them (also chapter five).  Finally, its reliance on physical 
intuition encourages students to search for explanations that are plausible when judged 
against their knowledge from everyday experience. 
The argument presented in this chapter may be easy to agree with for these young 
children: it is okay to primarily value Erin and Ben’s reasoning because it is okay if they 
leave their second grade class not knowing about air pressure.  However, we would like 
to at least suggest that mechanistic reasoning is also an appropriate instructional target for 
students in high school and college.  That is, we suggest that sophisticated mechanistic 
reasoning should be an objective of inquiry in its own right, rather than merely a method 
for learning correct content.  This view aligns with one presented by May, Hammer, and 
Roy (2006) with regards to analogical reasoning.  Placing mechanistic (or analogical) 
reasoning as a stand-alone instructional target stands in opposition to the view that “there 
is no value to student inquiry that diverges from those [canonically correct] concepts, 
except in so far as it exposes incorrect thinking that instruction should address” (May et 





In contrast to the above view, we suggest that to truly value mechanistic reasoning 
as a productive approach to science, it must be pursued even if it leads to incorrect 
answers.  Although we as scientists and educators know that such reasoning supports 
meaningful science learning, many students come to our classrooms still not believing 
that such reasoning is an important part of science and scientific inquiry.  These students 
may fail to learn appropriate ways to construct meaningful scientific knowledge if we 
continue to send them the message, either explicitly or tacitly through our lectures or 
grading, that it is less important to reason mechanistically and make sense of 
phenomenon than it is to get the right answer.  We need to help students establish and 
maintain a productive stance towards science knowledge that includes the expectation 
that mechanistic reasoning will support their understanding.  Once that foundation is 
established, they will be better prepared for us to help them learn canonically correct 





Chapter 6: Mechanistic Reasoning with Informal Empirical Evidence  
Introduction 
Within the current practices of education, scientific inquiry is defined in a highly 
empirical way.  Science standards and classroom teachers promote investigations in 
which students ask testable questions, design formal experiments, and collect and analyze 
data from dependent, independent, and controlling variables (e.g. AAAS, 1990; MCPS, 
2001; NRC, 1996; Windschitl, 2004).  Research into both student and scientist inquiry 
skills centers on the ability to correctly control variables and accept/reject hypotheses 
based on purposefully accumulated empirical results (e.g. Chinn & Brewer, 1998; Kuhn, 
1989; Roth & Roychoudhury, 1993).  
Although controlled experimentation is a valuable aspect of science learning, it is 
inappropriate to assume that scientists or students can only do quality inquiry when they 
are engaged in or working towards formal investigations.  In fact, there are many 
examples in the literature to the contrary (e.g. Hammer & van Zee, 2006; Rosenberg, 
Hammer, & Phelan, 2006).  Consider the following excerpt from an introductory college 
course in which students try to develop a model for static electricity.  After discussing 
various objects that charge one another, they try to figure out how rubbing objects 
together creates charge.   
 
Claire: Like the actual electrons leave one object and go to another one 
 John:  Right.  Right.  And I think its just, its due to like them getting 
excited, you know what I’m saying. 





 John:  Like they’ll get excited so they’ll jump up and [moving his hand 
up step levels) ‘Cause they need ener, it takes energy for them to 
just transfer, you know. 
 Claire: To go.  
John: So they’ll get excited and they’ll go. 
… 
Claire: Yeah.  You create energy [by rubbing] and that energy is used to 
excite the electrons and allow them to like transfer to the other one. 
 
In this episode Claire and John do not identify variables to control or analyze trends in a 
set of data.  Instead, they use anecdotal evidence from observations and prior knowledge 
from other classes (energy levels from chemistry) to think about how charging by contact 
might work.  Even though the students are not designing or performing a controlled 
experiment, many science educators would likely agree that Claire and John are having a 
valuable conversation that will contribute to their understanding of electrostatics.  Surely 
this kind of exploration ought to be included in our conceptions of scientific inquiry so 
that students (and educators) will recognize such discussions as appropriate and 
productive ways to construct science knowledge.   
This chapter attempts to more precisely describe the nature of some informal 
explorations that prove valuable in a particular episode of scientific inquiry.  It begins 
with a review of the argument laid out in chapter two for including mechanistic reasoning 
in inquiry.  The mechanism framework is used to explore how the above group of 
students uses experiential observations to construct a mechanism for electrostatic 





results are identified in which each one informs the other as students move fluidly 
between them.  Some strengths and weaknesses of each relationship are described.   
We do not claim that the relationships identified here are prototypical; we do not 
suggest that they will be present in all inquiry or that they should be.  We only present 
them as possibilities for the kind of thing that can happen when students are allowed to 
engage in inquiry apart from controlled experimentation.  Analyzing the ways in which 
students’ experiential data contribute to their mechanistic understanding of in phenomena 
in this case provides insight into how this less formal aspect of inquiry may proceed 
productively more generally. 
Inquiry as more than Controlled Experimentation 
The empiricist tradition for inquiry may be grounded in an interpretation of 
Piaget’s levels of reasoning that limits young students to concrete operational thought 
(and thus physical experimentation) to the exclusion of abstract thinking.  It may also 
grow out of the Humean ideal of assessing causality through the theory-independent and 
domain-general rules of data covariation.  Whatever its source, formal empirical 
investigation is a pervasive focus in current conceptions of scientific inquiry.  By 
ascribing to these characterizations, educators tacitly or explicitly imply that theoretical 
reasoning about mechanisms is either beyond the reach of school children or 
inappropriate for science.  Such a depiction of scientific inquiry is both incomplete and 
distorted in comparison to student abilities and the work of practicing scientists 
(Koslowski, 1996). 
To mandate that inquiry consist solely or even mostly of “well designed 





places too much emphasis on the logic of controlling variables during formal 
experiments.  There is evidence not only that students can reason about mechanisms for 
phenomena but also that they do so spontaneously and from a very young age (e.g. 
Hammer, 2004; Metz, 1991; Piaget, 1927).  By systematically requiring students to 
approach inquiry from the perspective of conducting experiments, we run the risk of 
disengaging their natural sense of mechanism built up from everyday experiences 
(diSessa, 1993) in favor of engaging less organic knowledge about the logical structure of 
covariation.  We should instead encourage students to also tap their existing “rich stores 
of causal intuitions” (Hammer, 1995, p. 422) about mechanisms that describe the 
processes underlying phenomena (Abrams & Southerland, 2001; Koslowski, 1996; Metz, 
1991; Schauble, 1996; White, 1993).   
In addition, formal experimentation without mechanism gives an incomplete 
representation of professional science.  The search for mechanisms for phenomena is 
central to science as a whole and the work of individual scientists  (e.g. Machamer, 
Darden, & Craver, 2000; Nersessian, 1992; Westfall, 1978).  Far from being illegitimate 
sources of evidence that bias data analysis (Kuhn, 1989), considerations of mechanism 
help decide which experiments to plan, which variables to control, and how to interpret 
anomalous data (Koslowski, 1996; Schauble, 1996).  It is not merely reasonable for 
inquiry to include mechanistic reasoning from the perspective of student abilities; it is 
essential for constructing and analyzing formal controlled experiments in science.    
 Defining inquiry as a theory- (or mechanism-) independent process also distorts 
the nature of science by placing undue importance on hypothesis testing – using 





impression that the primary activity of science is performing controlled experiments in 
which the question, hypothesis, and relevant variables are already known or easily found.  
Focusing on formal experimentation leaves out the “creative speculation” (Hodson, 1988) 
or “messing about” (Hawkins, 1974) that occurs when students and scientists first start 
thinking about a new phenomenon.  Part of science involves tossing around ideas and 
considering familiar anecdotal evidence that never makes it far enough to be tested more 
rigorously by the standards defined in classrooms (Hammer, 2004).  Klahr and Dunbar 
(1988) describe such time as hypothesis generation, in contrast to hypothesis testing, that 
is crucial to scientific discovery.  If we want to give a more accurate view of science, the 
phase preceeding hypothesis testing must be acknowledged as part of inquiry.   
Context for Analysis 
We use a conversation among a group of four college students about electrostatics 
as a context for observing the relationship between mechanistic reasoning and 
experiential data outside hypothesis testing.  These students are enrolled in the second 
semester (electricity and magnetism) of a reformed algebra-based introductory physics 
course taught by a physics education researcher at the University of Maryland.  They 
attend three fifty-minute lectures each week with approximately 200 other students, most 
of whom are junior and senior health and life science majors.  In addition each week 
there is a required two-hour laboratory and a one-hour session of tutorial that serves 20-
24 students per section.  The tutorials are conceptual worksheets, based on the model 
pioneered by the Physics Education Group at the University of Washington, in which 
students work on in small groups with limited guidance from instructors.  As part of a 





Group at the University of Maryland redesigned these tutorials to have an 
epistemological focus; that is, they encourage students to reflect not only on physics 
content knowledge but also on the reasoning strategies used in constructing that 
knowledge. 
The conversation analyzed here comes from one group of four students working 
on a tutorial in the third week of the semester.  This particular tutorial focuses on helping 
students develop a model for static electricity from their own experiences.  A copy of the 
tutorial can be found in Appendix D.  The data was chosen for two reasons.  First, 
tutorials (in general but for this student group in particular) were known to provoke 
thoughtful discussions where the students attempted to make sense of unfamiliar 
phenomena.  Second, we suspected that the physics of electrostatics would lend itself to 
discussions of mechanism.  An initial viewing of the data confirmed that it was 
mechanistically rich.  The excerpts below all come from the first half of the tutorial in 
which students discuss charging by contact.  Although the teaching assistants interact 
with the students several times during the hour, the conversation analyzed here occurs 
when the group is working on its own. 
The following is a synopsis of their discussion.  The students begin the tutorial by 
observing whether or not static electricity is created when various objects are rubbed 
together: two foam plates, a foam plate and a cloth, a foam plate and a sweater, or two 
hands.  After making these observations and recalling their everyday experiences with 
static electricity, the students spontaneously discuss why some pairs of objects charge and 
others do not.  They come up with several possible explanations, none of which seem to 





reconciling involves two pieces of scotch tape that are placed one on top of the other on a 




During lecture and again in tutorial, students observe that the two pieces of tape 
attract one another when they are pulled apart.  The students return to this phenomenon 
repeatedly.  (In the excerpts below they refer to the phenomenon as "the tape.")  After 
discussion with the teaching assistant, the students decide that the two objects must be 
different materials (as Claire says, "provide two different environments for the 
electrons") in order to produce charge.  In addition, they describe that electrons jumping 
from one object to the other create sparks and a resultant charge.  Appendix E is the 
transcript of the group’s discussion during tutorial.   
Coding for Mechanistic Reasoning and Informal Empirical Evidence 
 As a first pass at analyzing the small group discussion of electrostatics, another 
researcher (R. Scherr) and I coded the transcript line-by-line using the mechanism coding 
scheme.  Independently of the mechanism coding, the transcript was also coded for 
comments when students cited informal evidence.  We counted as evidence any time a 
student referenced a specific observable phenomenon regardless of whether they recalled 





Overlaying these two codings on the same graph (Figure 7) allows us to see whether 




Figure 7:  Graph of student conversation about electrostatics. The mechanism codes are 
as follows: (1) Describing Target Phenomenon, (2) Set-Up Conditions, (3) Identifying 
Entities, (4) Identifying Activities, (5) Identifying Properties of Entities, (6) Identifying 
Organization of Entities, (7) Chaining (Backward and Forward).  The (0) code indicates 
moments when informal evidence was cited.  Utterances 230-310 were not coded because 
the teaching assistant was present and guiding much of the conversation. 
 
The graph indicates that during this discussion students used all levels of mechanistic 
reasoning along with informal empirical results.  The mechanism and evidence codes 
often appear nearly simultaneously indicating that the students quickly flip back and forth 
between the two.  Each of the short excerpts presented below in more detail exemplifies 
this trend.  This fluid movement stands in contrast to what we might expect from even the 
best controlled experimentation in classrooms where students begin with a theory or 





their initial theory to explain the data.  In much of classroom hypothesis testing, theory 
and evidence are used separately; students are supposed to spend time thinking about 
theory and then set theory aside to think about evidence collection.  Instead, in this 
conversation we see students theoretically reasoning about mechanisms in one comment 
and drawing on experiential data the next.  This fluid movement suggests that traditional 
conceptions of the relationship between theory and evidence may misrepresent how 
students can engage in inquiry.  These students do not seem to be engaging in theorizing 
and experimentation as separate activities.  Instead, it may be more appropriate to think 
about them as drawing on both theory and evidence together to support the larger activity 
of making sense of a phenomenon.  
The graph does not indicate how students use mechanistic reasoning to inform 
informal empirical results (or vice-versa).   It is too coarse a tool for understanding the 
nature of the relationship between these two.  In addition to coding the content of each 
student comment, below we also make sense of the comments by organizing them into a 
larger narrative story.13 
 
Relationships Between Mechanistic Reasoning and Informal Empirical 
Evidence 
The goal of analyzing this data is to articulate more precisely how "messing 
about" (Hawkins, 1974) with anecdotal observations might productively inform student 
reasoning about novel physical phenomena.  To do so, we highlight several episodes 
                                                





from the discussion in which students use informal empirical evidence in conjunction 
with various levels of mechanistic reasoning.  
Each section below begins by describing a relationship between mechanistic 
reasoning and empirical results that has been observed in this student discourse as well as 
research literature.  Following that general discussion, we present episodes from the 
tutorial in which students use each relationship.  The analysis, however, did not proceed 
by first identifying relationships in the literature and then searching for them in the 
transcript.  Instead, the initial coding of the data revealed several moments where 
mechanism and informal empirical results seemed to inform one another and thus 
nominated possible relationships.  Attempts to more carefully describe those moments led 
to the articulation of relationships that were later found to be supported in research 
literature.  Do not be misled by the description in each section: we did not decide a priori 
what relationships were valuable for inquiry and then search the data for them; the 
relationships emerged organically from the data.   
Below we describe four relationships between mechanistic reasoning and 
empirical results evident in the electrostatics tutorial discussion.  They are: 
• Empirical results prompt mechanistic questions 
• Inducing parts of a mechanism from empirical results 
• Reconciling multiple empirical results to elaborate the underlying 
mechanism 





Empirical Results Prompt Mechanistic Questions 
 When students spend time “messing about” with a new phenomenon, they are 
likely to observe things that do not make sense to them.  As science educators, we might 
hope that students’ uneasiness or confusion would prompt them to search for a 
mechanistic explanation for the results.  People often formulate “why” questions from 
informal evidence, both in everyday life and in professional science practice. Hammer 
(2004) gives an anecdote from a time when he and his son saw a drawing that was taped 
to the wall fall to the floor.  He explains how “We laughed, asked each other “why did 
that happen?’ and started to talk about possible explanations”  (Hammer, 2004, p 281).  
He parallels this activity with Jocelyn Bell’s discovery of pulsars in which an unexpected 
observation of a regular radio signal caused her to wonder what was causing it.  We have 
all experienced our own falling drawing or pulsar that has caused us to stop and question 
what happened.  A desire to understand experience can lead us (and students) to ask 
mechanistic questions during inquiry. 
Early in the electrostatics tutorial, students observe that rubbing a foam plate with 
a cloth creates static but rubbing two hands together does not.  Below is the students’ 
immediate response to those observations (utterances 52 – 57). 
 
Audrey: So why, I don’t get this.  What’s the rational explanation for why 
there’s no sparks between our hands.  Is it ‘cause they’re moist? 
 John:  Because - 
 Claire: Because of moisture. 
 John:  - there’s so much moisture in the air and its a conductor so…  
 Claire: The air and in your skin.  It’s mostly in your skin. 






Audrey’s observation of these two contrasting results prompts her to seek “the rational 
explanation” for the phenomenon.  She both expects that an underlying mechanism exists 
and wants to know it.  Her next question about moisture gives a further indication as to 
the kind of explanation she wants.  She is not looking for a teleological answer such as 
“hands just don’t naturally spark” or a magical one such as “fairies block sparks from 
building up.”  Instead, she wants a explanation involving physical causes – a mechanism 
– and offers moisture as one possible relevant entity in that mechanism.   
After a brief discussion in which she contributes several ideas, Claire remains 
unsatisfied that moisture can account for the observation and asks another mechanistic 
question.  She seems to want to know why or how moisture by itself can affect the 
mechanism for static electricity.  Instead of just setting aside the hand observation as a 
fluke or automatically accepting it, Audrey and Claire explicitly request a mechanistic 
explanation to account for the data.   
 Students continue to ask mechanistic questions such as these throughout the 
tutorial as they make more observations.  For example, John later asks (utterance 86): 
 
John:  But why, why wouldn’t you get two charges on your hands if you 
can get two different charges on other things? 
 
Again, he has observed that some objects can be rubbed together to create static but two 
hands cannot.  He wants to know why the mechanism works for some situations but not 
others.  He is implicitly asking what set-up conditions, entities, and activities are required 





 The tutorial later prompts students to “mess about” with two foam plates.  They 
observe that two plates do not charge even though a plate rubbed with a cloth does.  This 
result prompts the following “why” questions (utterances 131 - 132). 
  
 John:  Yeah I don’t see why -  
 Claire: Why if you rub the plates aren’t they excite, like, if you rub things 
together we say that electrons get excited and whatever a charge.  
But like, why wouldn’t it work with plates? 
 
The informal, uncontrolled observation that two foam plates do not charge one another 
prompts John and Claire to again ask about the underlying mechanism.  Claire suggests 
that the parts of the mechanism they have discussed, i.e., electrons (entities) getting 
excited (activity), are insufficient to account for this new result.  Further pieces of the 
mechanism are required.    
The tutorial does not directly ask the students any of these questions, although the 
tutorial authors might hope such questions come up.  The students spontaneously asked 
these questions about the underlying mechanism of each other in response to their 
observations.  The informal empirical results themselves prompted the kind of reasoning 
and discussion about mechanism that many data analysis sections of traditional controlled 
experimentation labs attempt to foster.   
Inducing Parts of a Mechanism from Empirical Results  
 There are times when a new physical situation appears so disjoint from previous 
experience and current understanding that students may initially feel unable to propose a 





phenomenon, students might consider various examples of it and try to identify 
commonalities.  Klahr and Dunbar (1988) observed students using this strategy in trying 
to discover how an unknown device works.  They describe the strategy as a two-step 
process of inducing a hypothesis frame from a series of outcomes: “The first subprocess 
in INDUCE FRAME generates an outcome, and the second process generalizes of the 
results of that (and other) outcomes to produce a frame [hypothesis]” (p. 33).  Elements 
or properties that are similar across a variety of different cases may indicate important 
parts of the mechanism.  In this unidirectional relationship between informal empirical 
results and mechanistic reasoning, students use the former to identify possible pieces of 
the latter.  
 Near the start of this tutorial, the students are faced with the task of constructing a 
rule for when static electricity occurs.  They are not yet sure of the mechanism that 
causes static electricity, but they are familiar with several examples of it.   In the excerpt 
below (utterances 138 - 152), students use those examples as a basis for their discussion.  
The focus of the analysis is on the italicized utterances, but the entire episode is presented 
for context. 
 
John:  Maybe it has to be two different objects.  ‘Cause its balloon to 
head, cloth to plate. 
Claire:  But tape to tape remember? 
John:  But it was on a desk. 
Claire: I’m pretty sure if you just took the tape [Laughter as she pulls her 
hand apart like she’s holding tape.]  The tape desk interaction. 
[Laughter.] 





John:  Could be. 
Audrey: Well we didn’t rub the tape together we just stuck it together and 
pulled it apart.  ‘Cause like Saran Wrap, that already has like 
static in it. 
Claire:  From rubbing against itself when you pull it.  
Erin:  So. 
John:  Maybe foam’s not a good conductor. [Putting finger quotes around 
conductor.]  Or Styrofoam. 
Claire:  No because why is, why is it a good conductor when you 
rub it with something else? 
John:  Mmmm.  [Shrugs his shoulders.] 
 
In this episode, the students use anecdotal evidence to generate ideas for 
properties that may be relevant to the mechanism.  They cite the balloon/plate and 
cloth/plate interactions to support the entity property of different materials, tape/tape 
interaction and Saran Wrap against itself to support the activity of rubbing, and 
plate/plate lack of interaction for the property of conductors.  The students have ample 
experience with static electricity to draw on here; when one property seems not to fit with 
some evidence (i.e. different materials does not seem to apply to the tape case) they have 
a store of many other observations to generate new properties.  By surveying informal 
empirical results, students have immediate access to relevant phenomena that give clues 
to parts of the unfamiliar mechanism of static electricity.  “Messing about” can be 
productive for identifying those parts. 
 Although the students successfully use their observations to generate possible 
parts of the mechanism, different observations generate different possibilities.  John uses 





proposing rubbing, and finally John tries again with still more evidence in suggesting 
conductor-ism.  In this episode, there are no high-level mechanistic codes (e.g., 
chaining); the students do not move beyond levels 4 (Identifying Activities) and 5 
(Identifying Properties of Entities).  The students do not attempt to reconcile or connect 
the different properties but instead set aside each one when faced with another one.  Even 
Claire's direct objection that the different materials property does not account for the tape 
result only leads John to reject this idea in favor of others without attempting to resolve 
how his idea might account for her evidence.  Since these students do not attempt to 
chain to show what causes the observed phenomenon, they have difficulty judging among 
the possible variables (e.g., they have no method for discovering that the rubbing Audrey 
identifies is only a specious correlation among observations).  Without attempting to 
figure out how each possible part of the mechanism accounts for all observations (cycling 
from mechanistic reasoning back to evidence), students cannot make further progress.  
This unidirectional relationship between empirical results and mechanistic reasoning, 
while useful as an entry point for thinking about static electricity, is insufficient for 
deciding which properties are relevant to the causal mechanism and which are not.   
This analysis gives some insight into how we might distinguish between 
productive and unproductive “messing about.”  In productive discussions where students 
make significant progress in understanding the underlying mechanism, the coding 
scheme would likely identify students both suggesting possibly causal variables 
(mechanistic reasoning levels 3-6) and students using those variables to account for 
different outcomes (level 7).  In contrast, the coding scheme would probably only 





activities where students merely brainstorm about their experiences without attempting to 
reconcile them together.  Identifying students engaged in chaining helps differentiate less 
productive inquiry from quality “messing about” in which students are reasoning in a 
way that may help them discover how a variable causes the phenomenon.   
Reconciling Multiple Empirical Results to Elaborate the Underlying Mechanism 
As discussed above, multiple commonalities can be identified when considering 
multiple instances of a phenomenon.  Not all of these commonalities are present in all the 
cases and not all of them are important to the mechanism.  When trying to eliminate non-
causal properties, students might attempt to explain a seemingly anomalous case using a 
mechanism component identified from a different empirical result.  To do so often 
involves more precisely articulating exactly how the particular mechanism component 
works to produce the original phenomenon, thereby showing how it can account for the 
other phenomenon.  In this cyclic relationship between empirical results and mechanistic 
reasoning, students begin by using empirical results to conjecture a mechanism 
component.  Then, when presented with a conflicting empirical result, they elaborate how 
their component works with other parts of the mechanism to produce the anomalous data.   
In this excerpt from early in the tutorial (utterances 87 – 98), students are 
discussing whether the “different materials” property accounts for their everyday 
experiences with static electricity. Again, the focus of the analysis is on the italicized 






Audrey: Well I can, if I take my hand and rub on her sweater then I can 
touch something spark.  I don’t think you can do two things that 
are made out of the same thing. 
Claire: [Simultaneously with Audrey] Well your whole body is [?only one 
thing].  Like this is a plate and you can charge this [Styrofoam 
plate].  But, but your whole body is kind-of like a conductor really. 
Claire:  [To John] Yeah that’s true.  Because well it could go back to like 
what you [Audrey] said before with like it travels through your 
body. 
John:  But like, I mean, if you touch someone’s hand, [?it’s fine], you 
shock each other. 
Audrey: Yeah. 
Claire: You can create a charge maybe but it doesn’t stay there? 
John:  I think, I think [?it distributes]. 
Claire: Can you create a charge though? 
John:  I don’t know if I can get like two different charged hands. 
Audrey: No. I don’t think you can.  I don’t think just from your hands.  
[Rubbing her hands together]  I think, I think what makes the 
charge is two different substance things.  ‘Cause if you figure you 
walk around and then shock somebody, the charge is -  
Erin:   It’s the floor. Yeah.   
Audrey: - probably created from the carpet on your feet and then you 
carried it through [your body to your hands]. 
 
Audrey first surveys the available informal evidence observed during tutorial – 
hand to hand and plate to plate do not produce static but cloth to plate does.  These results 
help her identify a mechanism component – the entity property of “different materials.”  
Then John asks her to acknowledge a result from everyday experience that does not seem 





materials.  In response, Audrey fleshes out the mechanism by chaining; charge 
(underlying entity) is created between the carpet and feet (which satisfies the entity 
property “different materials”) and is carried (activity) through the body (organization of 
entities) to produce a shock between two hands (empirical evidence).  Audrey uses 
empirical results to generate a mechanism component then elaborates more parts of the 
mechanism to explain a different observation.  The initially anomalous data helps her 
specify “more precisely the situations in which a mechanism will produce an expected 
covariation” (Koslowski, 1996, p. 69).  In doing so, Audrey makes the different materials 
property more plausibly causal by using it to account for contrasting cases.  Her fluid 
movement between mechanism and informal empirical results contributes to her 
construction of the more complete underlying mechanism, and provides a reason for 
accepting her property over other observed commonalities. 
One potential weakness of attempting to reconcile multiple empirical results is 
that it may lead to ad hoc revisions to the mechanism.  To account for anomalous data, 
students may introduce an additional, independent component that accounts for the new 
results without discounting the old.  Students may then use both unrelated components to 
explain the phenomenon instead of elaborating how the original component can account 
for the new data. Consider the following excerpt (utterances 102 – 105) that occurs just 
after the suggestion that two objects must be different materials in order to become 
charged. 
 
Claire: What about the tape?  Why?  Like the tape we did in lecture.  Then 
why did that get staticy that’s two of the same thing? 





John:  Those are two separate objects.  These [hands] are not, like you 
have two hands but they’re not separate objects, its all connected. 
[pointing from one hand across his body to the other] 
Claire: But if you rub somebody else’s hand you still don’t get it. 
… 
John: I gotta think it’s because there’s moisture then. 
 
Like John in the previous episode, Claire draws attention to evidence that 
contrasts the entity property of different materials - two tapes stuck together can charge 
one another.  However, unlike Audrey, John does not attempt to elaborate how the 
“different materials” property can account for the anomalous observation.  Instead he 
adds another independent property of “separateness” to the mechanism; the tapes are the 
same material and separate objects so they charge but the hands are the same material and 
not separate objects so they do not charge.  Separateness merely supplements 
differentness; if things are different, they will definitely charge but if they are not, 
separateness will decide.  This ad hoc revision to the mechanism articulates a new 
common property that may or may not be related to the other one.  John does not describe 
how these parts of the mechanism might together produce the phenomenon.   When faced 
with further evidence that refutes his new entity property (two separate hands do not 
charge), John rejects both separateness and differentness in favor of the idea that moisture 
prevents hands from charging (though its not clear whether he thinks this accounts for all 
cases of non-charging).  Cycling between multiple empirical results and mechanistic 
reasoning is not always productive for further elaborating the underlying mechanism; it 





Constructing Empirical Tests to Flesh Out Mechanisms  
Experience with the physical world provides a wealth of intuitions about the types 
of mechanisms that can occur (diSessa, 1993).  Armed with that information and more 
formal prior knowledge, students may approach novel situations with a sense of the 
entities and activities involved in the mechanism.   However, this sense of mechanism is 
rarely complete and students may require empirical results to “fill in unspecified 
variables” (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988, p. 8).  This cyclical relationship between mechanism 
and empirical results is different from those described in previous sections.  Rather than 
beginning with experiential data that provide clues to the mechanism, students start with 
an incomplete sense of the underlying mechanism and then seek direct evidence to 
provide the missing pieces.  Students recognize a gap in their understanding of the 
mechanism and spontaneously construct an informal test to fill it in.   
After discussion with the teaching assistant, the students articulate an electron 
transfer model of static electricity: two different materials can charge one another 
because electrons move from one to the other.  When two pieces of tape are stuck 
together and then pulled apart, electrons either jump to the sticky side of the top tape or 
the slick side of the bottom tape.  This leaves one tape positive and one negative so they 
attract.   However, when students are asked to answer the specific question below 
regarding the location of charge, they quickly encounter a gap in their static electricity 
mechanism.   
 
Question: A bottom (B) piece of tape and a top (T) piece of tape are separated 
halfway as shown (Fig. 1).  Use “+” and “–” symbols to indicate the parts of the 






They respond to this question as follows (utterances 324 – 334). 
 
 Claire: So basically one is plus, one is minus, but does it matter which -  
Erin:  Which piece? [?] 
… 
Audrey: So does that just mean that the inside surfaces that touch are 
different?  Or like the entire piece of tape is now [?] 
… 
Claire: [Pulls two pieces of tape off the table and away from each other, 
then brings both sides near each other] No see, but both sides stick. 
Audrey: So you think it goes like, it goes through the –  
Claire: Like slick to slick still touches, still is attracted [Erin nodding].  So 
it must charge the whole thing. 
 
Claire begins by describing the relevant properties of the tapes: one is “plus” and 
one is “minus” (she later identifies them as having an excess or deficit of electrons).  
However, Audrey is unsure about whether the plus and minus are located over the entire 
tape or just on the inside surfaces.  To fill this gap in the mechanism, Claire 
spontaneously constructs an informal empirical test of whether the entire piece of tape is 
charged.  She pulls the tapes apart and notices that they attract on all sides, not just the 
inside surfaces that were originally touching.  This result helps her chain to discover the 
organization of the entities: both the slick and sticky sides of both tapes attract, so both 
sides of the tape must be charged.  Audrey’s question about a part of the mechanism 
prompts the construction of an empirical test that is meaningful to the students.  Even for 





value of also including “messing about” and mechanistic reasoning in inquiry.  Questions 
of mechanism may lead students to construct informal observations or formal hypothesis 
tests that are intrinsically and theoretically motivated.   
After Claire's test, the conversation continues as follows (utterances 343 - 351).   
 
Erin:  So like along this whole surface of this top one would be plus? 
Claire: I think the whole piece. 
Audrey: Once you open it, right like, this part down here [Unpulled apart 
section of tape] isn’t charged yet right?  ‘Cause you haven’t like 
taken it apart to make the – [Pulling her hands away from each 
other.] 
Claire: So, can, alright.  Am I wrong in thinking of it like the actual 
electrons go to the other one? 
Erin:  That’s what I thought.  They like jump from one piece of tape to 
the other one. 
Audrey: I thought that when we like -  
Claire: To the other so that like the whole piece has more positives, and 
this whole piece has more negatives. 
 Erin:  Has more negatives, right. 
 Audrey: Okay. 
 
While the observation explained the organization of entities to Claire, Erin and 
Audrey are still confused about which part of the tape is charged.  In response, Claire 
uses parts of the mechanism they agree on to chain to her conclusion about entity 
organization.  She explains that if electrons (entities) jump (activity) from one piece of 
tape to the other one when they are pulled apart, then one entire (entity organization) 





and Audrey only agree that the gap in the mechanism is filled ("right" and "okay") after 
Claire explains why her conclusion about the entity organization must be true based on 
their own sense of electrons jumping.  The empirical result did not convince all the 
students until chaining among known components of the mechanism further supported it.  
This finding may indicate why demonstrations and laboratories that are so clear to 
educators sometimes fail to convince students of the concepts they are meant to illustrate.  
The results from those experiments may need to be accounted for by chaining from parts 
of the mechanism accepted by the students.  Students can make significant progress in 
understanding novel phenomena by using a nascent sense of mechanism to construct 
empirical tests and then explaining those results with a more complete underlying 
mechanism. 
Implications  
Current conceptions of inquiry place significant emphasis on developing student 
abilities to design and conduct controlled experiments.  While this skill is important for 
science, it is inappropriate to limit scientific inquiry to formal hypothesis testing.  The 
analysis described in this chapter presents several episodes from an introductory physics 
course as candidates for the kind of discussions we might want to include in 
characterizations of inquiry.  Although the students are not selecting variables to test or 
performing rigorous data analysis, they are nonetheless making significant progress in 
understanding the physical world by reasoning mechanistically about informal empirical 
results.  These examples illustrate activities that reflect natural student abilities and 





If we choose to include this kind of "messing about" and mechanistic reasoning in 
our characterizations of inquiry, then we must articulate what it means to do them well.  
Just as controlled experimentation can be done well or poorly, we expect that "messing 
about" and mechanistic reasoning can both be either productive or unproductive. 
However, we are far from having a list of standards to identify when students are doing 
either of these well.  In that way our understanding of these parts of inquiry lags behind 
our understanding of formal experimentation.  It is only by carefully analyzing episodes 
of "messing about" and mechanistic reasoning that we will begin to be able to distinguish 
features of quality student engagement from less valuable activity.  This chapter provides 
one such analysis of a discussion in which students are, on the whole, productively using 
both mechanistic and informal ways of understanding the physical world.  We describe 
how the students use each to inform the other and why what they are doing is valuable for 
inquiry.   
Analysis with the mechanism framework reveals that informal empirical results 
can help students tap their existing causal knowledge and construct coherent mechanistic 
explanations for physical phenomena.  We identify four relationships in this data.  
Observations can 1) prompt students to ask appropriate mechanistic questions, 2) help 
students generate parts of unknown mechanisms, and 3) aid in the refinement and 
elaboration of mechanisms.  An incomplete sense of mechanism can prompt the 
construction of informal empirical tests that then further elucidate the mechanism (4).  In 
all of these relationships, students move quickly between these two activities allowing 
each to inform the other.  This fluid movement may indicate that the traditional 





understand them as part of the larger activity of making sense of underlying mechanisms 
with each contributing to that end instead of each representing a end in and of 
themselves. 
To be clear, we do not claim to have provided a list of the relationships between 
messing about and mechanistic reasoning.  We do not imagine that what we saw in this 
discussion would necessarily be present in other instances.  In other cases we might 
identify other relationships.  Nor do we suggest that what we saw in this discussion is 
necessarily the best-case scenario that all other scientific inquiries should attempt to 
emulate.  Instead, we use this analysis to describe the kinds of fruitful relationships that 
can exist between informal empirical results and mechanistic reasoning if students are 
given the freedom to “mess about” during inquiry.  In doing so, we hopefully provide 
evidence that “messing about” can be a productive thing to do and thus should be 





Chapter 7: Mechanistic Reasoning with Mathematics in Graduate Level 
Physics 
Introduction 
The argument that educators should attend to and encourage mechanistic 
reasoning as part of scientific inquiry may be easy to accept for college students learning 
conceptual physics.  Our goal as their instructors in these semester or year-long survey 
courses is to give them an introduction to, or first pass at, physics topics and help them to 
understand what physics is about.  Mechanistic reasoning provides a way for those 
students to make sense of introductory topics and thus serves as an appropriate entry 
point for physics learning.  We might also have the grander goal of helping them gain an 
appreciation for how science knowledge, and more specifically physics knowledge, is 
constructed; mechanistic reasoning can serve that purpose as well.  Just as mechanistic 
reasoning was part of how Newton and his contemporaries developed their initial models 
of the physical world, so it is also part of how introductory students can make sense of 
the basic elements of those models.  It is reasonable and appropriate to expect 
mechanistic reasoning from our introductory students. 
It may be more difficult to accept that mechanistic reasoning should be included 
in our understanding of upper level physics expertise partly because our instructional 
goals for physics majors and graduate students are different than those described above.  
Unlike our students in conceptual physics, students at this stage in their physics learning 
need to know many things that cannot be directly understood using an intuitive sense of 





students to be able to solve complex problems involving multiple abstract physical 
concepts and sophisticated mathematical formalisms.  Those formalisms are crucial to 
upper level physics understanding as they provide precise language for reasoning about 
physical systems.  To familiarize students with those formalisms, we require multivariate 
calculus as a prerequisite for many advanced physics courses.  In addition, the University 
of Maryland Department of Physics requires one undergraduate course and strongly 
recommends another graduate course in the mathematical methods of physics.  
Developing proficiency in using formal, mathematical language to model physical 
phenomenon is a major goal of upper level physics.   
Given that making sense of ‘real’ physics requires extensive mathematics, it is 
appropriate to question whether mechanistic reasoning is part of expertise in advanced 
physics, or if it is only part of how students “get started” in understanding basic physics.   
Should we expect or hope to see evidence of mechanistic reasoning like that used by 
students in introductory science when we analyze upper level students solving heavily 
mathematical problems?  Can we as educators and researchers understand the reasoning 
of experts in similar terms to how we understand novice’s reasoning, or is expert 
mechanistic reasoning so removed from that of novices that we cannot use the same 
language in talking about them? 
To help answer those questions, this chapter analyzes graduate physics students’ 
solutions to a classical mechanics problem on a PhD qualifying exam.  Application of the 
coding scheme identifies several elements of mechanistic reasoning in their mathematical 
problem solving.  One implication of this result is that the coding scheme developed from 





discussions can also be successfully applied to the written work of physics graduate 
students. In doing so, the coding scheme gives insight into what mechanistic reasoning 
looks like throughout physics learning, including in upper level physics.  The coding 
scheme is useful as an analysis tool across K-20 science inquiry and thus may help us 
begin to recognize some continuity from novice to expert reasoning.   
More importantly, the result also speaks to the questions posed above.  Evidence 
found in both the graduate students’ written work and their interviews suggests that 
mechanistic reasoning is part of the fabric of sophisticated mathematical problem solving 
and how upper level students ‘do’ physics.  Advanced students use mechanistic reasoning 
to supplement mathematical formalism and they use mathematics to express their sense 
of mechanism.  This work provides case-study evidence that mechanistic reasoning is not 
limited to use in introductory or conceptual physics but is also a crucial part of graduate 
(even expert) physics understanding. 
Context for Analysis 
Problem Context  
To explore mechanistic reasoning in advanced physics learning, we use student 
solutions to a classical mechanics problem on the August 2003, PhD qualifying 
examination from the University of Maryland Department of Physics.  As one of the 
requirements of the department’s Doctor of Philosophy of Science program, students 
must show “competence in basic [graduate level] physics as evidenced by passing a 
written qualifying examination.” (UMD-DP, 2000)  The exam consists of two parts given 





hours; questions on the first part test classical physics (mechanics, electricity and 
magnetism, and statistical physics) and those on the second part test quantum physics.  At 
the end of each part, students turn in their written work for each problem to be graded by 
faculty members in the department.  Graduate students are given as many as four 
opportunities to pass the exam, once when they enter in August and three times more 
after their first year in the physics program (August, January, and the following August). 
 The particular problem analyzed here comes from the classical part of the exam 
and tests student understanding of graduate level mechanics.  Below is the problem 
scenario.  
 
 A tube of total length l contains a right angle bend, as shown in figure [8], below.  
The tube is held rigidly in place.  At time t = 0, a flexible chain of length l and 
total mass m is placed in the tube, as shown in figure [9].  The chain is released 
from rest at t = 0.  The chain slides within the tube with no friction between the 
chain and the walls of the tube.  Assume that the mass of the chain is uniformly 
distributed along its length, and let g denote the acceleration of gravity.  Let ξ(t) 
denote the horizontal displacement of the end of the chain at time t with ξ(0) = 0.  
See figure [10].  Let t0 be defined as the time when the left end of the chain 
reaches the bend in the tube, 
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Figure 8   Figure 9   Figure 10 
Figures 8, 9, and 10 are the actual figures given to students during the exam. 
 
Given these conditions, students are asked the following questions. 
 
(a) Taking the horizontal portion of the chain to be at a height of zero, what is the 
potential energy of the chain for 
! 
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 and what is the Lagrangian? 
 
(b) What is the equation of motion for ξ(t) for 
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(c) What is ξ(t) for 
! 




(d) Now consider the case where friction between the tube walls and the chain is 
not negligible.  At the instant that the left end of the chain reaches the bend in 




.  How 
much energy has been dissipated due to friction by this time? 
 






We analyze two students’ solutions to parts (a), (b), and (c) of the chain problem. 
The first solution studied is my own; I took the qualifying exam following my first year 
in the physics program after taking five graduate courses including classical mechanics, 
electricity and magnetism, quantum mechanics (I and II), and mathematical methods.  
The other student, Ben, took the exam before taking any graduate physics courses but 
after completing an undergraduate degree in physics (and receiving a secondary teaching 
certification) the preceding May.  Both students received perfect scores on the first three 
parts of the problem and performed well in their graduate courses. 
To analyze my own work, we use the written solution I constructed during the 
exam and turned in for grading (found in Appendix G).  My written work includes 
several notes (to myself and the graders) that clarify my approach to the problem and 
describe my reasoning.  Since the analysis described here was performed three years after 
I took the exam, those notes helped remind me of my thinking during problem solving.  
We use two sources of data to study Ben’s reasoning.  First, we look at the solution he 
turned in at the time of the exam.  Copies of his work were obtained from the graduate 
director with Ben’s permission (found in Appendix H).  Early discussions with Ben 
revealed that the work he turned in was his “clean” finished solution; it did not include 
any extra information about why he solved the problem as he did or any incorrect paths 
he explored.  To supplement this written solution, we interviewed Ben and asked him to 
“talk through his solution,” reconstructing his reasoning from his written work as best he 
could remember.  His interview took place three years after the original exam and was 





Appendix I.  When referencing student work in the analysis below, we provide digital 
images of what the students actually wrote during the exam. 
We recognize that the time separation between solving the problem and reflecting 
on the reasoning that generated the solution is not ideal; Ben or I might not accurately 
remember how we were thinking in the moment of the exam.  There are two responses to 
this concern.  The first is that Ben and I are both fairly confident in our reconstructions of 
our reasoning.  Our written work provided us with cues to our reasoning; seeing what we 
had written jogged our memories of what we had been thinking at the time.  The second 
response is that perfect alignment between our recollections of our reasoning and our in-
the-moment reasoning is not crucial to the argument of this chapter.  We seek to show 
that mechanistic reasoning plays a significant role in how upper level physics students 
make sense of rigorous mathematical problems.  Ben’s and my current explanations of 
the mathematical solution to the chain problem speak to that question just as much as our 
solution of that problem three years ago.  Even if we are not accurately remembering how 
we reasoned about the problem then, how we reason about it now gives insight into how 
graduate students make sense of mathematical problems.   
Coding Scheme Reveals Evidence of Mechanistic Reasoning 
 At the start of this analysis, it was not clear whether the coding scheme developed 
to identify mechanistic reasoning in student discourse about conceptual science topics 
would necessarily be able to identify mechanistic reasoning in students’ mathematical 
written work.  That is, it was not obvious that the framework would function as an 
analysis tool.  It was possible that the framework would not be useful in this new context 





mathematics or because their reasoning has changed or been refined in such a way that 
the framework could not capture it.   
There is evidence elsewhere that rules out the first concern.  Sherin (2006) 
presents several case studies to demonstrate that students’ intuitive physics knowledge 
about mechanisms can influence their mathematical solutions to physics problems.  He 
describes how third semester university physics students’ “intuitive schematizations [of 
the physical world] can drive work with equations in a fairly direct manner” (Sherin, 
2006, p. 553).  He cites other work by Ploetzner and colleagues (e.g. Ploetzner & Spada, 
1993) that “provides an account of the role of nonquantitative reasoning in problem 
solving” (p. 538).  In addition to the research literature, our own experiences in advanced 
physics courses suggest that understanding the physical mechanism underlying a situation 
is crucial to solving heavily mathematical physics problems.  For example, one key part 
of solving for the electromagnetic field in a waveguide is correctly reasoning about what 
physically happens to the field at the boundary and then translating that physical picture 
into a mathematical boundary condition.  
 The question then becomes whether the mechanism framework can usefully 
portray and describe that reasoning.  Analysis reveals that the mechanism framework can 
be used successfully in this new context; we find evidence of the mechanism codes, and 
thus of mechanistic reasoning, in students’ work.  Below we provide examples of each 
that demonstrate the utility of the coding scheme.  The examples show students using 
mathematics to express their sense of mechanism and give insight into how mechanistic 





Identifying Set-Up Conditions 
 The first problem asks students to find the potential energy of the chain for all 
time (what I call Vpotenergy).  In my solution, however, I started by calculating the potential 
energy of the chain at time t = 0 (what I call V0).  In doing so, I used mathematical 




Even though it is not requested in the problem, I described the amount (mass) and 
location of each part of the chain at time t = 0.  I translated the initial physical situation as 
depicted in Figure 9 into an exact mathematical description in terms of potential energy. 
Only after finding the potential energy at the starting time did I proceed to calculate the 
potential energy in terms of generalized coordinates that change in time. 
Identifying Entities and Activities 
 The problem statement largely specifies the relevant entities and activities of the 
chain problem.  However, it is worth noting that in my solution, I drew special attention 










Of all the information given in the problem, I circled and underlined the entities and 
activities, presumably because they were important to my thinking. 
 In my problem solution I also modified the given entity by breaking it into two 
parts: the part on the table at height h = 0 and the part hanging off the table (see 
Identifying Starting Conditions section above).  Then, instead of considering the entire 






Ben similarly chose to only focus on the part of the chain that is hanging down.  In his 
written work he constructed an integral for the potential energy (what he called U) that 







              
Figure 14 
 
The limits on Ben’s integral only cover the part of the chain that is hanging vertically.  In 
his interview, he mentioned the chain on the table in passing, only to say that it does not 
contribute to the potential energy.  For the rest of the discussion, he focused only on the 
part hanging off the table. 
 
Ben: And the problem said that the height was equal to zero [on the table] so 
potential energy is zero up here. 
… 
Ben: Each different bit of this chain that’s hanging down here is going to 
contribute a different amount to the potential energy.  
 
While I used words explicitly to identify my modified entity, Ben used a mathematical 
expression for potential energy (the integral) to denote that he was only considering part 
of the chain.  Both methods provide evidence of mechanistic reasoning; only the chain-
off-the-table is an important entity for calculating potential energy while the chain-on-
the-table can be ignored.  An important aspect of solving this problem involves 
specifying which entities affect the outcome and thus need to be mathematically 





Identifying Properties of Entities: Mass Density 
 The problem not only specifies the entities but also some important properties of 
the entities; the flexible chain has a uniform distribution of mass.  Again in my solution I 





In order to find the potential energy of the chain, students must translate this physical 
property of the entity into a mathematical statement.  Both Ben and I did so in our 
solutions. 
 
     
Figure 16 
 
I defined a property of the chain called the mass density in terms of other parameters in 
the problem.  This mathematical expression more precisely specified the “uniform 
distribution” property of the chain given in the problem.  Ben did the same thing and his 
definition gave him information about a small piece of chain that he later used to set up 
an integral for potential energy.   








Ben described this step in his solution as follows.  
 
Ben: So I, I said on here, you know, define a linear mass density that is the 
mass of the chain over its length… And if that’s true, then if we’re talking 
about a little tiny piece of chain, you know, you just make this [the mass] 
infinitesimally small and that [the length] infinitesimally small.  
 
Ben defines the entity property of the entire chain mathematically and then uses that 
expression to describe an entity property of one “little tiny piece of chain.” Although the 
problem did not explicitly ask the students to describe the mass density of the chain (or 
the mass of a small piece of chain), using a mathematical expression to express the entity 
property is a necessary step in calculating the potential energy.  Identifying entity 
properties mathematically is part of solving advanced physics problems. 
Identifying Properties of Entities: Inextensibility 
The uniform distribution of mass over the chain is not its only important property; 
the chain is also inextensible.  However, when I first read this exam problem, the “coils” 
of the chain in the given diagram (Figure 9) made me think the problem was about a 









I recall being overwhelmed by this idea.  Solving the problem of a falling spring would 
be very difficult, since springs are extensible.  A correct solution to that problem would 
require accounting for all the internal forces and including the spring potential energy in 
addition to the gravitational potential energy.   
It was only on rereading the problem that I realized the problem was about a chain 
rather than a spring. 14  In my written solution, I made two moves to remind myself not to 
think about the problem as though it were a spring before I began any mathematics.  First, 





Second, I redrew the given diagrams.  
  
                                                








Notice that my diagrams are not the same as those provided in the problem; I 
purposefully used a line to represent the chain and left out the “coils” (or links) that cued 
my thinking of the problem as a spring.   
The explicit “not spring” reminders illustrate an important aspect of my 
mechanistic reasoning.  Before beginning any mathematical formalism, I first identified 
which entity properties were relevant to the mechanism; the “link-ness” of the chain 
could be ignored because it does not affect how the chain falls off the table (hence the 
line in my drawing).  In contrast, had the problem been about a spring as I had originally 
thought, the extensibility of the coils would be important to solving the problem 
correctly; the spring’s “springiness” would need to be modeled explicitly because that 
springiness would affect the potential energy and how the spring falls.  My reminders 
indicate that the inextensibility of the chain is an entity property I consider especially 
relevant to the problem. 
In my solution, I reminded myself to ignore the links in the chain not only 
because they were irrelevant but also because they distracted me by invoking entity 
properties that were not appropriate in the physical situation (springiness).  In previous 





properties partly because it helps eliminate irrelevant ones from consideration.  For 
example, the students in the falling objects discussion do not need to talk about what is 
on the cover of the book they are dropping because it does not affect the mechanism of 
falling.  In solving the chain problem, the chain links actually diverted my attention away 
from thinking about gravitational potential energy and towards thinking about the 
restoring forces between the links.  Identifying the chain as equivalent to an inextensible 
line is an important step in my solution because it helps me eliminate distracting 
properties (springiness) that do not affect the falling mechanism and not need to be 
modeled.  Had I not done so, my mathematical solution to the problem would have been 
dramatically different (not to mention incorrect). 
Identifying Organization of Entities 
The problem asks students to find the potential energy of the chain for time 
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.  Potential energy is a function of both the mass of an object and its location; an 
object held 10 meters off the ground would have more potential energy than the same 
object held 5 meters off the ground.  Thus an important step in this problem is precisely 
identifying the location of the chain; that location will dictate how much potential energy 
the chain has at any time. 
In my solution, I treated the chain as though all of its mass is located at the center 
of mass.  As such, I described the location of the entire length of chain with one 









Thinking of the chain as a point mass located in one place allowed me to use the single 
variable ‘y’ to capture all the relevant organization of the chain; I did not need to describe 
the entire extended object. 
Ben does not describe the organization of the chain in the same way.  Instead of 
thinking about the entire chain as effectively located at one point, he thinks about the 
chain as made up of many tiny pieces of mass each located at a different height. 
 
Ben: So I’m sure the way, I’m ve, quite sure the way, they way I went about 
this at the time, it’s still the way I go about problems like this, is uh, each 
different bit of this chain that’s hanging down here is going to contribute a 
different amount to the potential energy because it’s a different distance 
away from our reference line. 
Later:   
Ben: For the potential energy, you know the amount this bit [in the middle of 
the hanging part] contributes is, uh, different than the amount this bit 
[bottom of the hanging part] contributes to the potential energy…  
Because they’re at different heights. 
 
Thinking of the chain and its potential energy as many small pieces spread out over a 





representing the height of one of the bits of chain (called dm) and then integrated over the 






In the interview, Ben described how the integral allowed him to “consider every point 
along that chain.”  For him, it was important to identify and account for the location of 
each piece of chain.   
Ben and I produced equivalent solutions for the potential energy; our final 
answers for V (or U) were identical. 15  However, our descriptions of the entity 
organization in the chain problem were quite different; I described the extended body as 
located at a single point and Ben described each small piece of chain individually spread 
out over its length.  The difference in our mechanistic reasoning is reflected in our 
mathematical approaches to the problem; I defined the height (and mass) of the center of 
the chain using algebraic expressions and Ben defined infinitesimal mass elements, 
selected appropriate limits, and integrated to explicitly account for every piece of the 
chain hanging off the table.  The mathematical machinery Ben and I employed (i.e., 
integration vs. algebra) expressed our sense of mechanism in the chain problem, 
particularly our ideas about entity organization. 
                                                






In order to construct the Lagrangian, students need to find both the potential and 
kinetic energy of the chain falling off the table.  The kinetic energy of a point particle (or 







2where    m = mass of the particle 
       v = velocity of the particle 
 
Calculating the kinetic energy of the chain involves deciding what mass and velocity are 
appropriate to use.  Ben chose the velocity based on his understanding of the properties 




In his interview he further explained his decision to use 
! 
˙ "  for the velocity. 
 
Ben: If it’s an inextensible, inextensible chain, every bit of that chain is moving 
at the same velocity… So you know kinetic energy is one half m v squared 
there by definition.  You know, every bit of that chain is moving at the 
same velocity, so this [v] is just going to be constant of the length of the 
chain… And uh, you know, you can look at how fast ξ of t is changing, 
you know and that’s going to be how fast this, this first little bit of chain is 





moving.  So v here [in T] is just gonna be, you know, the first derivative 
of ξ. 
 
Ben is reasoning mechanistically by chaining: using what he knows about the properties 
and activities of the chain to select the appropriate velocity for his kinetic energy 
equation.  He knows an entity property of the chain: it is inextensible in that all the parts 
are connected and not stretchy.  Given that property, he describes the activity of the 
chain: all parts of the chain must be moving at the same velocity.  Since all points move 
together, he decides to model the velocity of entire chain with the velocity of one point.  
In his interview, Ben expresses his surprise at how easy this part of the problem was. 
 
Ben: I guess if you want the Lagrangian you need to know the kinetic energy 
also.  So, I mean that’s, I’m sure I remember thinking at the time, “Boy, it 
can’t be that easy, can it?”  But, I mean, it is. 
 
Ben’s chaining from entity properties he knows to the velocity he does not know is 
precisely what made solving for the kinetic energy straightforward to him.  However, we 
can imagine another (correct) method for finding the kinetic energy that involves setting 
up an integral over the mass and velocity of each little bit of the chain in the same way 
Ben set up an integral to account for the potential energy of each part.  This method 
would certainly be more difficult and time consuming to complete than Ben’s argument.  
By chaining from physical properties of the situation, Ben is able to simplify the 
mathematics he needs to correctly solve for the kinetic energy. We do not suggest that 
Ben (or other students who made this same decision) consciously do this chaining for the 





the integration method but rather just “see” that modeling the chain with one velocity is 
appropriate.  Chaining appears to be a fairly automatic part of how graduate students 
approach problem solving.   
The chaining Ben does in this problem is different from the chaining we have 
discussed in other chapters.  He chaining does not occur in time: he does not take what he 
knows about the properties of the chain at one time to reason about the velocity of the 
chain at another time.  Instead, his chaining occurs in sequential reasoning steps: the 
properties of the chain at one time have implications for the velocity of the chain at the 
same time.  This use of the term “chaining” is a departure from how it is used in MDC’s 
framework.  However, we feel it is an appropriate extension because Ben is still using 
what he knows about the physical situation to make claims about what he does not know. 
Mechanistic Reasoning Supplementing Mathematical Solutions 
 We have seen evidence of mechanistic reasoning in upper level physics students’ 
mathematical problem solving.  We now present two episodes in which students’ 
mechanistic reasoning supplements their mathematical reasoning.  In particular, we show 
students engaging in mathematics that is not technically correct or sensible but is 
nonetheless appropriate and effective for modeling the physical situations.  In one case, 
the “fudged” mathematics gives the correct answer and in the other case it does not.  
Regardless of whether it gives them the right answer, mechanistic reasoning seems to 





Episode One: Mechanistic reasoning contributes to a correct mathematical 
solution 
 As discussed earlier, one approach to solving for the potential energy of the chain 
involves performing an integral over the entire length of the chain that is falling off the 





Although Ben obtains the correct expression for potential energy (what he calls U), his 
mathematical solution is not technically correct.  When he introduces the U integral, 
Ben’s integration variable is dm (the mass) but his limits of integration are distances (l) 
along the chain.  Ben notices this problem during the interview. 
 
Ben:   So, I mean, looking at this now, I don’t think my notation is, is, ex, totally 
correct here… So I have to somehow, now here I’m mixing things because 
when I integrated over the chain, l is just a kind of variable that will sweep 
out up and down here [the chain]… Now I mean, that’s not technically 
correct, I can see that now, cause my infinitesimal is kind-of an m here. 
 
Ben’s integral also has the problem that he uses l both inside the integral and as an 





next line he adds primes to the l’s inside the integral.  Again, he discusses this move in 
the interview. 
 
Interviewer: And that l [inside the integral] was the same l as you’d been using 
[to specify limits]?  That’s the same l as you were using for l, as it 
were? 
Ben: Right, okay so, yeah, now at this point you’ll see on my paper 
these little primes mysteriously appear here…  Because, you’re 
right, they’re not the same l… technically speaking.  Yeah, this l 
[in the limit] is distinct from these l’s [in the integral].  These [in 
the integral] are just integration variables to help me sweep out, 
you know, this chain’s length. 
 
Ben’s notation in this part of the problem is not technically mathematically 
correct; he mixes variables both in the limits and inside the integral.  However, he is able 
to correctly solve for the potential energy because he is using the mathematical variables 
as place-holders to represent different physical properties of the chain.  The limits of 
integration represent the locations of the beginning and end of the falling chain that he 
needs to “sweep out” while the mass and length inside the integral represent the 
properties of a representative small piece of chain.  He does not need to obey the formal 
rules of integration because he is only using it to express his idea that the potential energy 
of every piece of the chain needs to be summed together to get the total potential energy.  
While his math might be incorrect, his physical mechanism for the falling chain underlies 
the formalism and helps him effectively keep track of the mixed variables.  In this case, 
Ben’s mechanistic reasoning supplements his mathematical moves and allows him to 





Episode Two: Mechanistic reasoning leads to an incorrect mathematical solution 
 The problem scenario describes the target phenomenon generally: a flexible chain 
falls off a table with no friction.  The first three parts of the problem ask students to 
describe the target phenomenon more precisely using mathematical formalism.  In 
particular, in part (c) students have to find the position of the chain for any time t by 
solving a differential equation derived from the potential and kinetic energies of the 
chain.   My first solution to the homogeneous equation reflects an incorrect attempt to 





From my equation of motion, I directly solve for the homogeneous solution and obtain a 
superposition of exponentially increasing and decreasing terms.  In reflecting on that 
solution, I grow concerned because it does not match my understanding of the 
mechanism at work:  I expect the chain to speed up with increasing acceleration because 





decreasing term from my mathematical solution on “physical grounds.”  My steps in 
solving the problem mathematically are dictated by my mechanistic reasoning about what 
the target phenomenon should look like. 
 After applying boundary conditions (what I call B.C.’s), I discover that dropping 




Application of the boundary conditions leads me to the conclusion that all terms in the 
complete solution (homogeneous and nonhomogeneous) are zero.  I am uncomfortable 
with this solution as well, not because it fails match my understanding of the target 
phenomenon but because I end up with a mathematically trivial solution: I did not 
imagine that they would give a problem to which the solution was zero.  I decide to 
resolve the differential equation keeping both the exponentially increasing and decreasing 
terms; this entirely mathematical method of solving the problem ultimately gives me the 
correct answer.  In this case, using my physical description of the target phenomenon to 
check and supplement the mathematics leads me to an incorrect answer that I correct by 
temporarily neglecting my sense of mechanism about the problem. 
Strictly speaking, dropping terms is not a legitimate mathematical move. 





solving reflection and transmission problems in quantum mechanics we often leave out 
solutions representing waves moving in the “wrong” direction around potential wells.  
We modify the mathematical solutions derived from Schrödinger’s equation using our 
understanding of the mechanism behind how the waves might plausibly be moving.  My 
mistake in the chain problem is not so much in dropping the term but in misinterpreting 
the exponentially decreasing term as necessarily indicating a decreasing solution.  
Although in this case it is incorrect to drop terms, dropping terms based on physical 
considerations is generally appropriate (and even necessary) in solving physics problems.  
Mechanistic reasoning often supplements mathematical solutions. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we use the mechanism coding scheme to analyze student solutions 
to a graduate qualifying exam question on classical mechanics.  The success of this 
methodology may in itself be somewhat surprising.  At the start of the analysis it was not 
clear that the coding scheme developed from characterizations of professional bioscience 
research and tested in conceptual science discussions would capture the advanced 
reasoning of graduate students in problem solving.  However, we find evidence of each of 
the mechanism codes in student written work.  As such, it seems that the framework 
might begin to help us characterize how students make progress in mechanistic reasoning 
across K – 20 science education.  
The analysis provides some insight into what mechanistic reasoning might look 
like in upper level physics learning.  For example, students use mathematical expressions 
to more precisely define target phenomenon, starting conditions, and entity properties.  





advanced mathematical machinery (integration vs. algebra) reflects their understanding of 
the underlying mechanism at work, particularly the entity properties and organization.  
Finally, mechanistic reasoning may dictate the particular mathematical moves students 
make in solving problems; that reasoning may be particularly noticeable when students 
make moves that are mathematically invalid.  
The excerpts from this analysis suggest that upper level students do in fact reason 
mechanistically when solving mathematically rigorous physics problems.  In doing so, it 
provides further evidence that mechanistic reasoning is part of expertise in “doing” and 
learning advanced physics and is not just a way for students to “get started” in 
understanding basic science concepts.  Mechanistic reasoning may thus be one element of 
continuity from naïve to expert physics understanding.  It seems appropriate then to 
attend to the development of that reasoning as an integral part of expert physics 





Chapter 8: Reflection on Current Work and Directions for Future 
Research 
Introduction 
The work presented in this dissertation is grounded in two assumptions.  The first 
assumption regards student resources for science learning. 
 
Imagine a kindergartener and ask yourself whether she’s likely to know about 
what its like to lift and drop rocks or books or tissue paper about how it feels to 
touch a candle flame or an ice cube; about what water does when she pours or 
drinks or swims in it.  Does she know about seeing things through a window or 
her reflection in a mirror; about the sounds of hitting drums or guitar strings or 
just her abdomen; about walking and running, slipping and falling, or slipping and 
gliding?  Could she predict what would happen is she were to step on a house of 
cards – if that’s not something she’s actually done – or what would happen if she 
were to pour a jar of ink onto a tablecloth, or if she were to try to use a bowling 
ball to play soccer?  (Hammer & van Zee, 2006, p. 13) 
 
From a very young age, students have lots of experience with the physical world.  It must 
be the case then that our students are familiar with what kinds of things can happen and 
what kinds of things can cause other things to happen.  As Sherin (2006) suggests: 
“Given that we [and our students], as humans, must function in the physical world, it is 
manifestly evident that we [and our students] must know a great deal about the behavior 






 The second assumption follows from the first and speaks to the purpose of science 
inquiry in classrooms. 
 
 Students start with sufficient understanding to engage in significant conversations 
that they can learn in and contribute to. (Greeno, 1992, p. 42) 
and 
  According to this view, we should try to change education in science and 
mathematics so that mathematical and scientific thinking are the main focus of 
activities in situations of learning, enabling students to develop the capabilities of 
scientific and mathematical thinking through elaboration, refinement, and 
modification of capabilities that they bring.  (Greeno, 1992, p. 40) 
 
Science classrooms should not always center on providing students with pieces of factual 
knowledge but rather should provide students with opportunities to practice and refine 
their thinking about knowledge they have already gleaned from their experiences with the 
physical world.   
 These two assumptions may be easy to accept in the abstract, but are more 
difficult to put into practice.  Much of the challenge in enacting science inquiry grounded 
in these two assumptions is in defining what constitutes good scientific thinking and how 
to assess it in students.  While many educators may accept the value of such inquiry, the 
continued ambiguity of “scientific thinking” makes it difficult for researchers, curriculum 
developers, and teachers to pursue it systematically.  This work attempts to make our 
understanding of that thinking more articulate.  We make progress in defining scientific 







Mechanism Framework  
In this work we motivated our attention to mechanistic reasoning by describing 
the limitations of current characterizations of inquiry centered on controlled 
experimentation.  We presented further arguments about the prevalence and value of 
mechanistic reasoning in professional science and in everyday causal thinking.  Finally, 
we discussed the need to make the heuristic descriptions and examples of mechanistic 
reasoning found elsewhere in the literature more explicit. 
The primary result of this work is the coding scheme itself.  Using Machamer, 
Darden, and Craver’s (MDC, 2000) account of bioscientists search for mechanisms, we 
developed a framework that provides a reliable means of analyzing student scientific 
discourse for evidence of mechanistic thinking.   We drew on their definition of 
mechanisms as “a series of activities of entities that bring about the finish or termination 
conditions [from the set-up conditions] in a regular way” (MDC, 2000, p. 7) as well as 
their notion of chaining: reasoning about one stage of a mechanism based on what is 
known about another stage.  Our framework consists of seven main codes derived from 
their characterization that identify aspects of mechanistic reasoning and can be used to 
systematically analyze narrative data for patterns in student thinking.  Below we briefly 
describe each of the codes.   
 
1. Describing Target Phenomenon (DTP): Students state or demonstrate the 
particular phenomenon or result they are trying to explain. 
2. Identifying Set-Up Conditions (SC): Students identify the particular enabling 





3. Identifying Entities (IE): Students identify objects that affect the outcome of the 
phenomenon. 
4. Identifying Activities (IA): Students articulate the actions and interactions that 
occur among the entities. 
5. Identifying Properties of Entities (IPE): Students articulate general properties of 
entities that are necessary for the mechanism to run. 
6. Identifying Organization of Entities (IOE): Students describe how the entities are 
spatially organized, where they are located, or how they are structured. 
7. Chaining: Backward and Forward (C): Students reason about one stage in the 
mechanism based on what is known about other stages in the mechanism. 
 
The coding scheme allows us to be explicit and articulate about the instructional 
intuitions we have regarding the value of student thinking.  Our ability to obtain precision 
and clarity with respect to mechanistic reasoning suggests that it is worthwhile and 
appropriate for educators to devote time to pinning down their understanding of 
productive science learning in other areas, perhaps with help from the history and 
philosophy of science.  
Case Study Analysis 
The mechanism framework provided us with a tool for analyzing student 
scientific inquiry.  We described the results of that analysis for four case-studies.  
Application of the mechanism coding scheme allowed us to develop rich, in-depth 
descriptions of the students’ inquiry; these descriptions captured both our intuitions about 
when students are doing well and revealed student abilities obscured by traditional 





Case One: First Graders Discuss Falling Objects 
Our coding of the first graders in a large group discussion about falling objects 
revealed young students engaging in sophisticated mechanistic reasoning; they are 
capable of constructing rich theoretical explanations that some education literature 
suggests is developmentally restricted from this age.  It seems appropriate then that 
science inquiry should allow for and promote student abilities to do so by including 
subject matter that is rich with mechanistic possibilities. 
The first grade students also transitioned quickly and fluidly between various 
levels of mechanistic thinking.  This observation suggests the need to account for the 
variability of student reasoning in our research on and assessments of science learning.  
In particular, it is inappropriate to assume how students act or respond in one context will 
be the same as how they act or respond in other contexts.  Thus researchers need to study 
student reasoning in a variety of situations: such as written work, students participating in 
class, students talking to their friends, and one-on-one interviews.  Similarly, educators 
need to assess student reasoning based on performance on a number of tasks or else they 
risk misrepresenting the breadth of their students’ abilities and ideas. 
Case Two: Second Graders Discuss Collapsing Juice Boxes 
The description of the second graders’ small group discussion about collapsing 
juice boxes illustrated that students can be engaged in mechanistic reasoning that is 
valuable and productive for understanding science even when the products of that 
reasoning are incorrect.  So we saw again that students are capable of mechanistic 
reasoning, which leads support to our initial assumption.  We also found that a teacher’s 





reasoning.  We suggested that such reasoning may be an instructional target worth 
pursuing in its own right, rather than merely using it as a method for teaching and 
learning correct content.   
The analysis also clarified that the quality of mechanistic reasoning is 
independent of whether the result of that reasoning is correct.  As such, reasoning can and 
should now become the subject of research in and of itself.  We can begin to 
systematically study reasoning, its development, and its dynamics to gain insight into 
what curricular materials might promote such reasoning. 
Case Three: College Students Discuss Electrostatics 
Applying the coding scheme to the discussion of electrostatics that occurred 
among college students in an introductory physics tutorial revealed several productive 
relationships between informal empirical investigation and mechanistic reasoning.  This 
finding suggests that scientific inquiry should not be limited to controlled 
experimentation.  Even when the students are not selecting variables to test or performing 
rigorous data analysis, they can nonetheless make significant progress in understanding 
and constructing models for novel physical phenomenon.  As such, theoretical reasoning 
supported by informal observation should be given a more prominent place in our 
conceptions of inquiry and our science curricula.   
Case Four: Graduate Students Solve a Classical Mechanics Problem 
The analysis of the independent work (written and interview) of graduate students 
on a classical mechanics exam question suggested that mechanistic reasoning plays a 
crucial role in solving heavily mathematical physics problems.  In addition, the 





continuity between what we observed in novices (first graders) and what we observed in 
experts (graduate students).  This possibility is discussed in more detail below. 
Reflections on the Current Work 
From Intuitions to a Coding Scheme to a General Language 
In looking back over this dissertation, I am reminded of my experiences in the 
physics education research group at the University of Maryland that led me to begin this 
work.  When I entered the group after leaving a traditional physics undergraduate 
program, I had difficulty “seeing” all the good stuff in video of student science 
discussions that others in the research group so readily saw.  I grew frustrated because 
while it seemed to natural to others in the group, when I watched episodes of student 
reasoning I did not even know where to look for the good stuff, much less what to see.  
Others in the research group tried to help me but they struggled when trying to be 
articulate about what they were seeing.  What they saw seemed to be grounded in their 
intuitions: intuitions that I did not yet share.  It took me over a year of listening to our 
group analyze student science conversations before I was finally able to develop my own 
intuitions about what productive inquiry looks like.  My frustration with this experience 
led me to seek a more precise language for talking about student reasoning so that others 
might not find themselves floundering as much when learning to watch video. 
I found that more precise language in a philosophy of science course about 
mechanisms in professional science taught by Darden (of Machamer, Darden, and 
Craver, 2000).  In retrospect it is somewhat surprising that a framework developed from 





students’ discussions of science.  First, Machamer, Darden, and Craver set out to 
characterize the mechanisms that exist in the world whereas we were trying to identify 
times when students reason about and construct understanding of those mechanisms. 
Second, MDC study the work of scientists with extensive content knowledge in their 
fields whereas we were studying student reasoning discussing topics in areas where they 
are not experts.  Third, whereas we studied students constructing knowledge in the 
moment, MDC look at historical episodes of discovery.  Finally, MDC’s work centers on 
the mechanisms studied by biologists, geneticists, and neuroscientists while we study 
how students learn physics concepts.  So in retrospect, it was by no means guaranteed 
that our analysis would be possible much less fruitful.  And yet, the framework both 
“works” and does work for us. 
Now that the framework has been developed, I am pleased that it has provided a 
language not only for me but also for others in our research group to talk about 
mechanistic reasoning.  When others who are not a part of our group ask us what kinds of 
good things we see in a particular student science discussion, we can now use the 
language of the mechanism framework to articulate our instructional intuitions.  The 
coding of entities, activities, and chaining helps us describe the good stuff that was 
formerly described only by our sense of goodness.  For those who have not yet developed 
intuitions about mechanistic reasoning, systematic coding provides a readily accessible 
avenue for developing them. 
In this sense, the framework has done its job; it has helped us develop and be 
clear about our intuitions regarding student mechanistic reasoning.  However, now that I 





scheme may no longer be necessary (at least for me).  At this point, I do not need to code 
every single line of every single student in a class discussion to identify moments of 
mechanistic reasoning.  My experience in applying the coding scheme to other pieces of 
data has helped me sharpen my focus; I know both where to look and what to see in 
student science discussions. For me, the power of the framework now lies in the language 
and terminology it provides, more than in the graphs or patterns of codes it generates. 
A Perspective on Continuity: Progress in Physics Learning 
At this point, it is appropriate to step back from the specifics of each case and 
think about the “bigger picture” of this work.  What might all the cases taken together 
indicate about student mechanistic reasoning? 
The cases presented here involve almost the largest possible breadth of students: 
first graders all the way up to graduate students.  Unlike education research that focuses 
on one particular age group or grade level, this work spans K-20 science learning; the 
same framework is able to capture similar mechanistic reasoning in all ages of students.  
When the cases are taken together, we begin see continuity between graduate level 
learning and elementary school science: part of what students are able to do in elementary 
school finds its way to graduate school.  
So what does it mean that we find mechanistic reasoning as a thread that runs 
throughout K-20 science learning?  Let us first consider what it does not mean. The fact 
that these cases show sophisticated mechanistic reasoning throughout the grade levels 
does not mean that educators should take that reasoning for granted in their students; it 
would be inappropriate for teachers to assume that just because students can reason 





have all observed instances when students are doing the exact opposite of mechanistic 
reasoning; instead of making sense of the physical situation they memorize and pattern 
match equations to problems.   
An Example of a Non-Mechanistic Approach to Science 
 Consider the following example from a group study session in which college 
students are trying to estimate the pressure difference between the top and bottom of their 
dorm room.  Solving this problem is fairly easy if one thinks about the mechanism for the 
pressure difference: the weight of the air in the room exerts an extra pressure on the 
bottom of the room that is not on the top.  All the students need to do is to find the weight 
of a column of air the height of their room.  Instead, they students do something that is 
physically non-sensible; they randomly apply a formula solely because it includes a 
relevant variable (P for pressure). 
 
S1:    Well pressure's supposed to be higher at the bottom, isn't it? 
S2:    Hmm? 
S1:    Pressure is supposed to be higher at the bottom. 
S2    I think there's more at the bottom, because the thing, because the  
gravitation. 
S1:    And, there's pressure pushing down on it. 
S2:    Um-huh. 
S1:   OK. 
S2:    Pressure's equal to the radius times the moles of the gas times the 
temperature divided by the volume.  So, what we need to do, we know the 
pressure find the volume from this.  Density is equal to... 
S1:    Are you using PV equals N R T? 





S1:    Are you using P V equals N R T? 
S2:    Yeah, or yeah 
S1:    Or. 
S2:    Or P equals R times N T... 
S1:    Over V. 
S2:    Over V. 
S1:    We know the pressure. 
S2:    We know the pressure.  But we need to take the density to volume.  
Density is equal to... 
S1:    Oh, we have the density. 
S2:    Yeah, yeah, but that doesn't matter we need the volume. 
S1:    Oh, what did I just say. 
S2:    Density is equal to volume over what mass, or something? 
S1:    Density equals mass over volume. 
S2:    Hmm? 
S1:    Density is equal to mass over volume. 
S2:    Is equal to mass over volume. 
S3:    It's over, it's over. 
S2:    OK.  So, if let's say it's equal to mass over volume, then [to another 
student] yeah.  No I just found the formula to do it.  So, this is equal to 
mass over volume, then the mass is equal to.  So, basically we just found 
the formula that P is equal to the radius times the moles times the 
temperature over the volume.  So, if we have the density we can find the 
volume. 
S1:    Is R the radius? 
S4:    I don't think R is the radius. 
S2:    It's not? The radius of the... 
S1:    R isn't radius.  R is... 
S2:    Or, whatever R is. 
S4:    Some number. 





S2:    Is it a constant? 
S3:    Yeah, it's a constant.  It's a constant. 
 
What these students are doing is ridiculous; though they start with a sensible idea that 
pressure should be higher at the bottom of the room than the top, they quickly move to 
using PV=nRT which has no physical relevance to the problem.  Unlike those in the 
cases presented in this dissertation, they are not engaging in any (much less sophisticated) 
mechanistic reasoning about the phenomenon in question.  They are not trying to identify 
physical causal entities and activities (nor are they chaining) that affect the pressure in the 
room.  This example is not an isolated case; we have all seen other students engaging in 
this non-sensible behavior instead of reasoning about problems mechanistically. 
However, even though students sometimes do not engage in mechanistic reasoning, we 
have no reason to suspect that they cannot do so.  In fact, we have evidence to the 
contrary: we see them doing so from a very young age.  
Supporting Continuity in Mechanistic Reasoning 
Our experiences with student discussions like those above suggest that it is not 
appropriate to assume that just because mechanistic reasoning can appear across grade 
levels it necessarily will.  These college students (and others) may have learned from 
other experiences in science that this kind of ‘plug-n-chug’ problem solving is how you 
are supposed to do science or that its how you get good grades in science classes.  Thus 
even though they are capable of the kind of mechanistic reasoning we see in young 
students, they may (tacitly) decide not to use it.  If we want to see more of the continuity 
in mechanistic reasoning across K-20 education, we need to be explicitly attentive to and 





suppression might occur, making it less likely that we will see mechanistic reasoning in 
upper level science learning.   
The first is epistemological: if we do not support student’s efforts at mechanistic 
reasoning, we may in fact send students the message that mechanistic reasoning is not 
appropriate or valuable for science learning.  Part of science teaching must involve 
helping students recognize that the thing they are doing in first grade is science and that it 
is the kind of thing they should continue doing throughout their school science careers.  
We need to be explicit with students that mechanistic reasoning is one of the right things 
to do in learning science, as opposed to the physically non-sensible activity we saw the 
college students do above.   
 The second way we might suppress students’ mechanistic reasoning is merely by 
failing to give them opportunities to engage in it.  Like any skill, from integrating a 
contour integral to doing a flip on the balance beam, learning to productively engage in 
mechanistic reasoning takes practice.  As Greeno (1992) suggests, we suspect that “its 
[scientific thinking] growth will depend mainly on opportunities to think” (p. 40).  Unless 
our classrooms provide such opportunities, students’ ability to reason mechanistically 
may not develop but instead stagnate. 
Progress in Science: Progress in Mechanistic Reasoning 
The continuity we observe in the reasoning of first graders and graduate students 
helps us think about how mechanistic reasoning might develop or progress if we are 
purposefully attentive to it.  One possibility for development would be for students to 
gain access to richer stores of entities and activities so that their mechanistic explanations 





“conductor-ism” to account for the mechanism of static electricity, students might show 
refinement in their mechanistic thinking by reasoning about what entities and activities 
underlie that property (namely electrons jumping).  Progress in mechanistic reasoning 
might also manifest itself in students’ more precise identification of entities and 
activities, as in the case when Ben and I use mathematical expressions to describe entity 
properties or organization.  Another type of progress might involve students becoming 
aware of their transitions into and out of mechanistic reasoning.  For example, while the 
first graders probably did not consciously or deliberately shift between describing target 
phenomenon and chaining, Ben and I both show awareness of and control over our 
decisions about when to use mechanistic reasoning (in calculating potential energy) and 
when not to (in using Lagrange’s equation to find the equation of motion).  Coordinating 
mechanistic reasoning with other strategies (e.g. constraint based reasoning, mathematics, 
experimentation) might also indicate development in science learning.   
This analysis gives us a way to conceptualize progress in science learning, and in 
particular physics learning.  Instead of thinking of progress in science learning as the 
accumulation of more conceptual facts, we might begin to think of progress as the 
refinement of mechanistic reasoning abilities.  Our ability to identify similarities in the 
mechanistic reasoning of students throughout K-20 education helps us think about how 
that reasoning is changed and refined (or can be changed and refined) through 





Directions for Future Research 
Analysis of the Effects of Systematic Attention to Mechanistic Reasoning 
 In this work we have suggested that it is appropriate (and possible with the 
mechanism framework) for educators and researchers to explicitly attend to and 
systematically promote mechanistic reasoning in student discourse.  One avenue for 
future research would be to explore the effects of such explicit attention on students’ 
science learning.  What would happen if educators were intentional about recognizing 
and promoting mechanistic reasoning in their classrooms?  It may be that the idea of 
mechanistic reasoning as appropriate and productive for science would become more 
firmly established in students’ epistemologies such that they would use it automatically.  
In that case, college professors might be able to take that reasoning as an existing 
foundation on which they can build conceptual understanding.  It may also be that 
students would develop and access richer collections of resources for making sense of 
physical situations.  Future research could explore these possibilities for what the 
continuity in mechanistic reasoning might look like if it received explicit attention in 
science teaching. 
Analysis of Student Resources for Science Learning 
The mechanism framework we developed provides a research tool for analyzing 
the phenomenology of student reasoning during inquiry; it allows us to be articulate 
about what we see students doing and helps us precisely describe student behavior.  
These rich descriptions of student behavior are interesting and valuable in and of 





students behave during inquiry naturally prompts questions about why students act as 
they do.  For example, 
 
1. Why do the students in the falling objects discussion (chapter four) switch 
from the lowest to the highest levels in the mechanistic framework when they 
do?   
2. Why do the students in the electrostatics discussion (chapter six) start talking 
about their observations and shift to thinking about the mechanism underlying 
those observations?  
3. Why did I “see” the chain falling off the table in terms of its center-of-mass 
while Ben thought about it in terms of an integral?  (chapter seven)  
 
These questions all arise from studying the data through the lens of the mechanism 
framework; we could not speculate about why the students in the falling objects 
discussion transitioned between levels without first identifying what those levels are and 
when students move between them.  Although these questions come out of the precise 
descriptions of student behavior, further work outside of phenomenology is needed to 
answer them.  Below is an example of the kind of analysis that might shed light on these 
kinds of questions.   
A Transition in Explanation: Juice Box Discussion 
Consider the following example from the episode of inquiry presented in chapter 
five.  Second grade students are discussing with their science enrichment teacher why 
empty juice boxes collapse when you suck on their straws.  The students give three 
different explanations for the phenomenon: the inside-pusher model, the outside-pusher 





holds the sides out until the air is removed.  The outside pusher model describes how the 
air outside the box pushes the sides in when the passive resistance of the inside air is 
removed.  Finally, the imbalance of pushes model involves both the inside and outside air 
actively pushing against one another until the outside air wins when the inside air is 
removed. 
Coding the conversation with the mechanism framework reveals an interesting 
transition in one student’s explanation.  In the excerpts below we have edited the 
transcript by removing teacher comments (replaced with ellipses) so that the student’s 
ideas, which are given in several turns at talk, are one continuous explanation.  Early in 
the discussion, Leah explains her reasoning for why the sides cave in when there is less 
air inside the box as follows: 
 
 Leah:  Because the air, it blows um, the uh sides (Holding sides of box 
and moving her hands out away from the box.) It blows the sides…  
Um.  I think that um as you s, um, drink the juice the air comes out 
too, and some air, a little bit of air comes out too.  And the more, 
the less air there is in the juice box, the more the sides go in. 
 
Leah initially expresses the inside-pusher model for the phenomenon; the sides of the box 
cave in when there is less air in the box because air inside the box blows out to hold its 
shape.  The coding scheme identifies evidence of mechanistic reasoning in Leah’s 
comments; she describes an entity (air), its location (inside the box), and its activity 
(blowing the sides).  She then chains from those elements to the observed phenomenon. 







Leah: Um.  I, I think since there's no, there's um air inside and then we suck up, 
out a little, um and the air uh is also like pushing, pushing in the sides 
[Pointing to the sides of her box.]  …from the outside…. And, uh while 
the um air is coming in [into our bodies as we suck it out of the box] from 
the inside [of the box], the ou, the air from the outside is push, push, 
pushing also to um, pushing the sides also to make it cave in. 
 
Leah now describes the outside-pusher model: there is air inside the box (she does not 
say it is pushing) and when it is removed, the air outside pushes on the sides to make 
them collapse.  Here she identifies the same entity (air) with the same activity (pushing 
the sides) only it now has a new location (outside the box).  
As educators, we might have hoped that on hearing that air pushes on the box 
from outside, Leah would add the new idea of air outside pushing to her original idea of 
air inside pushing to come up with the correct, balance of pushes explanation.  However, 
she does not.  We would like to be able to make sense of why Leah changes her 
mechanism for the juice box collapsing in the way that she does instead of changing to 
the imbalance of pushes model.  One possible way to explain her transition as evidenced 
in her verbal behavior (phenomenology) is to consider what sorts of elements are acting 
in her mind (ontology).  
The mechanism behind the (incorrect) inside-pusher model involves one entity in 
one location engaging in an activity to produce the entire phenomenon - air pushes on the 
inside of the box to support it.  The box’s collapse results largely from property of the 
box – without anything to hold the sides out, the box naturally falls in.  In the language of 





called a p-prim) about support in which an object (juice box) is held in place (sides held 
out) by another object (air) in its path.  This same general mechanism helps make sense 
of other situations as well.  For example, a glass of water sits on a table because the table 
supports its weight; without the table, the glass would naturally fall to the ground.     
The (incorrect) outside-pusher explanation also involves one entity in one location 
engaging in an activity to produce the entire phenomenon - air pushes on the outside of 
the box to collapse it against an inside resistance.  As with the inside-pusher model, there 
is only one active agent; the inside air serves only to resist and does not actively push.  
Here, Ben has applied Ohm’s p-prim, which diSessa (1993) describes as “an agent that is 
the locus of an impetus that acts against a resistance to produce some sort of result” (p. 
126).  This sense of mechanism allows Ben to make the claim that less resistance (inside 
air) with the same impetus (outside push) produces more result (sides go farther in).  
Although not appropriately applied here, Ohm’s p-prim accounts for other phenomenon 
such as Ohm’s law of electric circuits (V = I*R) where voltage (V) is impetus/effort, 
current (I) is result/effect, and resistance (R) is resistance. 
In contrast to both the inside- and outside-pusher mechanisms, the correct 
explanation requires two entities in two locations both engaging in an activity against one 
another to produce the phenomenon – air inside pushes out against air outside pushing in 
and the outside “winning” causes the box to collapse.  In addition to needing two active 
entities, the ideas of dynamic balancing and overcoming (diSessa, 1993) are also required 
for the mechanism to run.  In order for the box to collapse “two opposing forces ‘try’ to 
achieve mutually exclusive results” but one force is greater and “wins over the others, 





Considering the cognitive elements (p-prims or resources) that give rise to inside-
pusher, outside-pusher, and imbalance of pushes mechanisms gives insight why Leah 
might have shifted from inside- to outside-pusher instead of shifting to the correct 
explanation.  Leah’s transition from the inside- to outside-pusher model does not require 
changing the overall sense of the mechanism; in both her explanations there is one active 
causal entity responsible for the phenomenon.  However, a transition to the correct 
explanation would have involved not only recognizing that air exists and pushes on both 
sides of the box but also incorporating the (less obvious and thus perhaps more 
challenging) idea of two forces acting independently in opposition to balance one another 
until one overcomes the other.  Such a transition is non-trivial; it is similar to the shift 
required to understand normal forces.  A table does not just prevent (or resist or support) 
objects from falling to the ground; the table actually pushes back up on the object to 
balance gravity that is pushing down. 
Thinking about the cognitive elements that underlie Leah’s explanations helps us 
make sense of why Leah changes her explanation for the juice box collapsing in the way 
that she does; her transition only requires changing the entities in her existing mechanism 
whereas the correct transition requires thinking about an additional piece of mechanism: 
balancing.  This explanation for Leah’s transition gives an example of the kind of 
analysis that might follow and build on the work presented in this dissertation. 
A Shift from Phenomenology to Ontology 
The mechanism framework is a phenomenological coding scheme: it is used to 
identify evidence of student mechanistic reasoning during scientific inquiry.  An 





speculating about is happening in students’ minds that gives rise to that behavior.  As in 
the analysis above, understanding what cognitive elements exist in students’ minds 
(resources) will help us answer questions about the development and dynamics of 
mechanistic reasoning.  Possible questions to pursue include: 
 
1. Do new mechanisms that students reason about develop from old ones?  If so, 
how and why do students transition between the new and old ones? 
2. How does students’ understanding of mechanisms develop?  What conceptual 
resources do students have for thinking about physical phenomena (e.g. p-
prims)?  How do students use these resources to understand mechanisms? 
3. How does students’ understanding of mechanistic explanations develop? What 
do the epistemological resources for mechanistic reasoning look like?  How 
do students’ learn when it is appropriate to reason about mechanisms and 
when other types of explanations (i.e. intentional, constraint-based) are more 
appropriate?   
 
These questions represent a shift in focus from phenomenology to ontology.  That is, now 
that we have a framework for reliably identifying evidence of mechanistic reasoning 
(phenomenology), we are in a better position to answer questions about how that 
reasoning develops and becomes activated during scientific inquiry (ontology). 
Concluding Remarks 
 In this dissertation we used the framework we developed from the philosophy of 
science to describe both the abundance and value of mechanistic reasoning in student 
inquiry.  This reasoning is continuous with how laypeople reason about causal situations 





concerned because there was a “Low Toner” error message on the machine in my office.  
However, by reasoning about the mechanism of how the fax machine works (scanning 
the image, calling the recipient’s number, transmitting the information, printing the 
scanned image on the recipients machine), I quickly figured out that my concern was 
silly; low toner on my machine could not affect the image received at the other end.  
Mechanistic reasoning is also continuous with the work of professional scientists.  For 
example, some current work in molecular genetics is focused on how changes in the 
structure of the ribosome affect the mechanism of ribosomal frameshifting (e.g. 
Meskauskas, Harger, Jacobs, & Dinman, 2003).  That mechanistic reasoning, which we 
have identified across K-20 education, connects to both everyday experience and research 
science gives credence to Einstein’s suggestion that “the whole of science is nothing 






Appendix A: Summary of Mechanism Coding Scheme  
Mechanism Code Description of the Code 
Describing Target Phenomenon (DTP) Students state or demonstrate the particular 
phenomenon or result they are trying to 
explain. 
Identifying Set-Up Conditions (SC) Students identify the particular enabling 
conditions of the environment that allow 
the mechanism to run. 
Identifying Entities (IE) Students identify objects that affect the 
outcome of the phenomenon. 
Identifying Activities (IA) Students articulate the actions and 
interactions that occur among the entities. 
Identifying Properties of Entities (IPE) Students articulate general properties of 
entities that are necessary for the 
mechanism to run. 
Identifying Organization of Entities (IOE) Students describe how the entities are 
spatially organized, where they are located, 
or how they are structured. 
Chaining: Backward and Forward ( C)  Students reason about one stage in the 
mechanism based on what is known about 






Appendix B: Transcript of the Falling Objects Discussion 
 
Teacher:  What, what happened when you dropped the book and the piece of paper 
at the same time, at the same height? Huh, what happened? (Students 
raising hands.)  Okay, Ebony why don’t you go ahead and begin.  
Ebony:  To me, first, the paper fell first.  
Jorge:   No way, no!  
Student:  Whoa!!  
Brianna:  The book fell first.  
Ebony:  No, to me the paper fell first.  
Students:  No! 
Student:   It fell at the same time.  
Ebony:  No, the book, um - the paper fell - the paper fell first to me!  
Henok:  Yeah, but not to me!  
Ebony:  To me it fell, the paper fell first (Voice trailing off.) 
Jorge:   Yeah, but did the book fall first, just like the paper?  
Ebony:  No, the papers fell first.  
Henok: The book fell first. 
Ebony:  No, the paper – to me.  
Allison:  To Ebony – to Ebony the paper fell first.  
Student:       To me, not to you 
Brianna:  And to all of us the book might of fell first to us.  
Students:  Yeah.  
Jorge:  Our paper - our paper goes slowly.  It’s, it’s, it’s a little bit [“out of 
practice”?]. 
Student: [Inaudible comment.]        
Rachel:  With me and Julio twice the book and the paper tied - twice.  
Ebony:            went at the same 
time.  





Allison:  What do you mean tied?  
Rachel:  They both  
Ebony(?): They went both at the same time.  
Rachel: They both went down  
Autumn: They both fell down at the same time. 
Julio:   They both fell down at the same time.  
Allison:  Same with me, same with me, same with me, same with me!  
Students: [Inaudible discussion and laughter.] 
Teacher:  So, what I’m hearing is that we have one person that said when he did it, 
that - 
Brianna:  the paper fell 
Teacher:       - that when he dropped at the same time, from the same height -  
Brianna:  the paper fell first  
Teacher:  - that the paper fell first. Now do you mean it hit the ground first, or it just 
started to fall first?  
Ebony:  It hit the ground first.  
Teacher:  So, you’re saying the paper hit the ground first, and then the book hit the 
ground. (Ebony nodding his head in affirmation.) Then we have two other 
friends who are saying that the book and the paper hit the ground at the 
same time.  
Rachel:  Twice!  
Students:  Yeah! Twice! 
Teacher:  Twice.  You did it twice and that’s what you noticed.  
Allison:  Yeah, me too!  
Teacher: Okay. 
Students: [Inaudible discussion.] 
Student:   And then we did it. 
Teacher:  What happened with it when the rest of you did it?  
Diamond: Oooh. 
Autumn:  The book fell first.  





Diamond:  Um - the paper, when we - the book and the paper –  
Student: [Inaudible comment.] 
Diamond: - the book fell first –  
Teacher: Mmm hmm. 
Diamond: - but Henry (Points to Henry) keep putting the paper so it could fall first.  
Teacher:  How did, how was Henry putting the paper so it could fall first?  
Brianna:  He’s dropping the paper first, and then the book.  
Diamond:             He did like this. (Raises and lowers her 
arm.) 
Henry: No!  
Diamond:  Uh hm.  And I told you to stop.  
Henry:  I didn’t do that.  
Diamond:  Yes you did! 
Henry:  No, I didn’t. (5 second pause) 
Jorge: [I think both of ‘em??] 
Teacher:  How could this be that we all did the same thing – we dropped the paper 
and the book -  
Brianna:  and it was all different!  
Allison: [Inaudible comments.] 
Teacher:  - at the same place, at the same time.  How could it be that we got all 
these different results? One person found out the paper hit the ground first, 
and then the book. We have two other friends that found out the book and 
paper fell down at the same time.  
Rachel:  Twice.  
Teacher:  Twice, two times. And, then some other friends are saying, “Well, no the 
book hit the ground first, and then the paper.”  
Student: Yeah. 
Allison:  [??]  My group went around two times. My group went around two times.  
Teacher:  How could it be that we all – we got different results  
Allison:                and with 





Allison:  When one of - when our group went around once, the book hit the ground 
first. But, then, the second time we went around - with me they fell at the 
s, same time. And, with Ebony, the paper fell first.  
Ebony:        the paper 
Allison: And then with Eveen –  
Ebony: The book fell first 
Allison: - they didn’t get - have time to get a turn.  
Teacher:  Okay. Wh - why do you think that is? Why did that happen?   
Ebony:  Cause we did it twice.  
Teacher: Do you have an idea? 
Teacher:  Rachel has -  
Rachel:   Forces of gravity? 
Henok: Yeah. 
Teacher:  - Rachel has an idea.  
Rachel:  Forces of gravity.  
Allison:  Yeah! 
Diamond:  What are forces of gravity? 
Rachel:  Gravity is what -  
Allison:  Gravity, gra  – you know how when we jump we always land back on the 
ground.  
Rachel:  Exactly. It’s what keeps us down on the ground.  (Patting the ground.) 
Student: Yeah. 
Autumn?   Like ground magnets. 
Ebony:  And no gravity.  No gravity is when you’re like in space and you can 
never ever really fall down. [??] 
Julio:  You know, you just float in the air. (Ebony nods in agreement.) 
Allison:  Gravity – see how when I jump (Stands up and jumps.) I’m just landing at 
the same place on the ground that - because gravity, gravity is just pulling 
me down.  
Teacher:  Okay. 





Teacher:   Oh, we’re not all going to [jump?].  They already, they already showed us.  
(Students jumping.) 
Students: [Inaudible comments.] 
Teacher: You can sit down. (7 second pause) 
Students: [Laughter.] 
Teacher:  Okay, so, so what you’re saying is that a for - what is a - you’re saying the 
force of gravity - 
Rachel:  is pulling it down at different times.  
Teacher:  So, you’re sayin’ the force of gravity is pulling the book down at a 
different time than the paper.  
Student:  Yeah. 
Rachel:  Yeah, probably. And, sometimes it’s pulling it down at the same time, or 
pulling the paper down  
Alison or Brianna?:   Before the book. 
Brianna?:             And then the book, and then the paper [??] 
Rachel:              Before the book and then the 
book’s pulling it down before the paper. Gravity’s pulling the book down 
before the paper.  
Ebony:  You said that.  
Teacher:  Why would gravity – why would gravity (3 second pause) How do I 
phrase this. Why, why would gravity sometimes make the book come 
down first, and then the paper.  But the, the same gravity at other times 
make things come down at the same time.  Or you’re saying that gravity 
sometimes makes the paper come down before the book.  
Autumn: I am not [???] this.  [??] 
Teacher: Why does - why does gravity do all the - I’m trying to think. (2 second 
pause)  How could gravity make - how could the same force of gravity - 
give us three different results? 
Henry:   Ooh, ooh, ooh.  I know. 
Allison:  Maybe -  





Henry:  Uh cause it’s the, c - cause it’s um, if you drop the book first, then it goes 
[first?/like this?] but if you drop the paper then the paper will go down.  
(Voice trailing off.) 
Teacher:  Are you saying if you dropped the book first –  
Henry: Mmm-hmm. 
Teacher: - and then the paper, that the book will hit first?  
Henry:  No, if you drop them in, in the same time, they both will, I’m saying they 
both will fall down.  
Teacher:  They both will fall down.  We’re -  
Henry:            I think.  
Teacher:  Okay. So if we, if we drop them, I’ll go ahead and drop ‘em, you’re saying 
they both will fall down.  
Henry:  No. 
Student: They won’t. (Teacher drops the book and the paper simultaneously.) 
Brianna:  Oh. The book fell first.  
Students: [Inaudible comments.] 
Henry:  No, I said if you - if you drop ‘em at the same time, maybe they might fall 
on the same time - on the floor.  
Students: [Inaudible comments.] 
Teacher:  Let’s go ahead - let’s go ahead and just - I’m going to do this a few times - 
I’m going to do it five times. And, let’s watch and see what happens, 
okay? I’ll go ahead - I have the book and piece of paper.  
Diamond:  The paper’s gonna fall second and the book’s gonna fall first.  
Teacher:  Well, we’ll see. Some people said that that’s what they found out, other 
people that they saw that they hit at the same time, and then we had two 
people that said that, “Well the paper hit first.” Let’s see what happens, 
okay? You guys watchin’?  
Student: Yeah. (Teacher drops the book and the paper simultaneously.) 
Brianna:  The book fell first! Yeah! 
Allison:   I knew it! 





Teacher:  Let’s try it a few different times, because we got –  
Student:  One, two 
Teacher; - a lot of different types of results.  Are they about the same height? 
(Teacher holds the book and the paper up.) 
Students:  Yeah. (Teacher drops the book and the paper simultaneously.)  
Brianna:  The book fell first again!  
Diamond:  I knew it! 
Student: [Inaudible comment.]  
Teacher:  Alright, we’ll do it three times. (4 second pause.)  
Student: [Inaudible comments.] (Teacher drops the book and the paper 
simultaneously.) 
Brianna:  The book fell first!  
Diamond:  I knew it!  
Students: [Inaudible comments.] [Laughter.] 
Henok: See, Ebony? 
Teacher:  But, you found out something different.  
Ebony:  The book - the paper fell first.  
Teacher:  How could that be?  
Ebony:   I don’t know. (Ebony shrugs his shoulders.) 
Jorge:  Three times it falls down. 
Allison:  The gravity -  
Autumn:  You probably just dropped the paper first. 
Allison:   - the gravity probably -  
Ebony:         No. 
Jorge:   No the book fall down first. 
Allison:       - the gravity probably had uh - the gravity probably just 
pulled the paper a little more than it pulled the the um book. 
Ebony:  Maybe it’s tired. [Laughs.] 
Teacher:  So you’re saying that the gravity maybe - 
Student:           [Inaudible comments.] 





Henok:  I know! 
Allison:  Yeah.  Maybe the book’s tired. [Laughs.] 
Students: [Laughter.] 
Teacher:  [Laughs with the students.] Let’s come back to Allison’s idea. Allison 
said, “well, maybe the gravity – the time when Ebony did the gravity 
pulled the paper down more than the book that time.” 
Ebony:  Yeah.  Maybe the gravity’s tired. [Laughter.] 
Students: [Inaudible comments.] 
Allison:  Yeah, maybe the gravity’s tired!  
Autumn:   Maybe the gravity’s tired. 
Teacher:  We’re going to do something different now with the piece of paper, 
watch this.  
Students: [Inaudible comments about gravity being tired.] 
Allison: [Discussing with Ebony about gravity pulling one faster using hand 
gestures to represent each object.]  
Teacher: When you go back to your seat this is what you’re - you are going to do 
with your piece of paper.  (Crumples up the piece of paper.) 
Brianna:   Ball it up. 
Ebony: This is the book.  [Discussing with Allison about gravity pulling one faster 
using hand gestures to represent each object.] 
Teacher:   You’re going to make it into a ball. 
Brianna:   Yeah! 
Students:  [Laughter.] 
Teacher:   Not right now.   
Student:   Not yet Nancy. 
Teacher:                Nancy not yet sweetie.  You’re going to make into one ball, and 
you just need to crumple it one time.  You don’t need to keep doing it just 
one time.   
Henok: Oh yeah.   
Teacher: Then you’re going to try the same thing.  What will happen when you 





Brianna:  Crumpled 
Teacher: - at the same time from the same height? 
Students: [Inaudible comments.] 
Student:   Drop it. 
Jorge:   Oh yeah, I know, I know –  
Student:   Drop it. 
Jorge:  I know. 
Teacher:  What do you think will happen? 
Autumn(?):  Drop it!  Drop it!  Drop it! 
Jorge:         The book - um, the book the book and the paper will 
fall first. 
Brianna:  At the same time. 
Jorge:  Yeah. 
Diamond:  The book and the paper will fall at the same time. 
Jorge:        When you crush it.  When you crush it like this 
and it will fall down first.   
Student: Nancy. 
Jorge: Remember, I did that while at home. 
Diamond:  It gonna fall at the same time. [Laughter.] 
Jorge:  I used to do that all the time. 
Teacher:   Autumn and Nancy, I’d like you to be with the group.  We’ll go back to 
our seats in a just few minutes, okay?  Jorge what do you mean that it will 
fall first?  What is the “it”? 
Jorge:   The um, the book and the paper will fall first, the um, the same time. 
Teacher:   And you’re saying you did this at home when you knew that.  Go ahead 
now Diamond.   
Diamond:   The book and the paper gonna fall at the same time. 
Jorge:   [Yeah?]  If we crush it like - 
Teacher:  Why do you think that?  That now the book and the paper will fall at the 
same time. 





Diamond:   When you ball it up -  
Allison:         now the pap -  
Diamond:   - it’s almost like a ball - 
Allison:           - now, now, now the 
Diamond:          - and the ball falls first too, the same time as 
the book. 
Allison:  Now, now the paper has a little more weight because it’s all crumpled. 
Jorge:  Yeah.  Like crumpled.  Like -  
Allison:  So it has a little more weight.  
(Another teacher removes Jorge from the room.) 
 
Teacher:   So All - Allison has an idea.  She thinks that now maybe with the 
crumpled piece of paper it has more weight.  You guys are going to go 
ahead and test this out.  You should probably go ahead back to your seats. 
[Students talking inaudibly – Transcript resumes a few minutes later.] 
Teacher:   Be careful where you walk.  Keep it there.  Henry, keep, just keep it there.  
Okay.  [??]  We’d like for you to join us, on the carpet.  Keep it there 
okay.  [Teacher giving instructions to individual students.] Is everybody 
here with it?  Make sure that you can see everybody just like before.  You 
need to be able to see every, see everybody or part of that person so that 
you’ll be able to also hear them.  I want to know what happened when you 
dropped the book and now the crumpled piece of paper the same time 
from the same height.  So what happened guys when you dropped the 
book and the crumpled piece of paper?  What happened this time?  
(Students raising hands.) Brianna, Brianna will go ahead and begin.  
Remember, we just want to talk one at a time. (6 second pause) 
Brianna:  They will fall at the same time.  (5 second pause) ‘Cause they both got the 
same strength together. 
Teacher:  So Brianna has an idea.  She said, well, she found out that they fell at the 
same time because they both have the same strength together? (Teacher 





Brianna:  Strength together yeah. 
Teacher:  Before, we said that the book had more strength than the piece of paper.  
How could it be that now they have the same strength?  We are going to 
talk about Brianna’s idea and then we’ll go to the next one.  How could it 
be that now they have the same strength? 
Rachel:  I can answer that. 
Teacher:  Okay. 
Henok?:  [I could too?] 
Rachel:  Um.  Now that it’s crumpled up, there’s - the piece of paper has more 
strength because - 
Brianna:  And the book too.  [Because they have, same strength all together??] 
Rachel:           [No??]  No, I said.   The piece of paper has more 
strength because it’s all crumpled up and it used to be, um, really light but 
now it’s, um, it has more strength.  It probably has as much strength as the 
book since all the, um, paper is crumpled up together.  (Picks up book and 
paper, drops them separately.) 
Teacher:   Do you want to comment on that?  No, okay, do you have a different idea?  
Save that.  Julio, I know you wanted to add to that before about the 
strength.  How could they have the same strength now? 
Julio:   Um, crumpled up paper um is kind-of heavy. (7 second pause) 
Student: [Inaudible comment.] 
Brianna:   If it’s balled up it’s still not heavy it’s the same size. 
Brianna:   It’s just a little bit like, if you need the heaviest.   
Students:  [Inaudible comments.] 
Autumn:   Why are you doing that?  (Brianna picks up the crumpled paper and 
uncrumples it.) 
Students:  [Laughter.]   
Brianna:   It’s still at the same size. It still feels - 
Students:  [Laughter.] 
Brianna: - it still feels um –  





Autumn:   It’s not heavy. 
Brianna:   It still feels –  
Student: [Inaudible comment.] 
Allison:   My, my dad could probably throw that –  
Brianna:                 it still feels [??] light.  It’s still light. 
Allison:                     - My, my dad could 
probably throw it up to the ceiling and he wouldn’t, and he wouldn’t say 
it’s light.   
Brianna:   It’s still light. 
Student:   It’s not heavy. 
Student:   It is not. 
Students: [Inaudible comments.] 
Teacher:   So are you disagreeing with Julio?  Is that your – okay. 
Brianna:                Mmm-hmm. 
Teacher:   So you’re saying that it’s, it’s - this is still light even when it’s balled up?   
Student:       still light 
Student:   I know it’s not heavy.   
Student: But it’s just balled up at the same time because it’s crumpled up –  
Students: [Inaudible comments.] 
Teacher:   All right Diamond go ahead. 
Diamond:   Um, the piece of paper, it was, it was light the first time, and it had more 
[“pages”?] when its balled up.  But it don’t look - it looks like the book 
have a lot of pieces of paper cause when I dropped it, um the piece of 
paper and the book fell at the same time.  But, the, first the book and the 
paper, like the one [??] (Brianna gives Diamond the book and the 
crumpled piece of paper.) ‘Cause I balled it up – (4 second pause) 
Allison:   Can you show us what happened? 
Ebony:   And you crunched the book up too? 
Student:     like 
Allison:   Can you show us what happened? 





Brianna: [??] the book up. 
Allison:   Can you show it? 
Diamond: [I put it like this and I dropped it?]  (Holds up the book and the crumpled 
piece of paper and releases them both at the same time.) 
Brianna:   See it fell at the same time.   
Diamond:  It fell at the same time. 
Teacher:   Why do you - why do you think that is that it fell? 
Diamond:  Because the piece of paper was like [big?/this?] the first time (Uncrumples 
the piece of paper.), like this, and then it balled up. (6 second pause) 
Teacher:  So, you’re thinking it’s the change in -  
Allison(?):  In shape. 
Teacher:  In the shape?  And that’s what caused the difference? 
Student:         Yeah. 
Allison:          Because then you change the shape.  [At first 
it’s a?] rectangle.  Then, it’s a sphere. 
Brianna(?):  It’s a rectangle. 
Teacher:  Okay. 
Diamond:  Now, it’s a sphere. (5 second pause) 
Students: [Inaudible comments.]  
Teacher:  Go ahead and put it in the middle there.  Go ahead.  You wanna share with 
the group? Go ahead.  
Diamond:  Now - because now the piece of paper can roll. 
Henry:         If, if the book is the same like 
heavy, and and you go in the same time like, like at first at the same time 
the book will fall [like same time?] like this.  (Uncrumples the paper.) 
Student: [Inaudible comments.] 
Henry:  It will fall it will fall like that – ‘cause look.  If you put it in front of [??] 
Brianna:                   The, the 
book will fall first. 
Henry:  Because if it, if it goes like this, then it will go like that. 





Brianna:  The book. The paper -  
Diamond:  I was not done what I was sayin’.  
Henry: [??] will fall [last?/fast?] 
Students: [Inaudible comments.]  
Brianna: Yeah.  And the book will fall first. 
Diamond:   I was not done what I was saying.   
Student: [Inaudible comments.] 
Diamond: I was not done what I was saying.  
Ebony?: Hey now. 
Diamond: ‘Cause the piece of paper was balled up, it don’t go like this no more 
(Shows a rocking motion with her right arm.)  
Brianna:   No, yeah.  It don’t, yeah.  It just drops, kind of like the booklet.   
Students:          It just [??] 
Allison:   Henry, can I see the paper?  
Diamond:           Cause it just goes, cause it just goes straight like the book. 
Student: [Inaudible comment.] 
Allison:   No, uh, just, just the paper.   
Ebony: [For me and ?] 
Allison: Because - see, now the paper (Drops the crumpled up paper.) doesn’t keep 
going like this (Shows same rocking motion with her hand.) 
Brianna:   It just goes straight.   
Allison:             [Autumn, Autumn?] I need the paper. 
Brianna:  It goes - it just goes straight like the book.   
Allison:           Um, it just goes, “Ehhh,” (Drops her 
hand with the paper straight down from over her head.) and then it [goes 
like?] 
Brianna:   Straight, it just goes straight like the book like fall.  
Allison:                       It just goes.  It doesn’t, doesn’t go like 
this (Rocking motion with her hand.) [it just?], it just goes “Ehhh,” (Drops 
her hand straight down in front of her.)  and then it rolls a little. 





Ebony:   When me and Allison, and Eveen did it, it keep on going at the same time.  
[Going together?] 
Allison:   Yeah, every time, that Eveen, Ebony, and me did it, dropped the piece of 
paper and the book, it just went.  This is the paper (Holds up her clinched 
left fist.) this is the book (Holds up her right hand next to it flat out.) It 
went, “Eh, Eh, Eh, Eh, Eh” -  
Brianna?:                It just goes at the same time. 
Allison: - every single time we did it.  
Diamond:               The book - and the piece of paper. 
Autumn:         Let me see it.  Let me see it. 
Brianna:  Diamond. (Takes book from Diamond.) 
Student:   If it goes [??].  It, it rolls by. 
Diamond:   Can you pass it to me again? 
Rachel: I –  
Autumn:   When, when the paper’s like this, (Flattens out the paper.) straight like 
this straight, it just goes like that.  (Drops the paper.) 
Allison:   I, I know why. I know why. 
Autumn:  Like that, it just went crooked.  It just goes crooked. 
Allison: Because - I need to see the paper. 
Autumn:             Let me ball it back up.  Let me ball it back up. 
Allison:   ‘Cause this is thicker and - where’s the book? 
Student: [Inaudible comment.] 
Student: Thicker than the book.  Thicker than the book. 
Allison:      and this this is thinner –  
Students:  [thicker?]  
Allison:  [??]  because, because when its like this, it can be used as a bookmark.  
But when it’s like this – 
Brianna: [Laughter.]  Bookmark. 
Autumn:  It can’t be a bookmark! 





Brianna?:   I know.  
Students: [Laughter.] 
Teacher:   May I go ahead and see those two things.   It sounds like - 
Autumn:   I want to go home. 
Teacher:   - a, a lot of you guys are talking about the shape.  That they change 
because when it was like this (Flattens out the paper.) -  
Student:   It, it could be a bookmark. 
Teacher: most of you found out -  
Allison:   It could fit in my book. 
Students:   It could [??] 
Teacher:   It would go like - the paper would go like this.  But when the paper’s like 
this, (Balls up the paper.) it falls straight down. And that’s what you mean. 
Brianna:   Yeah.  And it [??] 
Student:   Like the book, like the book.  
Teacher:   This is what I’m going to challenge you guys to do at home.  You’re going 
to choose two things at your house that you’re going to get to do the same 
experiment with. 
Students: [Inaudible comments.] 
Allison:   Anything? 





Appendix C: Transcript of the Juice Box Discussion 
Teacher: I am wanting you to watch your box and your friends’ boxes as you suck 
on them. 
Erin:  [??] air 
Ben:  [??] but its still full of air. 
Kristen:   But the, when we drink it, it comes, it goes in. 
Eleanor:  Well I know what happens.   
Teacher:   What? 
Student ?:  [Inaudible comment.] 
Eleanor:   You’re also sucking out a little air because, so the 
Students:   [Laughter.] 
Teacher:  [Laughing] It’s squirting out all juice. 
Eleanor:  No so so the, the, these sides, the long sides of the boxes get, well, they 
sort of go in a little. [Motioning in with flat hands like a slow motion 
clap.] 
Teacher:   Is that what the rest of you are noticing, is that the sides go in a little bit? 
Students:  Yeah.  Uh-huh. Mm-mm. 
Student ?:  [goes like this??] 
Teacher: And that’s what I’d like to hear you talk about.  I wanna hear your 
thinking about why the ins, sides should be going in like that. 
Student ?:  Because [the amount of ???] 
Erin:  Woah. [Apparently spills juice on the table.] 
Students:  [Laughter.] 
Teacher: Let me get you a tissue.  [Gets up from the table.] 
Eleanor: Like this. [Sucks in on her juice box.] 
Erin:  Yeah, if you still have juice in that [??] 
Students:  [Inaudible comments.] 
Kristen: It's like oxygen, oxygen. 





Eleanor:  Yeah. 
Chandra: Like inhale. 
Student ?: [??It’s not an inhaler.]  
Students: [Laughter.] 
Students: [Sucking on their juice boxes.  Some cleaning up their spilled juice with 
the tissues from the teacher.] 
Teacher: Um, so again, if you haven’t figured out by now, what I want you to do is 
talk for the tape recorder and so we can each hear each other, why are the 
sides -  
Erin:  [There… orange juice??]  [Inaudible comments while she cleans up her 
spilled juice.] 
Students: [Inaudible comments and laughter.] 
Teacher: - Why are the sides going in? 
Chandra:  My box is like – 
Student ?: Because you are sucking it in. 
Chandra:  It’s like –  
Teacher:  One at a time. 
Chandra: - pushing in the front. [Apparently pushing on the box with her fingers.] 
Teacher: Now you can’t push it with your fingers because then you’re gonna to get 
wet like Erin did. 
Erin:  I didn’t push it with my fingers I blew air into it. 
Teacher: Oh you blew air into it.  But try to drink most of it, all the juice out of it 
first. [pause] Um, Kristen? 
Kristen: Um.  I think why its going in because you’re um sucking on the straw to 
get the um, the juice. And um, the air goes in, um, I don’t know. 
Teacher: And that’s what we’re here to do.  Think about it, get other ideas from 
others.  Leah? 
Leah: I think as the juice comes out, um, you’re also sucking out a little bit of 
air.  And so, um, um the less air there is the uh more it goes in. 
Teacher: The less air there is where? 





Student ?:  [Inaudible comment.] 
Teacher:  In the juice box.  Then finish the sentence again. 
Leah:  Um.  The more the sides go in. 
Teacher: The more the sides go in.  [pause] Could I ask you why?  Why you think 
that?  Why should they go in, if there’s less air inside? 
Students: [Laughter.] 
Leah:  Because the air, it blows um, the uh sides [Holding sides of box and 
moving her hands out away from the box.] It blows the sides. 
Teacher: Time out here a minute.  I’m anticipating that the sounds of our cart, our 
cartons doing that is going to show up on the, on the tape recorder and 
make it hard to hear everybody.  So having done it once or twice or three 
times or four times, just let it park.  You can hold onto it.  But let’s be sure 
we can hear everybody.  So, and don’t forget, how do you sit on a stool, 
young lady. 
Students:  [Laughter.] 
Teacher:  Thank you.  Um, tell us again then.  [Looking at Leah.] 
Leah:  Um.  I think that um as you s, um, drink the juice the air comes out too, 
and some air, a little bit of air comes out too.  And the more, the less air 
there is in the juice box, the more the sides go in. 
Teacher: Anybody want to add to that?  [Students raising their hands.]  Do you have 
the same idea or do you think there’s another explanation?  Ben? 
Ben:  When we first got it, there was stuff in it.  There was juice in it.  And 
when we drank it, the only thing that was left in it was air.  And –  
Teacher: Keep going. 
Ben:   - when we sucked the, when we um drank all the ju, juice.  And, and, and  
the only thing that was left in it was air and its only, its only a juice box 
with air. 
Student ?:  And juice. 
Teacher: Is that the case now for mine.  Look at your’s, they’re different aren’t 
they?  [Ben nods his head.]  So is there –  





Teacher: - so is there air inside everybody’s juice box now? 
Students: Yeah. Mm-mm.  [Nodding.] 
Teacher: We’ve drunk all the juice out of it. 
Students:  Yeah. [Nodding.] 
Teacher: So are you kind-of agreeing with Leah? 
Ben:  No. 
Teacher: Can I hear more?  What makes it cave in when you suck on the straw? 
Ben:   Everything [??around] -  
Student ?; [?Your breath.] 
Ben:  - The air pushing. [Pushes his hands forward in front of him.] 
Teacher: Tell me w, which air.  Where is the air that’s pushing? 
Ben:  Outside. [Pushing in on the sides of his juice box with his hands.] 
Teacher: Outside.  And its pushing what? 
Ben:   Pushing the sides in.  Because there’s not much [?] -  
Erin:  Woah. [Apparently squirts juice on Ben who wipes it off his arm.  Erin 
gets up from the table to get tissues.] 
Students:  [Laughter.] 
Ben:   - every time you drink it there’s less, there’s less stuff inside it. 
Erin:   [To teacher.] Where’s the paper? 
Teacher: [Gets up from table.] Right here. 
Students: [Inaudible comments.] 
Teacher: (talking to Erin) Try not to squeeze it. 
Erin: [Inaudible comments.] 
Teacher: [Returns to the table with Erin.]  You gotta, you might want to finish it 
and it won't do that. 
Erin: I did finish it.  I thought I finished it. 
Teacher: Okay just wipe it up so you're fine.  Um, so Ben keep going and let's see 
how well the rest of us were listening to this.  So there you talked about 
air, I think outside pushing. 





Teacher: Like you're doing it with your hands.  But if I do it this way, [Sucks on his 
juice box.]  you're saying that it’s the air that's pushing on it. 
Ben:  Mmm-mmm. 
Teacher: Why should it do that?  Why is the air on the outside pushing? 
Ben:  'Cause there's less stuff inside, and where there's less stuff inside, it's 
easier to push. 
Teacher: I hear that.  Other thoughts?  Eleanor? 
Eleanor:  Um.  I sort-of agree with Ben but I sort-of don't because I think air from, I 
don't think the air from the outside is pushing because I think the air from 
inside us [Pointing to herself.] is sucking and since the straw is in, would 
be in the juice, it it since the straw would be, is in the ju, juice, you'd be 
sucking up juice.  And that, and then there is more air in it so when you 
finish it there is all air. 
Teacher: Mmm-mmm. 
Eleanor: 'Cept a little, except there might be some little drops of juice.  And so 
when you're sucking it in, since the juice box, when we didn't, when it 
wasn't well, when it hadn't had.  Okay, when there wasn't anybody sucking 
out of it, when they were full, it was all the si, it was, the juice was inside 
it so that 
Teacher: Like these. [Holding up a full juice box.] 
Eleanor: Yeah, yeah.  So that the sides couldn't, that so that the sides couldn't suck 
[?it.]  So that orange juice or the apple juice couldn't get out of it.  And 
since it was, wasn't like um.  It wasn't like -  
Teacher: (To another student.) Did you lose your straw? 
Eleanor: - it was, since it wasn't like this [Holding up her sucked in juice box.]um, 
a, like a flat orange juice box. 
Teacher: Mmm-mmm. 
Eleanor:  juice box. [Pause] 
Teacher: What'd you do just now? 
Eleanor: I blew it up. 





Eleanor: Mmm-mmm.  And -  
Teacher: Why, what happens, what happens when you blow it up? 
Eleanor: More air comes [?in.] 
Teacher: And what happens to the, to the box itself? 
Eleanor: But when you're sucking on it, when you're sucking out juice [??] since 
juice was everywhere in the box so there wasn't much air in it.  If you suck 
out some juice it will go in because the juice I think was probably up 
against this, every side - 
Teacher: Okay. 
Eleanor: - and the top and the bottom and this side and this side and this side and 
this side [Pointing to all the sides of the box.] 
Teacher: Okay. 
Eleanor: Then if you suck it, the, it goes in because the less juice there is in there, 
the m, the less juice there is in there, the more the sides go in. 
Teacher: The less juice, the more the sides go in. 
Students: [Inaudible comments.] 
Teacher: We've certainly seen that.  
Eleanor: [?? be it.] 
Teacher: Can I hear Chandra?  I wanna to give everyone a chance to get on tape 
here.  What's your thinking on this? 
Chandra: Um. 
Teacher: Why are the sides caving in? [Eleanor gets up from her seat to get a paper 
towel.] 
Chandra: It's like when, when we had the the juice inside the the the juice carton  
Teacher: Mmm-mmm.  Like that. [Points to a full juice box.] 
Chandra:  - it was all full and it didn't [even/need to??] cave in. 
Teacher: Full of what? 
Chandra:  Full of juice. 
Teacher: All right.  Then? 
Chandra: And um then -  





Chandra: [??] we drank all the juice.  And the, the less juice there was in there.  Its 
like we were sucking, and [when/then?] we sucked in some air. 
Teacher: And where'd that air come from? 
Chandra: [Pointing to her juice box.]  Inside the, the juice carton. 
Teacher: Okay.  But I'm still trying to get a sense of why if you suck air from inside 
the carton, why should the sides cave in? 
Student ?: I don't know. 
Chandra: [?So when you suck in] air, suck in some air with the juice [5 second 
pause] you’re sucking in some air [?] cave in. 
Students: [Inaudible comments.]  Sucking in. 
Teacher: Do you understand why that might happen? 
Kristen: (To Eleanor.) Still [?] juice in there.  [Pointing to Eleanor's juice box.] 
Teacher: Why should it cave in?  Why shouldn't it just stay this shape it is? [6 
second pause.]  Do you wanna th, we'll just go around the table, take your 
time.  Erin? 
Erin: Um, I think because since you sucked out the air, it's like, it caves in 
because there's not any air so it has no, nothing's pushing it in from the 
inside [Pointing towards her box with her index fingers.]  to make it like 
[?squa], like -  
Teacher: Like that? 
Erin: - like its normal shape.  Yeah. 
Teacher: Nothing's inside there so -  
Erin: There's not mu, not as much is inside so it's, it, there's not mu, as much 
pushing out so it caves in. 
Teacher: Oh.  So you mean right now there's air in there pushing out to make it the 
box shape. 
Erin:  I think so.  [Nods her head.] 
Teacher: And then what happens when I suck?  What's -  
Erin: You take some of the air out so -  
Teacher: - and so why should the sides.  (To Kristen who is blowing paper across 





should the sides then cave in?  [2 second pause]  If there's not as much air 
on the inside?  [4 second pause] I mean, is there anything pushing - 
[Points to the outside of his juice box with several fingers.] 
Erin: No -  
Teacher: - the outside in? 
Erin:  - there's nothing pushing. 
Teacher: There's nothing pushing. 
Erin: So when -  
Teacher: Nothing pushing where, on the inside or the outside? 
Erin: Inside. 
Teacher: Inside.  So why, if there's nothing pushing on the inside, why should the 
outsi, why should the box's sides cave in?  [3 second pause]  Hunter, be 
thinking, I wanna, I'm gonna call on you soon 'cause I want to hear your 
ideas on this too. 
Erin: 'Cause uh, there's not as much air in [this/it?]. 
Teacher: Okay, so there's less air in the inside that way. 
Erin: Yeah. 
Teacher: But I don't understand why that makes the sides have to go in. [5 second 
pause] 
Erin: Maybe its pressure I don't know. 
Teacher: What's that?  Pressure? 
Erin: It's something that's hard to explain. Um. [4 second pause]  It's something 
that's [6 second pause] like, it's hard to explain. 
Teacher: Okay.  Let's try, as a group and individually.  You had your hand up Leah. 
Leah: Um.  I, I think since there's no, there's um air inside and then we suck up, 
out a little, um and the air uh is also like pushing, pushing in the sides 
[Pointing to the sides of her box.]  So -  
Teacher: From the outside. 
Leah: - from the outside. 
Teacher: 'Cause I notice you've got your fingers, [Models Leah's actions with her 





Leah: Mmm-mmm. [Nodding her head.] 
Teacher: Like pushing. 
Leah: Mmm-mmm.  And, uh while the um air is coming in from the inside, the 
ou, the air from the outside is push, push, pushing also to um, pushing the 
sides also to make it cave in. 
Teacher: [Looking at Ben.] Is that the idea you had expressed?  Is that it's the air 
outside that's pushing? [Pointing his fingers together towards each other.] 
Ben: [??It was.] 
Teacher: That's what you said.  Hunter, what do you think?  What's your thought on 
this? 
Hunter: Um.  What I was thinking was when it's empty there's air inside -  
Teacher: Okay. 
Hunter: - and if you suck up, and there's like air pushing on the sides.  And there's 
air pushing um, wait.  Inside there's air pushing on the sides to make it 
come out.  And outside, um there's air pushing on the outside.  Um -  
Teacher: Pushing.  So the air outside is pushing which way? 
Hunter:  Um it's, um the sides in. 
Teacher: Pushing the sides in.  And then -  
Hunter: And then if we take some of the air out it won't be equal so, um, the sides 
start to go in. 
Teacher: Equal.  That sounds like a math term.  What do you mean by that?   
Hunter: Um. 
Teacher: What's not equal? 
Hunter: They both um, the amount of air is the same. 
Teacher: By the amount the same you mean on the inside and on the outside? 
Hunter: Yeah. [Nodding his head.] 
Teacher: Interesting. [3 second pause] I have a big, I'm gonna, [Gets up from the 
table and brings back a large orange juice carton.]  I have a big juice box 
here.  This is orange not apple.  But I've already drunk it.  [Shakes the 
carton.]  I did this at home.  It's got kind of a different opening in it.  So I 





from the table and returns with a small vacuum cleaner.]  This is a little 





Appendix D: Electrostatics Tutorial 
Working from a model: Static electricity 
 
You probably associate “electrostatics” with physics class, but you probably also have lots of 
experience with “static electricity” at home.  Of course, it’s the same stuff!   
In this tutorial, you’ll work with materials you could get at the supermarket, or may even already 
have at home.  And you’ll see that you can use the model we’ve started to develop in lecture to 
make sense of what happens. 
What happens when you rub? 
Using our model of electrostatics, what might rubbing do?  It often helps, in thinking about how 
something happens, to think about situations when it doesn’t happen, or when you think it might 
not. 
Rub a foam plate with cloth (or on your sweater, etc) and see that it gets a 
charge.  (You could tear paper into tiny bits and see that the plate picks them 
up; try bringing it near the little ball that’s hanging from a string at your 
table.)  
 
Have you ever noticed an electric charge (sparks?) when you rub your hands 
together?  How about if you rub someone else’s hands?  Try it if you’re not 
sure, and then suggest an explanation.   
 
 
Make a prediction for what would happen if you were to rub two foam plates 
together.  If they had no net charge to begin with, would either one have a net 
charge as a result of rubbing?   
 
 
You should have two foam plates at your table.  Try rubbing them together and see if they get 
charged. Does the explanation you tried in part B fit with what you observe? 
 
What if instead of rubbing foam plates together, you peeled apart two pieces 
of tape?   





Get a piece of tape (2 or 3 inches) and fold over a little bit of one end.  Stick the tape 
to your desk with the folded end sticking out over the edge of the desk.  Write the letter “B” 
on the tape.  Now get another piece of tape and fold the end in the same way.  Put the second 
tape directly on top of the first and write the letter “T” on it.   
Pull both tapes off the desk together.  Get rid of any excess charge by running it 
lightly over your lower lip (or on your nose).  Then hold the folded ends of the two tapes in 
your opposite hands and pull the two tapes apart. 






 Please check with your TA before you continue. 
Representing charge 
According to our model of electricity, everything is loaded with positive and negative charges 
(protons and electrons), but in nearly identical numbers.  If you wanted to represent all the 
charges around in a drawing, you could draw lots of pairs of “+” and “–” symbols everywhere, 
but that would get tedious.  So it’s customary to draw “+” and “–” symbols only to show that 
there’s more of one or the other.  (You could draw a couple of pairs to remind yourself what’s 
going on, though.) 
Also according to our model, the amount of charge can be distributed in different ways in an 
object:  Different parts of an object may be charged differently.  So we use “+” and “–” symbols 
to show where on the object there’s an excess of which kind of charge.   
A bottom (B) piece of tape and a top (T) piece of tape are separated halfway 
as shown below.  Use “+” and “–” symbols to indicate the parts of the tapes 
that are charged and the type of the charge on a diagram like the one below.   
 
Suppose you were to take one of the 
foam plates and rub it with a piece of 
cloth.  Draw a diagram in the space to 





plate and on the cloth.  (Can you tell whether the plate is + or –?  If not, just 
pick one!) 
 
If you earn $500 and $150 is deducted in taxes, the amount of money that you 
take home ($350) is called your “net” income.  The word “net” is used 
similarly to describe the relative amounts of charge on an object.  (We also 
sometimes use the word “total.”)  If there is more positive charge than 
negative charge then the object is said to have a “net” positive charge.  If an 
object has the same amount of both types of charge, then it is common to say 
that the object has a “net” zero charge.   (We also sometimes say it has “no 
charge,” but that could be misleading!)   
In part A, was the sign of the net charge on the pair of tapes taken together 
positive, negative, or zero?  Explain how you know. 
 
In part B, would the net charge on the plate and cloth taken together be 




Check that the drawings you made in parts A and B are consistent with your 
answers above.  
 
 
Another way to separate charge 
Notice that in our model, we never make charge (electrons and protons); we pull pairs of charge 
apart from each other.  Rubbing was one way to do that.  In this section, you’ll find another way. 
You should have at your table an aluminum pie plate with the foam cup attached.  This is a 
version of a device called an “electrophorus”—a fancy name for a simple thing.  It’s a device for 
holding charge.  The following instructions will show you how to put a net charge on the 
electrophorus; at the end of the tutorial we’ll ask you to use the model of + and – charges to 
explain why these instructions work. 
To charge the electrophorus:   
1. Rub a foam plate with cloth so that it has a net charge (and let’s suppose it’s 
negative).   
2. Set the foam plate on the table, and, holding the electrophorus by its handle (the cup), 





3. Holding the two plates close together, touch the top of the aluminum plate with your 
finger.  If things work well, there’ll be a tiny spark.  (Even if there isn’t, the 
electrophorus still might be charged.) 
Verify that the electrophorus is charged after steps 1-3.  (Later we’ll ask you 
to explain how touching the plate can result in its being charged.) 
 
Charge the electrophorus and set it on the cup as a stand.  Now find the pith 
ball at your table.    
(In place of a pith ball, you might have a tiny ball of aluminum foil, also 
hanging from a string.)   
Make a prediction for what will happen if you let the pith ball touch the 






Try it:  Touch the bottom of the plate to the pith ball.  If it doesn’t come out 







 Please check with your TA before you continue. 
(At any point during this tutorial, especially now with that pith ball, you might make your own 
discovery of some interesting phenomenon.  As long as you can reproduce it—make it happen 
reliably when you do specific things—you could use it to further your thinking.  We’re just 
picking some things we know about and expect will give you reproducible results.  So feel free, if 
you find something else that’s interesting and reproducible, to go figure it out.  Use the model!) 
     
Charge the electrophorus again, and, holding it by the cup, touch it to the 
pith ball and hold it near.   
Make a prediction for what would happen if you were now to touch the pith 
ball with a foil-covered straw, still holding the plate near by.  Draw a 










Try it!  If something different happened, same deal:  Try to figure out why 






Would the same thing happen if you used a plastic straw, with no foil 









D. Try to explain those instructions for charging the electrophorus.  
Draw a series of sketches showing what happens at each step, in terms 






Appendix E: Transcript of the Electrostatics Discussion 
 
Erin:   Is it hard? [the pith ball] 
Claire:  No.  [Shaking her head] It looked hard but its not.  It’s like –  
John:   Styrofoam. 
Claire:  - feels like styrofoam yeah. 
[Audrey picks up a Styrofoam plate and rubs it on Erin’s sweater.] 
Claire:  Oops. [Laughter] 
John:   [Inaudible comment.] 
Erin:   [Inaudible comment.]  Yeah, on camera, they got you. 
Audrey: I think it has charge. 
Claire:  Bring it near the ball to see if it worked. [Audrey brings the plate near the 
pith ball.] 
Erin:  No. 
Claire:  A little bit. 
John:  Your sweater sucks. 
Claire:  Here, try the, try the cloth. [Passes Audrey the cloth.] 
Audrey: Which side should I do it on? Like that? [Rubbing the plate.] 
Claire:  I don’t think it really matters.   
John:  [Inaudible comment to Claire.] 
Audrey: [?The sides too?] 
Claire:  [In a mocking tone.] I think rubbing creates static electricity. 
Erin: [Laughter.] You’re good.  [Pause as Audrey continues to rub the 
Styrofoam plate and then holds it up to the pith ball.] Is it doing anything? 
[They do not see any attraction between the plate and the pith ball.] 
Claire:  Let’s go with the little pieces of paper approach. 
Audrey:  Yeah. 
Claire:  How about we use this extra tutorial? 






Claire:  All right, we’ll use notebook paper. [Laughter.] [??] yet. [To John] 
[Inaudible comments by Erin and John.] 
Claire:  I’m kidding. [Laughter as they look at the camera.]  
John:  There’s the [?]. 
Claire: And I’m sitting here with the microphone right in front of me.  “Let’s tear 
up the tutorial.” [Audrey laughter.] 
John:  [Inaudible comment.  Laughter.] 
Audrey: You’re gonna set the whole building on fire.  Oh great, if there is a fire 
they’ll think I did it.  
Claire:  Do you think he watched that last semester like before this semester? 
Audrey: Maybe. 
Claire:  All right, we’ll try it with these little pieces of paper. [Puts the pieces of 
paper on the table and Audrey holds the charged Styrofoam plate to them.] 
Erin:  Yeah I saw. [the paper jump up] 
Claire:  Oh, it definitely works.  
Audrey: Oooh-wahhhh. [waving the plate over the paper.] 
John:   Maybe that was a fluke. 
Claire:  Must be windy in here or something. 
Audrey: Okay.  That’s great. 
Claire:  Okay. 
Erin:  Alright, that was fun. [Pause to read next question.]  Sparks when you rub 
your hands?  I haven’t. 
Audrey: No. 
Erin:  Like if you touch something metal I have. 
Audrey: Yeah but not just your hands together. [Rubbing her hands] 
John:  Your hands. 
Claire:  When you rub your hands together, is there a spark? [Rubbing her hands]  
Audrey: Shk-Shk-Shk [Rubbing her hands together making “spark” sounds.] 
Erin:  [Laughter.] 
Audrey: I wonder wait, why –  





Claire:  It’s hot too.  
Audrey: So why, I don’t get this.  What’s the rational explanation for why there’s 
no sparks between our hands.  Is it ‘cause they’re moist? 
John:  Because - 
Claire:  Because of moisture. 
John:  - there’s so much moisture in the air and its a conductor so… [Motions 
with his hands.] 
Claire:  The air and in your skin.  Its mostly in your skin. [Audrey nodding.] 
Claire:  [To Audrey] But why does, is it just moisture? 
Erin:  So moisture prevents - 
Claire:  ‘Cause they’re –  
Erin:  it? 
Simultaneous conversations: 
John:  Because it’s, it’s a conductor so like its not going to let charge build on 
your hands because its [?] a conductor so it [?can easily jump off and 
disappear]. [Pointing to his fingertips.] 
Erin:  Okay. 
John:  Before it actually builds up enough so that you’d see a spark. 
--------------------- 
Claire:  I mean they’re neutral, our hands are neutral.  No matter how much you 
rub your hands the papers aren’t going to [?jump to them.] 
Audrey: So what happens when you scuff your feet on the carpet and then you 
touch the door nob? 
Claire:  I guess it stays in your body. 
Audrey: Does it carry through our body? 
Claire:  Yes.  But I guess its just, it must be too moist. 
Return to Group Discussion: 
Erin:  Mmm-Mmmm. 
Audrey: What about two plates? 
Erin:  Didn’t we say yeah, like –  





Erin:  - that rubbing causes. 
Audrey: Maybe it has to be two different things. 
Claire:  Because they may have the same - [Rubbing two Styrofoam plates 
together.] 
Audrey: Maybe that’s why.  They have different materials. 
Claire:  Well maybe.  We’ll see. 
Audrey: ‘Cause yeah.  ‘Cause if I rub my hand –  
Claire:  Oh no that worked. [Rubbing to plates together picked up paper.] 
Audrey: Did it? 
Claire:  Well one piece moved. 
Audrey: Does it still have charge [?from] before. 
Claire:  Maybe. 
Claire:  Well also I don’t think you’re going to get two different charges from you 
hands really. 
Audrey: It should all be balanced then. 
John:  But why, why wouldn’t you get two charges on your hands if you can get 
two different charges on other things? 
Audrey: Well I can, if I take my hand and rub on her sweater then I can touch 
something spark.  I don’t think you can do two things that are made out of 
the same thing. 
Claire:  [Simultaneously with Audrey] Well your whole body is [?only one thing].  
Like this is a plate and you can charge this [Styrofoam plate].  But, but 
your whole body is kind-of like a conductor really. 
Claire:  [To John] Yeah that’s true.  Because well it could go back to like what you 
[Audrey] said before with like it travels through your body. 
John:  But like, I mean, if you touch someone’s hand, [?it’s fine], you shock each 
other. 
Audrey: Yeah. 
Claire:  You can create a charge maybe but it doesn’t stay there? 
John:  I think, I think [?it distributes]. 





John:  I don’t know if I can get like two different charged hands. 
Audrey: No. I don’t think you can.  I don’t think just from your hands.  [Rubbing 
her hands together]  I think, I think what makes the charge is two different 
substance things.  ‘Cause if you figure you walk around and then shock 
somebody, the charge is -  
Erin:   It’s the floor. Yeah.   
Audrey: - probably created from the carpet on your feet and then you carried it 
through. 
Claire:  But what about the –  
Audrey: Like if I rubbed on her sweater and I touched you I might shock you but I 
don’t think you can rub two like things together it makes any sort-of –  
John:  Right. 
Claire:  What about the tape?  Why?  Like the tape we did in lecture.  Then why 
did that get staticy that’s two of the same thing. 
Audrey: I don’t know. 
John:  Those are two separate objects.  These are not, like you have two hands 
but they’re not separate objects, its all connected. [pointing from one hand 
across his body to the other] 
 Claire: But if you rub somebody else’s hand you still don’t get it. 
Audrey: So, but that would work with the plate thing though ‘cause they’re two 
separate plates and they’re made out of the same thing. 
Claire:  Yeah.  [Rubbing two plates together.] 
Audrey: So I guess maybe if they’re… 
Claire:  [Holds the rubbed plates to the pieces of paper.]  No. 
Erin:  It’s not working. 
John:  I gotta think its because there’s moisture then –  
Claire:  I definitely think moisture with the hands. 
Audrey: Yeah. 
Claire:  But I don’t know why it doesn’t work with the plates. 
John:  If one of them is not charged to being with then –  





John:  Yeah. [?] see. 
Claire:  If, if they had no net charge to begin with, would either one of them have a 
net charge as a result of rubbing? [Reading from the tutorial.]  We said in 
lecture that if you take an uncharged balloon and rub it against uncharged 
hair, you get a charge. 
Audrey: Its still, ‘cause it like concentrates the -  
John:  Yeah ‘cause it transfers them [??] 
Claire:  It concentrates the ions? 
John:  Yeah its, its like a transfer.  Like they just rub it and like excite, excite the 
s, like [Laughing at his inability to get the words out.] excites electrons 
and they jump off the balloon. 
[3 second pause] 
Audrey: That sounds good. [Sounds not convinced.] 
John:  I’ve got a speech impediment. [Laughter.] 
Erin:  So there is a charge created when it rubbed –  
Audrey: So is there a net charge to begin with?  They’re both neutral until you start 
changing up the, I guess the balance of how they’re spread out. [Wiggling 
her fingers.] 
[7 second pause while they write on their tutorials.] 
Erin:  So charge is still created? 
Claire:  Yeah. 
Erin:  But, if the charge was there, wouldn’t we be able to pick these [pieces of 
paper] up? 
Audrey: I don’t know. 
John:  Yeah I don’t see why -  
Claire:  Why if you rub the plates aren’t they excite, like, if you rub things 
together we say that electrons get excited and whatever a charge.  But like, 
why wouldn’t it work with plates? 
Audrey: I thought it did work with plates? 
Claire:  It didn’t. 





Audrey: Is that [??]  Oh. 
Erin:  [?Yeah and it didn’t move the] [Pointing to pieces of paper.] 
Simultaneous Conversations: 
 John:  Maybe it has to be two different objects.  ‘Cause its balloon to head, cloth 
to plate. 
Claire:  But tape to tape remember? 
John:  But it was on a desk. 
Claire:  I’m pretty sure if you just took the tape [Laughter as she pulls her hand 
apart like she’s holding tape.] 
John:  I tried. [Laughter.] 
-------------------------- 
Audrey: Maybe it has to be - 
Audrey: Well if you rub two things that are the same [rubs her hands together], 
there’s nothing making them change like their plus minus normal balance. 
Return to Group Discussion: 
Claire:  The tape desk interaction. [Laughter.] 
Audrey: The stupid tape. [Pounds the table.] 
John:  Could be. 
[3 second pause] 
Audrey: Well we didn’t rub the tape together we just stuck it together and pulled it 
apart.  ‘Cause like Syran Wrap, that already has like static in it. 
Claire:  From rubbing against itself when you pull it. [ERIN nods her head.] 
Erin:  So. 
John:  Maybe foam’s not a good conductor. [Putting finger quotes around 
conductor.]  Or Styrofoam. 
Claire: No because why is, why is it a good conductor when you rub it with 
something else? 
John:  Mmmm.  [Shrugs his shoulders.] 






Claire:  Maybe it could have a small charge. 
Audrey: What happens if you rub two balloons together?  Can you stick it on the 
wall? 
Claire:  I don’t know. 
John:  I think you can rub balloons [??] 
Claire:  I don’t think it would work. 
Audrey: Because you clothes stick to themselves too like. [Laughter.]   
Claire:  Yeah. 
Audrey: Have you ever like took a shirt out, a shirt out of the dryer and went to like 
shake it to fold it and its like kcreeer [Strange sound as she scrunches up 
her body to show the shirt.]. 
Claire:  Yeah. 
Audrey: You can like hear it [Laughter] like crackling. 
Claire:  The only place I’ve seen sparks from static electricity was in my sheets 
coming out of the dryer. 
Audrey: Really? 
Claire:  [Nods her head.] 
[5 second pause.] 
Claire:  All right, I have no idea. 
Audrey: Alright. Next. [They all flip over their tutorial.] 
Claire:  The joy of tutorial. 
Audrey: I know. 
Claire:  It confuses you. [Laughter.] 
Audrey: No, no, uh closure. 
Audrey: Oh, here’s the tape thing. 
[26 second pause as they read the tutorial, flip between pages and write.] 
Audrey: Well if you play along with their little game then you say the hands are the 
same material.  ‘Cause then they’re like okay what about the plates?  And 
you’re like well yeah that makes sense.  And they say well what about the 
tape? 





Audrey: Yeah.   
Claire:  Yeah.   We did play along we just didn’t know we were. [Laughter.] 
Audrey: So we just walked through all of that now we’re on part three.  We just 
made up like every [??] 
Claire:  The tape is charged for the same material.  Why doesn’t it work with the 
plates?  I don’t know.  Let’s go to the next question. 
Audrey: Now we’re ready f - Oh we gotta, wa – we gotta do our, our TA check. [in 
finger quotes.] 
Claire:  Oh. 
Audrey:  Before we’re allowed to continue. 
John:  Are, aren’t we supposed to go in [??] fix [???] 
Erin: Yeah. Um. 
Claire:  Yeah. 
Audrey: We’re reconciling. 
Erin:  So the two pieces of tape did get a charge, but not plates. 
Audrey: So. 
Claire:  So we’re pretty much saying it depends on the material.  That we need to 
look at the properties of the materials. 
John:  [?How good] a conductor I guess.  [?Something like that]  I don’t think 
tape’s a very good conductor though. 
Claire:  No. 
John:  I’m just guessing. [Laughter.] 
Audrey: It’s probably better than foam though I guess, since it was able to generate 
[shakes her hand.] 
Claire:  No well if you think about something that might get staticy, I would think 
Styrofoam. 
John:  What are we [?] 
Claire:  Styrofoam’s really good with static.  Like that’s why this [the pith ball] is 
made out of it for sure. [5 second pause.]  Like if you rub this [rubbing 
plate with cloth], we know that this gets staticy.  [holding plate to pieces 





Audrey: Not when you do it. [Laughter.] 
Claire:  Apparently, um, that’s not right either. 
[Laughter.] 
John:  Well we saw it earlier so –  
Claire:  Yeah, but I mean does the cloth get staticy too? 
Audrey: I would assume it was, it was.  If it was hot and dry enough, just like 
sheets and the sweater come out of the dryer. 
Claire:  Yeah. 
Audrey: If it’s hot and dry.  Like this room sucks right now. 
Claire:  This room is like hot and wet. [Laughter.] 
Audrey: It is.  You have to like get the s–  
Claire:  That’s why they run the dehumidifier in here so we can get some static 
goin’ on. 
Audrey: [Inaudible comment.] 
Claire:  Um. 
John:  [??] section it is you took. 
Claire:  I know. 
Erin:  I know.  We have to go up four flights of stairs.  I’m really mad about that. 
[Laughter.] 
Claire:  I know. 
Erin:  That’s a lot. 
Audrey: Do they have a elevator? 
Erin:   You need a breather to go up one.  I know. [Laughter.] 
Claire:  Alright. 
John:  Yeah. 
Audrey: So basically we’ve decided we can’t reconcile it. 
Erin:  [? We haven’t done it yet.] 
Claire:  We basically don’t understand yet which is why we need to do the check. 
Simultaneous Conversations: 





Audrey:  - to go on and do the rest.  Yup.  That’s how it always ends up working.  
Oh no, ‘cause if we ask her she’s –  
Erin:  We – Can you come over here?  [To TA]  We don’t understand.  [TA 
comes over.]  
---------------- 
John:  So what was our predict [?], did we actually end up with a prediction? 
Claire:  A prediction for what?  What would happen with the plates? 
John:  For C.  Yeah.  Would they both [?] charge? 
Claire:  We - 
Return to Group Discussion: 
Erin:  We have help. 
TA:  You guys can keep talking.  If you’re s - keep working. 
Claire:  Well [Sigh.]  We’re, we’ve kind-of reached a point where we don’t really 
know where to go.   
TA:  Okay. 
Claire:  Because we, we’re thinking that maybe when you rub two like things 
together it won’t get a charge but then with the tape you got a charge. 
TA:  Mmmm-hmmmm. Okay. 
Claire:  And things stick to themselves.  So we’re kinda stuck. 
TA:  Okay. 
Claire:  ‘Cause we don’t know why –  
TA:  Okay, how do you mean things stick to themselves. 
Claire:  Things stick to themselves like –  
Audrey: Saran Wrap.  Tape. 
Claire:  Saran wraps sticks to itself.  Or like clothes like, like materials can stick 
together. 
Audrey: Static cling. 
TA:  Okay.  If I just have two things hanging in my closet, do they stick 
together? 





TA:  So how do you – Right.  So there’s no charge on them.  So those two 
things aren’t sticking together.  [Putting her hands together and taking 
them apart several times.] 
Claire:  Right.  Though, but -  
TA:  My hands aren’t sticking together. 
Audrey: I guess if they rubbed together. 
Claire:  It, it we, we can’t.  We’re having trouble determining what properties a 
material has to have so that when its rubbed together it becomes charged. 
TA:  Okay. 
Claire:  And what has to rub against what to charge it. 
TA:  Okay.  Okay.  So what are, what are the things you’ve thought of?  You’ve 
thought of this idea that two of the same things won’t –  
Claire:  - can. 
TA:  - can? 
Claire:  Can and sometimes don’t. 
TA:  Okay so they can and the instances when they can would be [?]? 
Claire:  Tape, t, tape, the tape. And like static cling. 
TA:  Okay.  Okay.  Let’s look at the tape.  [To another group.] Can I steal this 
from you guys?  Okay. [Tearing off pieces of tape to show the group.]  So 
in class what you guys we kind-of doing was, was something like this 
where you had one piece of tape on top of the other. 
Claire:  Mmmm-hmmm. [TA sets up tape experiment.] 
TA:  What um, what two things are touching there?  In that situation? 
Claire:  The tape to the tape and the tape to the table. 
TA:  Okay so.  [Inaudible comments.]  Is the tape the same on both sides? 
[Students shake their heads no.]  If I put the tape down like this instead, 
so, so I had the two slick sides together, would those charge? 
Claire:  No. [Mostly silence and confused looks from the students.] 
TA:  We could try it and see.  I’m not sure if like -   
Audrey: So [?there it goes, there really is] two different. [TA is putting like sides of 





Claire:  They must have been already charged. [Laughter from all students.] 
TA:  Um. 
Claire:  No, ‘cause there’s no friction. 
TA:  Okay.  Do we think friction matters then?  That’s another idea that maybe 
friction could matter. [Erin nodding her head.]  Am I making friction here? 
[TA rubs her hands together.] 
Erin:  Yeah. [Nodding their heads.]  Are my hands charging? 
Erin:  No. [Shaking their heads.] 
Audrey: They’re wet. 
Claire:  Moisture. 
John:  Yeah. 
TA:  They’re wet.  Okay. [Rubs the back of her hands together instead of the 
palms. Laughter from the students.]  My palms aren’t sweaty, I mean this 
side of my hands aren’t sweaty as far as I know.  Okay.  So one, one thing 
that you guys brought up was this idea that they’re the same, and you said 
that the tape was an example of when that didn’t work. [Students 
nodding.]  But now maybe we’re seeing that’s not the case.  That maybe 
these are two thing, two different things.  ‘Cause you’ve got this side of 
the tape which is obviously different from this side.  
Claire:  Okay. [Silence from the group.] 
TA:  So now, now what do we, what do you guys think?   
John:  [Starts saying something but is cut off by TA.] 
TA:  What would be a reason that if two things were the same electrons 
wouldn’t go back and forth? 
Claire:  ‘Cause they have the same electric –  
John:  It would be balanced [??] 
Audrey: - distribution. 
TA:  Everything’s balanced, right so –  
John:  [Inaudible comment.] 
TA:  So if I was a little electron on this plate, and, and I start rubbing these 





Claire:  No ‘cause it’s the same. [Silence from other students.] 
TA:  ‘cause it’s exactly the same.  These two things look the same to me.  So 
it’s like, you know, if I’m standing in the middle of like two Snicker’s 
bars.  And I, you know, I could equally as well have that one as that one.  
But if it was like a Snicker’s bar and green beans –  
Claire:  Yeah. [Audrey laughter.] 
TA:  Which side are we going to go to?  So maybe that’s why.  So that’s a, that 
could be an explanation for why. 
Claire:  Okay. [Other students nodding.] 
TA:  So that, that was a good idea [pointing to John], that that they, they look 
the same to them.  Can you think of anything else maybe that you might 
have done last semester that’s could be a similar kind of thing? [Students 
laughing and looking lost.]  What about with heat flowing?  With heat 
moving back and forth between two objects. 
John:  Yeah.  [Nodding his head.]  If it’s the same temperature then heats not 
going to flow.  It stays there. 
TA:  But if one is, has a higher temperature than the other, what’s gonna 
happen? 
John:  Heat goes to the other one. 
TA:  Heat’s gonna flow. 
Claire:  Okay. [Students nodding their heads.] 
TA:  Okay.  So yeah, those are all, those are all good ideas.  And I think it was, 
it was good that you guys were coming up with those contradictions.  So 
now maybe you can go back to the clothes thing and think about why do 
you s, why do you get charge between clothes. 
Claire:  ‘Cause they may not be exactly the same material.   
TA:  Mmm-hmm. 
Claire:  They may not be the same texture. 
TA:  Mmm-hmm.  When do you notice, well I don’t know if you guys do 
laundry, like, when do you most notice the static? 





John:  Dryer. 
TA:  When you pull it out of the dryer.  So what’s it been doing while it was in 
the dryer? 
Audrey: Rubbin’ everything else.  Like dry [??] 
Claire:  Rubbing.  Mmm-hmm. 
TA:  Rubbing everything else.  Rubbing on to the sides of the, you know, on to 
 the sides of the thing.  The dryer sheet.  Yeah. [Students laughter.] 
Claire:  Mmmm-hmmm. 
TA:  So you guys are doing a really good job. [Walks away] 
Claire:  Okay so we were right and wrong. [ERIN laughter.] 
Audrey: So, and we just checked with our TA, so -  
[15 second pause to write and read the tutorial.] 
Erin:  So unless they’re two different objects -  
Audrey: Like two different surfaces I guess we should say. 
Erin:  Yeah. 
Claire:  Unless they provide two different environments for the electrons –  
Erin:  They will not conduct charge. 
Claire:  So they could be like different by like a tiny bit, and it will work. 
Erin:  Okay. 
[25 second pause while they write on their tutorials] 
Claire:  Okay. 
[45 second pause to read the next section] 
Claire:  How do we know if the top or the bottom one [tape] is –  
Audrey: These ones probably aren’t charged right [picture of two tapes halfway 
together]. ‘Cause they’re not, is this like after its already been stuck 
together and you’re pulling it? [pulling apart her hands] 
Claire:  Yeah. 
Audrey: Okay.  So –  
Claire:  So basically one is plus, one is minus, but does it matter which -  
Erin:  Which piece? [?] 





Audrey: ‘Cause we don’t know which one it is. [Erin nodding her head] 
Claire:  Right. 
Audrey: Right now. 
Audrey: So does that just mean that the inside surfaces that touch are different?  Or 
like the entire piece of tape is now [?] 
Claire:  Well, when we did the tape thing -  
[Interruption from course instructor trying to learn names.] 
Claire:  [Pulls two pieces of tape off the table and away from each other, then 
brings both sides near each other] No see, but both sides stick. 
Audrey: So you think it goes like, it goes through the –  
Claire:  Like slick to slick still touches, still is attracted [ERIN nodding].  So it 
must charge the whole thing. 
Audrey: Okay.  Sounds good to me. 
John:  Why are they, why, you [Audrey] have opposite.  Or you have negatively 
attracting? 
Claire:  They attract to each other.  This is the tape thing that we did in lecture. 
John:  Right, so they [?] 
Claire:  What?  So one’s plus, one’s minus. 
John:  Okay. 
Claire:  Right. 
John:  Yeah.  Sorry. 
Erin:  So like along this whole surface of this top one would be plus? 
Claire:  I think the whole piece. 
Audrey: Once you open it, right like, this part down here [Unpulled apart section of 
tape] isn’t charged yet right?  ‘Cause you haven’t like taken it apart to 
make the – [Pulling her hands away from each other.] 
Claire:  So, can, alright.  Am I wrong in thinking of it like the actual electrons go 
to the other one? 
Erin:  That’s what I thought.  They like jump from one piece of tape to the other 
one. 





Claire:  To the other so that like the whole piece has more positives, and this 
whole piece has more negatives. 
Erin:  Has more negatives, right. 
Audrey: Okay. 
Claire:  Is that right? 
Erin:  That’s what I thought.   
Audrey: What was the thing we were talking about in class where we had that 
equal distribution of pluses and minuses.  And all the positives moved to 
one side.  [Moving her hands from right to left in front of her.]  That’s 
how it stuck to the wall. 
Claire:  Yeah. 
Audrey: So it wasn’t like removing charges from something.  Well that was –  
Claire:  But did we even, that was like a, that was like a hypothesis.  Was that even 
shown to be?  Because that wouldn’t even makes sense because that would 
mean that when you are holding that balloon, something with a negative 
charge is going to stick to this side and something with a positive charge is 
going to stick to this side.  ‘Cause if you pull all the positives to the right, 
the left side is going to be negative.  It’s gonna be polar.  Does that 
happen? 
John:  I think the negative [?one] just gets more electrons, I think.  [?And that’s 
why] 
Clare:  Like the actual electrons leave one object and go to another. 
John:  Right.  Right.  [Erin nodding her head] And I think its just, its due to like 
them getting excited, [?like us], you know what I’m saying. 
Claire:  Yeah. 
John:  Like they’ll get excited so they’ll jump up and [moving his hand up step 
levels].  ‘Cause they need ener, it takes energy for them to just transfer, 
you know. 
Claire:  To go. 





Audrey:  So if you rub ‘em then you’re making the heat energy. [rubbing her hands 
together] 
John:  Right.  Exactly.  You’re making the [?] -  
Audrey: And now that makes them “Wahohohoho.” [Shaking her hands and body] 
[? Together.] 
Claire:  Yeah.  You create energy and that energy is used to excited the electrons 
and allow them to like transfer to the other. 
John:  Transfer. 
Audrey: Then they’re about at the same [? Both sides], like –  
Erin:  [Reading] Take one of the foam plates. 
Claire:  Take one of the foam plates and rub it with [?] 
Audrey: Here’s the plate. [Drawing on the tutorial.] 
Claire:  How could we tell if it’s positive? 
Erin:  Can you tell where the plates [Reading] – I don’t think you can tell. 
Claire:  I don’t think you can tell. 
John:  Is there a [rule] that dictates which plate has which [? charge]? 
Audrey: There’s probably a way to test it, like somehow but –  
Claire:  I’m sure it depends on the material. 
Erin:  There’s no way, there’s no way to tell. 
Claire:  But I don’t think we know right now. 
Erin:  Yeah. 
Audrey: Right.  That’s what I’m sayin’.  All right that’s plus that’s minus. 
[Drawing on her tutorial.] 
John:  I mean, I’d say the plate, just guessing, I’d say the plates positive but I 
don’t have a reason for that.  I’d say that –  
Claire:  I was going to say the plate was negative, but that was just guessing. 
[Laughter.] 
John:  I like, I would say that, it just seems to me that electrons.  This [the cloth] 
looks like it could hold electrons to me. [Laughter.] 
Claire:  ‘Cause its soft.  There’s room for them. [Laughter.] 





[Laughter from group,]  
Audrey: They’d slide off the plate. 
Claire:  It’s roomier. 
John:  It’s quilted, you see. 
Audrey: It’s like toilet paper. [Laughter from group.] 
Claire:  Alright we’ll make the plate positive. Alright? 
John:  Thank you.  Appreciate that. [Laughter.] 
Audrey: Okay to total’s interchangeable with net so that answers our question from 
the homework. [Reading.] 
Claire:  Oh.  I was trying to do my homework.  I got through the first two 
problems but then the third one when you need to like learn something. 
Erin:  Yeah that’s –  
Audrey: Me too. 
[Laughter.] 
Erin:  I know. 
Audrey: Like a formula or something. 
Erin:  Um.  A bunch of us are meeting at four today after our lab in the course 
center. 
Audrey: And that’s gonna to be our homework time.  We’re gonna be there at four. 
Erin:  If you wanna work on the homework with us. 
Claire:  After lab? [Erin and Audrey nodding.]  Yes, I can do that. 
Audrey:  [?] we should try to get a group together. 
Claire:  [??] Ooh.  I have to remember.  I have to hand mine in early. 
Audrey: Are you going away to run or something? 
Claire:  [Nodding her head.]  Probably this weekend so I have to either hand it in 
like tomorrow or Thursday morning. 
Audrey: Thursday morning sounds good. [Laughter.] 
Claire:  Yeah.  Especially because I need to kinda learn something tomorrow to 
finish my homework. 





Erin:  I know.  I don’t know how they expect us to do the homework and not 
teach us anything. 
Claire:  Alright. 
[10 second pause as they read the tutorial.] 
Audrey: [Reading.] Net charge on the pair of tapes.  Well together they would be –  
Claire:  Same thing as force.  Like force. 
Audrey: -It would be like zero. 
John:  I mean together they should be in equilibrium right? 
Audrey: Yeah. 
John:  For part, for like, for this part ‘cause the tape is still - 
Claire:  They should, they should be. 
John:  They should be, together. Because you’re not – [Touching his fingertips 
together.] 
Claire:  Neither one was charged when it was by itself. [Pulling her hands apart 
from one another.] 
John:  No they were charged but they were balanced.  They say “no charge, that 
would be misleading.” [Quoting from the tutorial.] 
Claire:  They were neutral. [Laughing.]  I obviously didn’t read carefully enough. 
Erin:  How are we supposed to know?  How are we supposed to know if one is 
[??]? 
Audrey: Well. 
Erin:  There’s no way to know. 
Audrey: No.  There probably is a little bit different.  [???]  I think they’re tryin’ to -   
Claire:  They weren’t charged in relation to each –  
John:  Like they attract. 
Audrey: Their net charges probably. 
John:  They have, they’re net charge for the two of them is zero.  Like they each 
have the positives and the negatives. [Moving his hands back and forth in 
front of each other.] 
Claire:  But their net charge is still zero. 





Audrey: ‘Cause as much as one lost by that one [? Gained] by. 
Claire:  Okay.  Say, say you could count the, the charge as like plus four or minus 
four, you know. 
John:  Right. 
Claire:  So if these two objects are, [Picks up a plate and a cloth and holds them 
together.] you know, whatever they haven’t touched, they’re not static. 
John:  Alright. 
Claire:  You rub ‘em. [Rubs plate and cloth together.] This one loses four this one 
gains four. 
John:  Right. 
Audrey: So then, together - 
Claire:  There’s still [?a/no] net charge of zero. 
John:  Right, but, yeah.  It’s -  
Claire:  And initially there’s a net charge of zero, but was there any charge at all? 
John:  Initially there’s be a net charge of zero but it’s equally distributed.  So –  
Claire:  Yeah. 
John:   - one of them [???] On the whole system there’s still a net charge of zero, 
but whenever it’s –  
Audrey: Conservation of charge. [Laughter.] 
Erin:  Oh yes. 
Claire:  We’re learning.  Okay.  So in part A –  
Audrey: So do we think that –  
Claire:  - the net charge was zero, because neither one.  They were both neutrally 
charged. 
Audrey: ‘Cause in theory they, yeah.  
John:  Yeah. [Erin nods her head.] 
[5 second pause.] 
Erin:  What you said.  What one gains the other loses so the bal, its always 
balanced. 
Claire:  But wait.  No they’re not the same charge.  They’re just neutral. 





Claire:  Okay. [All writing on their tutorials.] 
John:  Yeah.  It’s not.  Because if they were the same charge they’d repel. 
Claire:  Right. 
John:  And same with B then. [Referencing part B of the tutorial.] 
Audrey: Yeah. 
John:  And the charge [?just doesn’t] 
Audrey: I think they’re just trying to throw us ‘cause its two different materials but 
its still only just shifting the way its – [Moving her hands from side to 
side.] 
[4 second pause while students write in their tutorial.] 
Claire:  [?] part B, are they asking about after its been rubbed? 
John:  I’m just going to explain it as if it’s [?] 
Claire:  As, yeah. 
[4 second pause while students write in their tutorial.] 
Audrey: ‘Cause it’s zero before like the other one.  And it’s zero after still. [Erin 
nods her head.] [8 second pause for writing in tutorial.]  I think it’s getting 
like, warmer in here.  My face. 
Claire:  I know.  I’m like sweating.  
Audrey: Yeah.  [6 second pause.] Yeah.  They were consistent ‘cause we have one 
until giving it away plus or minus [??] [Responding to a tutorial question.]  
Like anybody’s gonna draw three pluses and one minus or something.  
Like here’s another positive charge to put on the plate.  [Pulls a “charge” 
out of her back pocket and slams it on the table.] 
Claire:  But how do we know that? 
Erin:  How do we know –  
Claire:  Well because we d, they would just fly off into nowhere.  They’d have to 
be conserved. 
Erin:  Mmm-hmm. 
Claire:  Conservation of –  
Erin:   Charge. 





Erin:  Yeah. [Audrey laughter.] 
Claire:  Is it?  That’s an actual theory. 
Erin:  I thi, I read that in the book. 
Audrey: I think, I think I saw that in the book. 
Erin:  Yeah. 
Claire:  It’s like the little conservation thing that keeps things simple. 
Erin:  Mmm-hmm. 
Audrey: Yeah.  Momentum.  Energy.  Charge.  Water. 
Claire:  [?] Follow the ongoing theme in this class. 
Audrey: We never make charge. [Reading.] 
Claire:  How would they be consistent with our answers from part A? 
Audrey: ‘Cause they’re balanced.  If you add the two of them together you get 
zero. 



























































Appendix I: Transcript of Student Interview about Qualifier Problem 
Interviewer: So what I guess I would like for you to do is actually just to through your 
solution on the board. 
Ben:   Okay. 
Interviewer: [Laughter] And um, just talk me through what you did and why you did it, 
I guess, and why it seemed reasonable to you.  If you can remember why it 
seemed reasonable to you at the time or if -  
Ben:   Uh-huh. 
Interviewer: Why it now seems reasonable to you to do it that way. 
Ben:  So do it the same way I did it here? 
Interviewer: Um –  
Ben:  Is what I should do? 
Interviewer: Yes. But if, I mean, you said to me that there were some sort of 
supplemental things that went into that.  So if you remember those, or, do 
you see what I’m saying? 
Ben:  Yeah, yeah, okay. 
Interviewer: Yeah, I mean, if there is additional information that you feel is relevant to 
how you did the problem then that’s fine. 
Ben: So I guess I started by drawing a picture there (draws on board) and – You 
know can this thing even hear me with my voice like this? 
Interviewer: Yeah. 
Ben: Okay.  And the problem said this was height equal to zero (writes h=0 
next to top), so potential energy is zero up here (writes V=0 on board).  
And there’s the chain. 
Interviewer: So it actually does, oh it does say height equals zero there.  Okay.  And so 
why did, why is potential energy zero there? 
Ben:  Because that’s where they defined the h equals zero point. 






Ben:  Right.  Because the only thing that has physical meaning is a change in p 
  otential energy. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  A difference in potential energy between two points. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  So you can call the zero point wherever you want. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  So what, problem one says find the potential energy of that chain? 
Interviewer: Um, I think it asks you, yes, what is the potential energy and then what is 
the Lagrangian. 
Ben: Okay.  So I’m sure the way, I’m ve, quite sure the way the way I went 
about this at the time, its still the way I go about problems like this, is uh, 
each different bit of this chain that’s hanging down here is going to 
contribute a different amount to the potential energy because it’s a 
different distance away from our reference line. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  So you have to somehow sum up all these little parts. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  And well, that’s gonna be an integral. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben: So, the, the thing that always goes thr, through my mind is pick out a little 
representative element –  
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  You know, so something like that (boxes a piece of chain) 
Interviewer: Um-hm. 
Ben: And just try to write, you know, what the contribution to the potential 
energy would be for that little part right there. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  And then you can worry about integrating over all the - 
Interviewer: The little points. 






Ben: So, I guess, thinking about this representative element here was what I was 
doing in the first few lines here. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben: So I, I said on here, you know, define a linear mass density that is the 
mass of the chain over its length (writes eqn on board) 
Interviewer: Um-hm. 
Ben: And if that’s true, then if we’re talking about a little tiny piece of chain, 
you know, you just make this (mass) infinitesimally small and that 
(length) infinitesimally small.  You could say dl times lambda is dm 
(writes ldl=dm). 
Interviewer: Okay.  And why did you, why were you wanting to find the mass?  Or the, 
why, why were you doing this? 
Ben:   Why was I doing this? (points to infinitesimal equation) 
Interviewer: Mm-mm. 
Ben: Because I need to some, I’m thinking in the back of my mind I need to 
somehow integrate over, you know, the little contributions to the potential 
energy from each point along this chain. (writes integral dU over chain) 
Interviewer: Okay.  And the mass matters in contributing to the potential energy? 
Ben:  Right, right. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  Um, U is mgh. (writes U = mgh on board) 
Interviewer: Okay so you’re thinking for each individual point, that contributes to the 
total U by some factor mgh. 
Ben:  Right. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  Right.  And, you know, I’m thinking in the back of my mind I want to do 
an integral I need infinitesimals here (in integral equation) –  
Interviewer: Okay. 






Ben: [Laughter drinking water.] So, I mean lookin’ at this now, I don’t think my 
notation is, is ex, totally correct in here. 
Interviewer: Okay, it’s okay. 
Ben:  But, I’ll just copy what I have here (writes U = in front of dU integral) 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  There.  Um, the total potential energy here, I have to integrate all the U’s –  
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben: - over the chain.  So like I said U is m (writes dm), g, h (writes l).  So I 
have to somehow, now here I’m mixing things because when I integrated 
over the chain, l is just kind of the variable that will sweep out up and 
down here (pointing to the hanging part of the chain) 
Interviewer: Right. 
Ben: That was the, the way I gonna go from here to here (chain at table to chain 
bottom). 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben: So, l from zero (writes bottom limit l=0) to l equals to what I call h prime 
(writes l=h’ upper limit), you know, down here. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben: At the bottom of the chain.  Now, I mean, that’s not technically correct, I 
can see that now, cause my infinitesimal is kind-of an m here –  
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben: And so this is really, I’m just kind-of noting to myself, I gotta somehow 
sweep out (pointing to hanging chain), you know, consider every point 
along that chain, and here that’s my notation for how I’m going to do that 
(gesturing up and down on the integral in the same way he did it over the 
chain). 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben: So then, what did I do?  Let’s see here.  Because I guess I have written on 
this paper “but h prime equals l over 2 plus x of t.” (writes but h’=l/2 + 
x(t))  So that must have been, I guess I was concerned that ultimately the 





equation of motion in terms of this function (writes x(t)) that they gave me 
in the problem. 
Interviewer: Right. 
Ben: So I guess I was concerned that, you know, I, I have to somehow work in 
the problem’s given notation into the way I’m doin’ this problem.  
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben: And so I guess that’s, I was gonna replace what I naturally called h prime 
with this equation here (points to h’ equation). 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben: And that makes sense ‘cause (back at diagram) its like, the chain started 
out half here and half here (pointing on table and off) –  
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  And whatever extra distance it goes down is what they defined as x –  
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben: And so to sweep out however much chain is here you gotta go from zero 
to (points to h’ equation) wherever. 
Interviewer: So the U is also gonna be changing with time? 
Ben:  Yes because the uh, the chain is, the chain’s gonna be moving –  
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  - in this event.  
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben: So if the chain moves more of its hanging down further and U’s gonna 
change. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben: It’s kinda, yeah, I mean, the thing that went through my mind there was 
we want to find the equation of motion for this chain so we have to allow 
the potential energy of it to change. 
Interviewer:  Okay. 
Ben:  If you want it to move in time. 
Interviewer: Right. 






Ben: So yeah, um, let’s see.  On the next line I guess I wrote, I called this 
negative too (puts negative in front of U integral) because I’m below my 
reference point. (points to drawing vertical part). 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  So potential energy has to be negative. 
Interviewer: Mm-hmm. 
Ben:  If I’m calling this way (points down) negative. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben: So the next line it seems I wrote I’m integrating from zero to l over to plus 
x of t (writes limits on integral on board). 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben: And I did this little substitution here (pointing to dm equation and writing 
ldl in integral) 
Interviewer: Mm-hmm. 
Ben: So uh, lambda dl in for dm.  So I’ve got lambda g l dl. (writes lgldl in 
integral). 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  Yeah okay so that’s - 
Interviewer: And that l was the same l as you’d been using?  [T pointing to diagram] 
That’s the same l as you were using for, l as it were? 
Ben:  Here? (pointing to h’ equation) 
Interviewer: Yeah. 
Ben: Right, okay so, yeah, now at this point you’ll see on my paper these little 
primes mysteriously appear here (writes primes on the l’s on the board). 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  Because, you’re right, they’re not the same l. 
Interviewer: Okay, okay. 
Ben: Technically speaking. Yeah, this l [in limit] is distinct from these l’s [in 
integral].  These [in integral] are just integration variables to help me 






Ben:  This [in limit] is a given parameter of the problem. 
Interviewer: Oh, I see, I see, I see. 
Ben: Okay, so now I’m just thinkin’, I mean this seems to have led me to the 
right answer, but I want to try to understand why I put those limits on 
there. 
Interviewer: Mm-hmm. 
Ben: Like, so l prime is apparently my coordinate locating myself along this 
length of chain (pointing to part of chain hanging off). 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  So l prime equals zero up here –  
Interviewer: Mm-hmm. 
Ben:  And I’m gonna sweep out ‘til l prime, which is the same as h prime –  
Interviewer: Mm-hmm. 
Ben:  - equals where it started (pointing to l/2 in upper limit), half and half –  
Interviewer: Mm-hmm. 
Ben: - plus however extra long its moved.  So yeah, I, I can see this, these limits 
of integration (pointing to limits) are gonna let me sweep out (pointing to 
diagram), at any given time (points to t in upper limit), however much of 
the chain is hanging here (pointing to chain off table in diagram). 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  So then, okay.  So that’s great, now that’s just an integral you can do that. 
Interviewer: Right. 
Ben:  And work, work, work and you get to the answer that I came up with. 
Interviewer: Okay.  Okay.  Great.  And, I’m trying to think.  Hmm.  Okay, no, no, no, 
I’m good.  Go ahead.  Great. 
Ben:  Okay.  Okay. So that’s, uh, U and I guess if you want the Lagrangian you 
need to know the kinetic energy also.  So, I mean that’s, I’m sure I 
remember thinking at the time, “boy it can’t be that easy, can it?”  But, I 
mean, it is.  If it’s an inextensible, inextensible chain, every bit of that 






Ben:  So, you know, kinetic energy is one half m v squared (writes t = 1/2mv2 
on board) there by definition.  You know, every bit of that chain is moving 
at the same velocity, so this (v) is just gonna be constant of the length of 
the chain. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  Not constant in time because its speeding up (motions hands down across 
the diagram). 
Interviewer: Right. 
Ben:  And uh, you know, you can look at how fast x of t is changing (write x(t) 
on the board at start of chain), you know and that’s going to be how fast 
this, this first little bit of chain is moving, which I just said is the same as 
how fast every bit of the chain is moving.  So v here (in T equation) is just 
gonna be, you know, the first derivative of x -  (writes ½ mx2). 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  - squared, in time.  So then yeah, the Lagranian is T minus U (writes L = T 
– U). 
Interviewer: So why is it that for the potential energy you have to sum up over every 
little point but for the kinetic energy you can just say the whole thing is 
like one point? 
Ben:  Oh, so technically I did sum up over al, everything. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  And I did that when I argued that, you know, you can say the kinetic 
energy of the ith little bit of -   
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  - chain is one half the mass of that little tiny bit times however fast it 
happens to be movin’ squared (writes Ti = 1/2mixi2). 
Interviewer: Got it.   
Ben:  And I just got into that implicitly ‘cause I said, every bit’s movin’, every 






Ben:  So I, I did, I summed up for the kinetic energy too but I just did it 
implicitly. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  Using the mass of the whole chain. 
Interviewer: Okay.  Okay. Cool.  Um, and the potential energy didn’t work that way 
because, why did potential energy not work that, why couldn’t you do it 
that easily for potential energy? 
Ben:   Oh, why couldn’t I, okay, why couldn’t I just do the sum implicitly? 
Interviewer: Yeah. 
Ben:   Because, um, here, each little bit, you know, this bit and that bit (boxing 
out pieces of chain on the diagram) and that bit and that bit –  
Interviewer: Uh-huh. 
Ben:  - they all contributed equally to the kinetic energy. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  You know, that’s [mass] the same and that’s [velocity] the same for each 
bit. 
Interviewer: Mm-hmm.  Okay. 
Ben:  So you can just do an algebraic sum really. 
Interviewer: Mm-hmm. 
Ben:  But, uh, for the potential energy, you know the amount this bit [in middle 
of hanging part] contributes –  
Interviewer: Mm-hmm. 
Ben:  - is, uh,  different than the amount this bit [bottom of hanging part] 
contributes to the potential energy. 
Interviewer: Because? 
Ben:  Because they’re at different heights. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  Now, I mean, there’s a way, because, I mean, I don’t think I thought this at 
the time, or if I did I couldn’t see an easy way to make it work.  But, I 
mean, I could see now there’s uh, kind-of an easy way because the 






Ben:  - things are gonna average out.  I mean, that bit and that bit [top and 
bottom] added together will give the same contribution as that bit and that 
bit [next to top and next to bottom]. 
Interviewer: Got it. 
Ben:  So there’s a way to do a center of mass argument there too, but –  
Interviewer: Yeah, that’s fine.  Okay.  Okay, great.  Cool, so then, uh, let’s see.  The 
equation of motion.  Well, you could just, I mean, how did you do the 
equation of motion? 
Ben:  Okay. 
Interviewer: How did you find the equation of motion? 
Ben:  Can I erase this? 
Interviewer: Yes you can.  
Ben:  Okay. [Erases board but leaves diagram]  Okay, so the equation of motion. 
I mean, on this paper, I started with the physical fact that once you have a 
Lagrangian, which I figured out in part a.  Then this relation [Lagrange’s 
Equation which he writes up] here is just a physical fact of nature.  I mean 
–  
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  In, in my mind, this [Lagrange’s equation] is on par with this [F = ma]. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  I mean that’s, and really this [Lagrange’s] is just a, you know, fancy  
  repackaging of this [F=ma]. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  You know, its basically in terms of energy instead of forces but um - 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  - and, yeah that –  
Interviewer: So then you just crank out the algebra of that. 
Ben:  Right. 
Interviewer: Okay, great, great.  And so then gives you, what did you have for your 





Ben:  Okay, so, um, yeah.  Yeah so, I mean, crank away partial derivatives are 
easy –  
Interviewer: Right.  Yeah, yeah, yeah I don’t need you to actually do that. 
Ben:  And, okay, so at the very end I came up with [writes eqn on board] that. 
Interviewer: Okay, so then the next part asks you to solve for c of t. 
Ben:  Right.  Okay, so –  
Interviewer: So what did you do for that? 
Ben:  What I did, you know at the time I remember thinkin’, well you know, 
that’s, yeah, a little difficult.  I don’t exactly know how to solve this 
equation, but I would know how to solve something like this [writes up 
homogeneous eqn]. 
Interviewer: What is that thing in front of the first y? 
Ben:  Oh, its just some constant. 
Interviewer: Oh, okay, got it. 
Ben:  You know, um, this is just an exponential solution. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:   Right here.  And, you know, I wasn’t exactly sure, I couldn’t just write 
down the solution –  
Interviewer: Mm-hmm. 
Ben:  - you know, it wasn’t a pre-packaged thing in my head.  How to, you 
know, just write down a solution dealing with this inhomogeneous term 
right here. (pointing to g/2 term on board). 
Interviewer: Okay, 
Ben:  So what I then tried to do was switch variables. (motioning back and forth 
with hands) 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  Right, you know, redefine this equation here, or the function c –  
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  - in a clever way that would leave me to this equation. 
Interviewer: Okay. 






Ben:  And then once I solved it for y, I could then go back by definition to how c 
relates to y and –  
Interviewer: Right. 
Ben:  - go backwards that way. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  So, the first time I tried to do it I said let y of t equal g over 2 minus c, uh, 
g over l c of t (writes “Let y(t) = g/2 – g/lc(t)” on board)  Which, you 
know, is is really kinda silly because, I, I just, this this [putting g/l in front 
of c] was just a rote mistake, you know. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  I just missed that positive [from eom] and made it minus [in redefining 
variable]. 
Interviewer: Oh I see. 
Ben:  So the correct way to do it, which that’s why I scribbled all this out 
(pointing to his paper). 
Interviewer: Oh I see. 
Ben:  And then, you know – 
Interviewer: So you made that a positive? 
Ben:  That, right, right.   
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  Unfortunately not before working it all out with the minus here. 
Interviewer: Ahh. Got it. 
Ben:  I mean the reason you need a mi, plus here is because that [redefined y], 
then just makes the left hand side of this equation, you know, just y. 
Interviewer: Uh-huh.  Uh-huh. 
Ben:  And then, um, if you’re gonna talk about how does y change in time –  
Interviewer: Mm-hmm. 






Ben:  And its just gonna be, that. (writes g/l c double dot, erases it for y double 
dot.) 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  So now you have, now, I’m just looking back here to be sure that’s what I 
did on here.  [17 second pause] Oh right, I screwed that up.  If this 
[redefinition of y] is true, then, I screwed it up up here [on board] on here 
[on his solution] its right. 
Interviewer: Oh, okay. 
Ben:  If this is your definition 
Interviewer: Mm-hmm. 
Ben:  Then, uh, the second derivative of y equals that [writes g/l c double dot]. 
Interviewer: Okay, 
Ben:  And then, I mean you’re, you’re rearranging this equation 
[inhomogeneous EOM] so you care about what this is (c double dot). 
Interviewer: Mm-hmm. 
Ben:  So its l over g y double dot is c double dot. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  And then, then, this half of the equation is just y [LHS EOM] and this half 
over here [RHS EOM] is l over g y double dot. (Writes this on board and 
boxes it) 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  So that, that’s the easy, simple exponential equation of motion that I know 
I can solve. 
Interviewer: Okay. 
Ben:  So that’s what I did here, um.  I know the solution is, you know, a sum of 
the positive exponential and the negative exponential. 
Interviewer: Mm-hmm. 
Ben:  With some constants in front of ‘em.  And, you can get those two 
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